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Abstract
The first essay (Chapter 2) shows that changes in gambling attitudes affect asset prices
and corporate decisions. Using the Internet search volume for lottery-related keywords to
capture gambling sentiment shifts, we show that when the overall gambling sentiment is
high, investor demand for lottery-like stocks increases, stocks with lottery-like
characteristics earn positive abnormal returns in the short-run, managers are more likely
to announce stock splits to cater to the increased demand for low-priced lottery stocks,
and IPOs perceived as lotteries earn higher first-day returns. Further, the sentiment-return
relation is stronger among low institutional-ownership firms and in regions where
gambling is more acceptable.
The second essay (Chapter 3) examines the relation between social attributes and stock
returns. As investors regularly update their beliefs on firm-level CSR records, they are
likely to rebalance their portfolios to include firms with good social attributes. Using a
novel measure to identify perceived social attributes, we demonstrate that stocks with
good perceived social attributes have better future returns. A trading strategy that attempts
to exploit demand-based return predictability generates an annualized risk adjusted
performance of 14% and spans 15-36% of the market. Further, institutional trading results
show that institutions have consistently higher demand for firms with good perceived
social attributes. Our findings suggest that perceived social attributes predict stock
returns.
The third essay (Chapter 4) investigates how social attributes affect mutual fund flows.
Using social sensitivity estimates to capture fund-level social attributes perceived by the
market, we show that mutual funds with good social attributes attract 0.13% higher
monthly flows than their counterparts. In addition, these funds experience greater
appreciation in flows following good performance and lower decline in flows following
bad performance. When investors increase demand for corporate social responsibility,
funds perceived to have poor social attributes experience 0.5% reduction in monthly fund
flows. Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that mutual fund investors value
social attributes when making investment decisions.
xAbbreviations
ADR American Depositary Receipt
ADS Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti
AMEX American Stock Exchange
ASVI Abnormal search volume intensity
BSI Buy-Sell Imbalance
CRSP Center for Research on Security Prices
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
CUSIP Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures
DEF Default Spread
DGTW Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers
DIV Dividend Yield
EBSI Excess Buy-Sell Imbalance
ESG Environment Social and Corporate Governance
FACPR Factor to Adjust Price
FACSHR Factor to Adjust Shares Outstanding
HML Value Factor
IPO Initial Public Offering
KLD Kinder Lydenberg and Domini
LIDX Lottery Index
LIQ Liquidity Factor
LTR Long-Term Reversal Factor
MKTRF Market Excess Return
MOM Momentum Factor
MP Monthly Growth in Industrial Production
NASDAQ National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations
NASPL North American Association of State and Provincial Lotteries
NBER National Bureau of Economic Research
NYSE New York Stock Exchange
REC Recession Indicator
xi
REIT Real Estate Investment Trust
RP Monthly Default Risk Premium
S&L Savings and Loan Association
SIC Standard Industry Classification
SMB Size Factor
SRI Socially Responsible Investing
STR Short-Term Reversal Factor
SVI Search Volume Intensity
TERM Term Spread
TNA Total Net Asset
TS Term Spread
UEI Unexpected Inflation
UMD Momentum Factor
UNEMP Unemployment Rate
USD U.S. Dollar
USSIF U.S. Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment
VIX Daily Market Volatility Index
YLD Yield on the 90-day Treasury Bill
1Chapter 1
Introduction
There is considerable interest among academics in examining the effect of investor
attention on financial market outcomes. Among others, Barber and Odean (2008) shows
that with limited attention, individual investors are likely to be net buyers of attention
grabbing stocks. In addition, Antoniou, Kumar, and Maligkris (2016) show that attention
to negative events could also affect the investment decision of more sophisticated
investors such as equity analysts. Further, investor attention not only has influence on
different types of investors, but also on various market outcomes such as analyst forecasts
(Antoniou, Kumar, and Maligkris, 2016), earnings announcements reactions (e.g.,
DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009; Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh, 2009), and initial public offering
(IPO) returns (Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2011).
When examining the impact of attention on the stock market, early empiricists face a
substantial challenge: there are no direct measures of investor attention. Therefore, they
use indirect measures to proxy for investor attention. These indirect proxies include
extreme returns (Barber and Odean, 2008), trading volume (Gervais, Kaniel, and
Mingelgrin, 2001; Hou, Peng, and Xiong, 2009), news and headlines (Yuan, 2011),
advertising expense (Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston, 2004; and Lou, 2014), and price
limits (Seasholes and Wu, 2007).
More recently, Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) propose a novel measure to directly
capture investor attention. Specifically, they use the search volume intensity (SVI)
reported by Google Trends as a direct attention measure. As Google is the largest search
engine in the world and accounts for about 70% of total search volume in the U.S. as of
2013, Google search volume is likely to represent the online search behavior of the general
public.
In this thesis, I investigate the impact of investor attention on various financial market
outcomes with a novel and objective measure for overall attention. Specifically, I use a
new feature in Google Trends called topic search. According to Google, the topic search
2feature aggregates online search queries in different languages and different keywords as
long as they are related to the topic of interest.1
Using the new topic search feature in Google Trends, I investigate the impact of
investor attention on various financial market outcomes. Specifically, Chapter 2 examines
how the time-variation in gambling attitudes affects asset prices and corporate decision. I
use the SVIs for the topic “lottery” to capture shifts in investors’ gambling attitudes. In
Chapters 3 and 4, I change my perspective and investigate whether perceived social
attributes affect stock returns and mutual fund flows. In these two chapters, I use the return
sensitivity with respect to SVIs for the topic “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) to
identify stocks and mutual funds that are likely to be perceived by investors as having
good social attributes in the recent past. In the remaining part of this chapter, I briefly
describe the motivations and key findings of the three essays.
Chapter 2 investigates whether changes in gambling attitudes affect stock returns and
corporate decisions. An emerging literature in finance examines the potential link between
gambling behavior and financial market outcomes. Recent theoretical studies predict that
investors would be willing to accept a negative return premium for stocks with positively-
skewed returns (e.g., Shefrin and Statman, 2000; Brunnermeier, Gollier, and Parker, 2007;
Mitton and Vorkink, 2007; Barberis and Huang, 2008). Stocks with lottery-like payoffs
are overpriced in the short-run and earn a negative average risk-adjusted return in the
long-run. Empirical research on the effects of gambling attitudes has typically focused on
the cross-sectional variation in gambling preferences and their impact on financial market
outcomes (e.g., Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw, 2011; Kumar, Page, and Spalt, 2011). For
example, Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2011) find that investors’ gambling preferences vary
geographically impact stock returns as well as corporate policies.
In Chapter 2, I study how the time-variation in overall gambling attitudes affects
various stock market outcomes.2 I posit that attention to low-probability payoffs in one
1 One potential limitation of Google search data is that the data are only available from 2004. Therefore,
research using Google data tends to have a relatively short sample period.
2 Google search volume mainly captures the attention of retail investors. Chapter 2 focuses on retail
investors since institutional investors are more constrained when buying lottery-like stocks (e.g., Kumar,
Page, and Spalt, 2011). Therefore, the Google measure is appropriate. In addition, since retail investors
could invest through institutional investors like mutual funds, retail attention could also affect institutional
trading. Further, Ben-Rephael, Da, and Israelsen (2017) show that Google measure is positively correlated
with institutional investors’ attention measure (i.e., search in Bloomberg).
3setting may motivate individuals to overweight low-probability events in other related
economic settings. Specifically, I conjecture that an increase in overall attitudes toward
gambling (i.e., gambling sentiment) is likely to generate price pressure on stocks with
lottery-like characteristics. Consequently, if arbitrage costs are high, the return of these
stocks may be predictable in the short-run. In addition, corporate financial decisions could
be affected as firms respond to changes in investors’ gambling attitudes and their impact
on asset prices.
Consistent with my conjecture, I find that when the overall gambling sentiment is high,
investor demand for lottery-like stocks increases, stocks with lottery-like characteristics
earn positive abnormal returns in the short-run, managers are more likely to announce
stock splits to cater to the increased demand for low-priced lottery stocks, and IPOs
perceived as lotteries earn higher first-day returns. Overall, these findings suggest that
changes in investors’ gambling attitudes have a positive spillover effect on stock market
outcomes.
Chapter 3 examines whether perceived social attributes affect stock returns. Survey
evidence suggests that investors are actively updating their beliefs about firm-level CSR
records. Therefore, their recent perception on firm-level social attributes could affect their
investment decisions. In particular, investors are likely to invest more in firms with good
perceived social attributes. To investigate the effect of perceived social attributes on stock
prices, I propose a novel measure to identify firms that are likely to be perceived as having
good social attributes by the market. Specifically, I use social sensitivity, defined as the
return sensitivity to the aggregate attention to CSR, to capture perceived social attributes.
I conjecture that there will be predictable return patterns of socially sensitive firms and
industries that can be identified ex-ante.
Consistent with the conjecture that perceived social attributes affect stock returns, I
find that stocks with the most positive social sensitivity have better future returns. A
trading strategy that attempts to exploit demand-based return predictability generates an
annualized risk adjusted performance of 14% and spans 15-36% of the market. Further,
institutional trading results show that institutions have consistently higher demand for
firms with the most positive social sensitivity.
4Relatedly, in Chapter 4, I investigate whether social attributes affect the investment
decisions of mutual fund investors. Recent literature on mutual funds demonstrates that
mutual fund investors care about fund attributes. Among others, Kumar, Niessen-Ruenzi,
and Spalt (2015) document that investors are likely to avoid funds managed by individuals
with foreign-sounding names even if these funds do not have inferior return performance.
In addition, to pursue social objectives, mutual fund investors are willing to accept lower
risk-adjusted returns (e.g., Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang, 2008). Further, fund
attributes could also influence the flow-return sensitivity of mutual funds (e.g., Bollen,
2007; Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang, 2011).
Motivated by these studies, in Chapter 4, I investigate whether potential stereotypes
associated with a fund’s social attributes affect the investment decision of mutual fund
investors. Since socially responsible investing (SRI) has become an important criterion to
mutual fund investors, I ask whether investors are more likely to invest in funds that are
perceived to have good social attributes. In addition, I also examine whether perceived
social attributes influence flow-return sensitivity. My key conjecture is that funds
perceived to have good social attributes attract higher flows even if these funds do not
have superior return performance. In addition, I posit that these funds are likely to be
rewarded more following good performance and punished less following the bad
performance.
Consistent with my conjecture, I find that monthly flows are around 0.1 percent higher
for funds with good perceived social attributes. In addition, compared to equity funds with
comparable characteristics, funds with good social attributes experience 0.19 percentage
lower outflows when their recent performance is in the bottom decile of all mutual funds
and 0.46 percentage higher inflows per month when their recent performance is in the top
decile. Collectively, results in Chapters 3 and 4 show that investors value social attributes
when making investment decisions, and their trading behavior affects stock returns and
mutual fund flows.
Collectively, this thesis shows that investor attention affects investment decisions of
both retail and institutional investors. Using the topic search data from Google Trends as
a novel and direct measure for investor attention, I show that the time-variation in
investors’ gambling attitudes affect stock prices and corporate decisions such as stock
5splits and initial public offerings. In addition, using social sensitivity to capture the
perceived social attributes of stocks and mutual funds, we show that investors demand for
stocks with good perceived social attributes and are more tolerate toward mutual funds
with good perceived social attributes. Overall, this these contributes to the literature by
providing new evidence on the impacts of investor attention on different financial market
outcomes from a time-varying perspective.
6Chapter 2
Searching for Gambles: Investor Attention, Gambling
Sentiment, and Stock Market Outcomes
2.1. Introduction
An emerging literature in finance examines the potential link between gambling
behavior and financial market outcomes. Recent theoretical studies predict that investors
would be willing to accept a negative return premium for stocks with positively-skewed
returns (e.g., Shefrin and Statman, 2000; Brunnermeier, Gollier, and Parker, 2007; Mitton
and Vorkink, 2007; Barberis and Huang, 2008). Stocks with lottery-like payoffs are
overpriced in the short-run and earn a negative average risk-adjusted return in the long-
run. Empirical research on the effects of gambling attitudes has typically focused on the
cross-sectional variation in gambling preferences and their impact on financial market
outcomes (e.g., Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw, 2011; Kumar, Page, and Spalt, 2011). For
example, Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2011) find that investors’ gambling preferences vary
geographically impact stock returns as well as corporate policies.
In this paper, we study how the time-variation in overall gambling attitudes affects
various stock market outcomes. We posit that attention to low-probability payoffs in one
setting may motivate individuals to overweight low-probability events in other related
economic settings. Specifically, we conjecture that an increase in overall attitudes toward
gambling (i.e., gambling sentiment) is likely to generate price pressure on stocks with
lottery-like characteristics. Consequently, if arbitrage costs are high, the return of these
stocks may be predictable in the short-run. In addition, corporate financial decisions could
be affected as firms respond to changes in investors’ gambling attitudes and their impact
on asset prices.
To test these conjectures, we develop a novel measure of gambling sentiment of
investors using Google’s search volume intensity (SVI) for lottery-related keywords. We
first examine the effects of gambling sentiment on stock returns. We focus on a segment
of the U.S. stock market in which stocks have lottery-like return distributions. Following
7Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2016), we define lottery-like stocks as those with low nominal
share prices, high idiosyncratic skewness, and high idiosyncratic volatility. These stocks
are also associated with low average returns, high return volatility and high turnover
(Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong, 2006; Grinblatt and
Keloharju, 2009; Dorn and Sengmueller, 2009). We conjecture that lottery-like stocks are
likely to be more affected by gambling sentiment than non-lottery stocks. Specifically,
when the overall gambling sentiment is stronger, investor demand for lottery-like stocks
would increase. If arbitrage costs are high,3 this excess demand in turn could generate
price pressure on lottery-like stocks and generate positive abnormal return in the short-
run.
Consistent with our conjecture, we find that when gambling sentiment of investors
becomes stronger, lottery-like stocks earn positive abnormal returns in the following
month. In economic terms, a one standard deviation increase in investors’ gambling
sentiment is associated with an abnormal return of 47 basis points for the lottery-like stock
portfolio in the following month. Further, this positive abnormal return is eventually
arbitraged away within three months.
Next, we use attention-grabbing lottery jackpots to identify the source of time-variation
in investors’ gambling attitudes. Jackpot announcements are exogenous, attention-
grabbing events that are likely to generate excitement among investors who may gamble
in the stock market. Consistent with our expectation, we find abnormal stock returns
among lottery-like stocks around these jackpots. The average abnormal return during
month -1 to month +1 around the lottery jackpot events is 1.7% per month. In addition,
during this period, the average abnormal trading volume is 17.2%.
To directly examine whether shifts in overall gambling attitudes have a positive
spillover effect on the demand for lottery-type stocks, we use trading data from a major
U.S. discount brokerage firm (Barber and Odean, 2000). Consistent with our conjecture
of a positive spillover effect on investor demand, we find positive excess buy-sell
imbalance on lottery-like stocks around the largest jackpot during the 1992-1996 period.
The average excess buy-sell imbalance during month -1 to month +1 is 7%, which
3 Given the low prices and high volatility of lottery-type stocks, the costs associated with arbitraging them
are likely to be high.
8indicates a 7% increase in net purchase of lottery-like stocks relative to non-lottery stocks.
Similarly, large drawings are associated with excess buy-sell imbalance of 3% on the next
trading day. This positive spillover effect is similar to the evidence in betting markets
(e.g., Scott and Garen, 1994; Calcagno, Walker, and Jackson, 2010) and suggests that the
demands for various gambling instruments in the U.S. are likely to be positively
correlated.4
In the next set of tests, we examine the extent to which geographical differences in
gambling sentiment influence the long-term performance of lottery-like stocks. As local
investors’ gambling sentiment varies across regions (Kumar, Page, and Spalt, 2011), we
posit that the effects of gambling sentiment on stock returns would be stronger among
U.S. states with stronger gambling sentiment. In these states, lottery-like stocks are more
likely to be overpriced in the short-run and are likely to underperform in the long-run. To
test our prediction, we use each firm’s headquarter state to define its location and use the
average state-level SVI to capture the gambling sentiment of local investors.
We find that in states with strong gambling sentiment, lottery-like stocks underperform
non-lottery stocks (i.e., stocks with high stock price, low idiosyncratic skewness, and low
idiosyncratic volatility) by 60 basis points per month. The results are stronger for stocks
that are smaller or have lower institutional ownership. In contrast, in U.S. states with
relatively weaker gambling sentiment, lottery-like stocks do not perform differently from
non-lottery stocks.
Next, we change our perspective and investigate whether gambling sentiment affects
corporate decisions. Low nominal share price is a salient feature of lottery-like stocks.
Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2009) show that retail investors’ demand for stocks with
low nominal share prices is time-varying. Further, firms cater to such demand by splitting
stocks with high nominal share prices. We conjecture that the time-varying demand for
low-priced stock would be related to the time-variation in investors’ gambling attitudes.
Consistent with this conjecture, we find that firms with high nominal share prices are more
likely to split their shares when investors exhibit stronger gambling sentiment.
4 Our findings are opposite to the evidence reported in Gao and Lin (2015). They use data from Taiwan and
find a negative spillover effect. Our evidence indicates that the results from Taiwan are unlikely to
generalize to the U.S. See Section 4.3 for additional details.
9In the last set of tests, we examine the effects of gambling sentiment on the first-day
returns of initial public offerings (IPOs). These tests are motivated by previous research,
which demonstrates that IPOs are often perceived as lottery-like by retail investors
(Barberis and Huang, 2008; Green and Hwang, 2011). Further, Loughran and Ritter
(2004) show that the magnitude of the average first-day return for IPOs changes over
time. We conjecture that IPOs would earn higher first-day returns when investors exhibit
stronger gambling sentiment. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that a one standard
deviation increase in investors’ gambling sentiment is associated with a 1.6% increase of
the average first-day IPO return in the following month.
Overall, these findings suggest that changes in investors’ gambling attitudes have a
positive spillover effect on stock market outcomes. In particular, when investors’
gambling sentiment becomes stronger, stocks with lottery-like characteristics earn
positive abnormal returns and firms with high nominal share prices are more likely to split
their shares. In addition, initial public offerings earn higher first-day returns during these
periods of high gambling sentiment.
Our findings contribute to at least four distinct strands of finance literature. First, we
contribute to the finance literature on skewness and gambling. Recent literature shows
that cross-sectional differences in gambling attitudes affect stock returns and corporate
decisions (e.g., Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw, 2011; Kumar, Page, and Spalt, 2011). For
example, Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011) examine the role of extreme positive return
in the cross-sectional pricing of stocks. They show that maximum daily stock return
during the previous month is negatively correlated with returns in the following 11
months. This evidence suggests that investors are willing to pay more for stocks with
extreme positive returns. In addition, Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2011) show that gambling
propensity is stronger in U.S. states with high concentration of Catholics relative to
Protestants. Investors located in regions with higher Catholic-Protestant ratios have a
stronger preference for lottery-like stocks, broad-based employee stock option plans are
more popular, and the initial first-day return following an initial public offering is higher.
Our findings suggest that shifts in gambling attitudes over time also matter.
Second, our results provide new evidence on the possible link between the lottery
market and the stock market. On the one hand, Kumar (2009) shows that state lotteries
10
and lottery-like stocks attract similar socioeconomic clienteles. In addition, Doran, Jiang,
and Peterson (2012) show that during periods with high participation rate in other forms
of gambling activities (i.e., new year), investors also increase their demand for lottery-
like stocks. Relatedly, the introduction of state lotteries has a positive spillover effect on
participation in casino gaming and horse racing (Scott and Garen, 1994; Calcagno,
Walker, and Jackson, 2010). In contrast, Dorn, Dorn, and Sengmueller (2015) and Gao
and Lin (2015) find a substitution effect between lotteries and aggregate stock trading
using international data. With a direct measure of gambling attitudes, we show a positive
spillover effect to the stock market in the U.S.
Third, we provide new evidence on the economic effects of investor attention (e.g.,
Odean, 1999; Barber and Odean, 2008; Palomino, Renneboog, and Zhang, 2009; Da,
Engelberg, and Gao, 2011 and 2015). Specifically, we show that salient lottery events
trigger strong gambling sentiment, which generates return predictability among lottery-
like stocks.
Fourth, we add to the catering literature in corporate finance. In particular, our results
provide new insights into managerial motivation behind stock splits (e.g., Lakonishok and
Lev, 1987; Angel, 1997; Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler, 2009) and provide an
alternative explanation for the time-variation in first-day IPO returns (e.g., Loughran and
Ritter, 2004). Specifically, we show that firms cater to the time-varying demand for
lottery-like characteristics (e.g., low nominal share prices) by splitting stocks with high
nominal share prices. These finding offer a potential explanation for the nominal share
puzzle documented by Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2009). In addition, we
demonstrate that time-variation in investors’ gambling sentiment is an important
determinant of first-day IPO returns.
Collectively, this paper proposes a novel and direct measure of investors’ time-varying
gambling attitudes. Using this measure, we investigate the impact of the time-variation of
gambling attitudes on various financial market outcomes, which has not yet been
investigated in the existing literature due to data limitations.
2.2. Hypotheses development
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We consider four different economic settings to study the impact of gambling
sentiment on financial market outcomes. In the first setting, we focus on the short-term
mispricing and correction pattern among lottery-like stocks. This analysis is motivated by
recent studies, which find that investors are more likely to buy stocks that have recently
captured their attention (Barber and Odean, 2008). Specifically, Da, Engelberg, and Gao
(2011) show that a surge in attention could lead to temporal overpricing and predict short-
term return reversals among the set of attention-grabbing stocks. Further, Google’s daily
search interest by retail investors is likely to capture market-level sentiment (Da,
Engelberg, and Gao, 2015).
We extend this insight to lottery-like stocks that provide gambling opportunities to
investors in the stock market. Kumar (2009) finds that state lottery players have similar
behavior as investors who overweight lottery-like stocks, and the propensity to participate
in state lotteries and purchase lottery-like stocks are positively correlated. When investors
gamble in the stock market, they are likely to prefer stocks with low nominal share prices,
especially those with positive idiosyncratic skewness for the possibility of extreme
returns. Investors may also prefer stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility since extreme
returns are more likely for these assets.
Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2016) construct a Lottery Index to categorize all stocks in the
CRSP universe into lottery-like stocks, non-lottery stocks and other stocks. Lottery-like
(non-lottery) stocks are those with low (high) price, high (low) idiosyncratic skewness
and high (low) idiosyncratic volatility. Using this definition of lottery-type firms, we posit
that when gambling sentiment is strong, investors are likely to invest disproportionally
more in lottery-like stocks, leading to positive price pressure on these stocks. To
summarize, our first hypothesis posits:
H1: Following periods of high gambling sentiment, lottery-like stocks would earn
positive abnormal returns in the short-run.
Our second hypothesis focuses on the cross-sectional variation in the impact of shifts
in gambling sentiment on stock returns. Barberis and Huang (2008) show that a security’s
idiosyncratic skewness would be priced. In particular, investors would be willing to accept
lower returns for stocks with positive return skewness. Positive skewness could be a
particularly important characteristic for investors with strong gambling attitudes. As
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investors are known to exhibit local bias (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Grinblatt and
Keloharju, 2001; Hong, Kubik, and Stein, 2008; Seasholes and Zhu, 2010), the effects of
gambling sentiment on stock returns would be stronger for stocks headquartered in states
with stronger gambling attitudes. Further, we expect a larger impact on stocks that are
more likely to be held by retail investors, i.e., stocks that are smaller or with lower
institutional ownership. For stocks located in states with relatively weaker gambling
attitudes, the negative lottery-like stock premium would be weaker or non-existent.
To summarize, our second hypothesis posits:
H2: The effects of gambling sentiment on stock returns would be stronger in U.S.
states with stronger gambling attitudes. Further, this impact is likely to be amplified
for smaller stocks and firms with lower institutional ownership.
Our third hypothesis focuses on managerial response to changes in investors’ gambling
attitudes and their potential impact on asset prices. Weld, Michaely, Thaler and Benartzi
(2009) show that firms keep their nominal share prices in a particular range by conducting
stock splits. Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2009) propose a catering theory of nominal
share prices to explain this behavior. They find that the demand for low-priced stocks is
time-varying and firms with high nominal share prices splits their shares when such
demand is high. So far, the literature has not clearly identified what drives the time-
varying demand for low-priced stocks.
We posit that the demand for low-priced stocks would at least partially be related to
the gambling sentiment of retail investors.5 Since low nominal share price is a salient
feature of lottery-like stocks, stronger gambling sentiment would increase the demand for
low-priced stocks and raise their share prices. Firms with high share prices would cater to
this excess demand by splitting their shares. In contrast, firms with low nominal share
prices would not split their shares.6
5 We focus on the behavior of retail investors since past studies show that stocks splits are used to attract
retail investors (Baker and Gallagher, 1980; Baker and Powell, 1993; Fernando, Krishnamurthy, and Spindt,
1999) and they are more likely to hold low-priced stocks than institutional investors (Lakonishok, Shleifer,
and Vishny, 1992; Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Fernando, Krishnamurthy, and Spindt, 2004; Dyl and
Elliott, 2006; Kumar and Lee, 2006).
6 If the low-priced firms split shares, they would face substantial delisting risks. For example, for a firm
with share price of $8, below the median share price of the CRSP universe of $14, a typical split ratio of 2
to 1 brings the share price down to $4. Practitioners often believe that firms with share price below $5 to
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To summarize, our third hypothesis is:
H3: Firms with high share prices would exhibit a higher propensity to split their
stocks when investors exhibit stronger gambling sentiment.
Our fourth hypothesis relates to another corporate finance anomaly, i.e., IPO
underpricing. Loughran and Ritter (2004) show that the initial stock return after IPOs
changes over time. The average first-day return doubled from 7% during 1980-1989 to
15% during 1990-1998 and surged to 65% during the 1999-2000 Internet bubble before
reverting back to 12% during the 2001-2003 period. IPOs could be perceived as lotteries,
given their positively-skewed returns (Barberis and Huang, 2008; Green and Hwang,
2011). Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2011) show that IPOs by firms located in regions with
stronger gambling sentiment earn higher first-day returns.
Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2009) show that firms choose a lower nominal
offering price for IPOs when investors place relatively higher valuations on low-priced
stocks. This raises post-IPO first-day return. Hence the time-variation in the IPO
underpricing could be related to investors’ gambling sentiment. In particular, if retail
investors treat IPOs as lottery-like investment opportunities, they would be willing to pay
a higher price for IPOs when their gambling sentiment is strong. This could generate a
larger average first-day IPO return.
Overall, our fourth hypothesis posits that:
H4: The average first-day IPO return would be higher during periods of high
gambling sentiment.
2.3. Data and methodology
To test these four hypotheses, we collect data from various sources. In this section, we
describe those data sets and also describe our measure of gambling sentiment.
have substantial delisting risk (Market Watch: http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nyse-euronext-seeks-
relax-minimum-bid). In addition, firms cannot easily undo their splits by undertaking reverse splits, as this
would give negative signals to the market (e.g., Woolridge and Chambers, 1983; Campbell, Hilscher, and
Szilagyi, 2008; Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio, 2008).
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2.3.1. Measures of gambling sentiment
Motivated by Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011, 2015), we use the search volume intensity
(SVI) for lottery-related keywords from Google to capture retail investors’ gambling
sentiment. Specifically, we use SVIs for the topic “lottery” from Google Trends,7 at both
national- and state-levels in the U.S. This includes searches in different languages and
different text strings when they are lottery-related.8 We choose the topic “lottery” for two
reasons. First, the existing literature on gambling and skewness (e.g., Kumar, 2009) tends
to use the payoff of state lottery to define stocks with lottery-like characteristics.
Therefore, the topic “lottery” is more likely to capture investors’ attitude toward stocks
with similar payoff structure when compared to search topic of gambling activities with
different payoff structures (e.g., casino gaming). Second, other relevant topics such as
“gambling” do not have enough search volume for Google to report a complete time-
series.
SVI measures the popularity of a particular search term relative to all other terms from
the same location at the same time. An increase in SVI indicates that people pay more
attention to the topic than they normally do. Google Trends reports SVI at weekly
frequency. We aggregate this to the monthly frequency using linear interpolation, as in
Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011). In particular, we divide weekly SVI by 7 to obtain daily
SVI by assuming that daily SVI is constant within the week. We then sum up daily SVI in
a given calendar month to obtain monthly SVI.
To study the geographical variation in gambling attitudes, we use the average state-
level SVI in the previous year to sort all U.S. states and the Washington D.C. into three
groups with 17 states or district in each group. State-level SVIs are not directly comparable
when downloaded separately. We deflate the SVI of each state by the corresponding
national-level SVI to ensure they are comparable cross-sectionally and across time. We
7 Google Trends reports weekly search volume intensity for various keywords. It is available at
http://www.google.com/trends/.
8 Google aggregate search volume in different languages into topics, so the search volume intensity of a
topic represents the overall search interest in the selected region. In addition, to ensure that the search
volume intensity is not driven by non-English search in the U.S., we also obtain the SVI of the following
text strings: lottery. We find that the SVIs of the keyword search are highly correlated with the SVIs of the
corresponding search topic. Therefore, SVIs of topic search are less likely to be biased by non-English
search conducted in the U.S.
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define strong (moderate) (weak) gambling sentiment states as the top (medium) (bottom)
17 states or Washington D.C. as measured by the average SVI.9
Following Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011), our main variable is the abnormal search
volume intensity (ASVI) for the topic “lottery”:
ܣܸܵ ܫ௧ = ܮ݋݃ ܸܵ ܫ௧− ܮ݋݃ ܸܵ ܫ௧ି ଵ, (2.1)
where ASVIt is the abnormal search volume intensity for the topic “lottery” in month t.
LogSVIt and LogSVIt-1 represent the natural logarithm of SVIs in month t and month t-1,
respectively.10 The time-series of ASVI starts in March 2004 and it measures changes in
people's attention toward lottery-related events.11
2.3.2. Validating the gambling sentiment measure
To test whether our measure of gambling sentiment is reasonable, we obtain the state
lottery sales data from the North American Association of State and Provincial Lotteries
(NASPL). The launch dates of state lotteries are collected from the websites of
corresponding states. To measure per capita lottery sales, we obtain the demographics
data from the U.S. Census Bureau. Population and education data are from the 2010
Census. We collect the news data from Factiva.
In the first validation test, we examine whether our measure of gambling sentiment
correlates with news about state lotteries. Panel A of Figure 2.1 plots the “lottery” SVI for
the U.S. Using Factiva, we find that nearly all peaks in the series coincide with the dates
9 The purpose of deflating by state level is to measure how strong is gambling search interest in each U.S.
state relative to the national level so that we could sort 51 U.S. states into 3 groups (i.e., strong, moderate
and weak gambling sentiment group). We use this sorting to conduct our cross-sectional analysis in section
2.4.4 only. In other empirical analysis, we use the time-series of national level search volume intensity.
Therefore, we are not giving equal weighting to all states in our analysis.
10 Da, Engelberg and Gao (2011) define weekly frequency ASVI as the difference between the natural log
of SVI in the current week and the natural log of the median value of SVIs during the prior 8 weeks. They
argue that the median over a longer time window captures the “normal” level of attention in a way that is
robust to recent jumps. This is the intuition of the name “abnormal search volume intensity”. In this paper,
since we use monthly frequency, so we define ASVI as the difference between natural log of SVIs between
month t and month t-1 to ensure a longer period. We still call this variable ASVI because Da, Engelberg and
Gao (2011) also call their monthly frequency measure (defined in the same way as ours) ASVI. We could
also define abnormal SVI using the error term in a time-series regression. We choose the current definition
to ensure the consistency with the existing literature.
11 We also use two alternative methods to construct ASVI. First, we calculate ASVI as the log difference
between SVI in month t and the median of SVIs in the previous three months (Da, Engelberg, and Gao,
2011). Second, we regress our baseline ASVI measure on month and year dummy variables and use residuals
as a robustness check for any potential seasonality effects (Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2015). Both ASVI
measures yield quantitatively similar results.
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of the largest lottery jackpots. For example, Points A to H correspond to record-breaking
or near-record jackpots. These jackpots are independent of each other and are from two
multi-state games, i.e., Mega Millions and Powerball. We use these attention-grabbing
jackpots as natural experiments in Section 2.4.2.
Large jackpots receive greater media coverage. A search of lottery related news on
Factiva illustrates this. On March 30, 2012, the drawing Friday for the $656 million
jackpot, there were 1,045 lottery-related news stories in the U.S. The number of lottery-
related news items reduced to 579 on the Friday one month later, almost a 50% drop in
one month. This change in media coverage matches with our measure of gambling
sentiment.
Next, we analyze how our state-level SVI relates to demographic characteristics of
local investors. Panel B of Figure 2.1 depicts the geographical differences in gambling
sentiment. It shows that jackpots of single-state lotto games raise mainly the SVI in that
particular state, while jackpots of multi-state lotto games increase SVIs in all states. Panel
C reports the regional search interest for each state. It is evident that the Internet search
volume for the topic “lottery” is higher in the Western and Eastern coasts and is lower in
the Central region.
Table 2.1 presents the top five and bottom five states during the 2004-2013 period.
Florida and Georgia have the highest average SVIs, which is consistent with the fact that
Powerball (Mega Millions) drawings are based in Florida (Georgia). Further,
Massachusetts has one of the highest levels of Catholic concentration and it also has one
of the highest average SVIs. In contrast, Utah has the highest level of Mormon
concentration and it has one of the lowest average SVIs. This is consistent with the
findings of Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2011) who show that Catholics are more likely to
gamble while Mormons have a strong opposition to gambling.
In 2012, the median lottery sales value is $3,834 million for the top gambling sentiment
states. This is 27 times greater than that of the bottom states. Obviously, these measures
do not account for differences in state population. The median per capita lottery sales is
$244 ($136) for the top (bottom) gambling sentiment states. In addition, we observe that
the median percentage of the state population over the age of 25 that has a bachelor's
degree or higher is 26.5% (29.5%) for top (bottom) states, which is consistent with Kumar
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(2009) who shows that education is negatively related to the likelihood of lottery
purchases.
Further, all of the top five states have legalized state lotteries. In contrast, three out of
the bottom five states have not adopted state lotteries. This is similar to the findings of
Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2011) who show that regions with stronger gambling propensity
legalize state lotteries earlier. Overall, the validation test results indicate that our measure
of gambling sentiment is reasonable.
2.3.3. Lottery-like stocks
To analyze the influence of shifts in retail investors’ gambling sentiment on stock
market outcomes, we focus on lottery-like stocks for our first two economic settings. Our
definition of lottery-like stocks follows that of Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2016), which is a
continuous measure of the “lotteriness” of stocks. This measure is based on the theoretical
frameworks developed in Harvey and Siddique (2000) and Barberis and Huang (2008)
and is also motivated by the empirical definition of lottery-type stocks in Kumar (2009).
Specifically, we use the following three measures to construct the Lottery Index (LIDX):
nominal stock price, idiosyncratic skewness, and idiosyncratic volatility. Stock price is
the closing price in the last trading day of previous calendar year. Idiosyncratic skewness
is the third moment of the residual obtained by fitting the following model using daily
stock returns in the previous year:
ݎ௜− ݎ௙ = ߙ+ ߚଵ൫ݎ௠ ௞௧− ݎ௙൯+ ߚଶ൫ݎ௠ ௞௧− ݎ௙൯ଶ + ௧߳, (2.2)
where ri is the return of stock i, rf is the risk free rate, and rmkt is the market return. And,
idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of residual from the Carhart (1997) model
using daily stock returns in the previous year:
ݎ௜− ݎ௙ = ߙ+ ߚ෨௠ ௞௧൫ݎ௠ ௞௧− ݎ௙൯+ ߚ෨௦௠ ௕ݎ௦௠ ௕ + ߚ෨௛௠ ௟ݎ௛௠ ௟+ ߚ෨௨௠ ௗݎ௨௠ ௗ + ௜߳,
(2.3)
where ri is the realized return of stock i, rf is the risk free rate, and rmkt is the market return.
rsmb, rhml, and rumd are size, market-to-book, and momentum factor returns. We obtain
price, return, and market capitalization data at monthly and daily frequencies from the
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Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP). The size, market-to-book, and momentum
factors are from Kenneth French's data library.12
Motivated by Harvey and Siddique (2000) and Kumar (2009), we use different models
to estimate idiosyncratic volatility and skewness. Since the Carhart (1997) four-factor
model is a standard benchmark for stock returns, we use it to estimate idiosyncratic
volatility of stock returns. In addition, Harvey and Siddique (2000) suggest that excess
return on an asset could be determined by its conditional covariance with both the market
return and the square of the market return (conditional co-skewness). Therefore,
idiosyncratic skewness could be better estimated using an asset pricing model that
combines the multi-factor model with a simple nonlinear component derived from
skewness. This choice is also consistent with the empirical finding in Ghysels (1998).
In January of each year, we assign all common stocks (with a share code of 10 or 11)
in the CRSP universe into twenty groups based on each criterion. We conduct the three
sorting independently and create 60 groups. Group 20 (1) contains the stocks with the
highest (lowest) idiosyncratic skewness, highest (lowest) idiosyncratic volatility, or
lowest (highest) price. We then add up the group numbers of each stock to a score between
3 and 60 and standardize this score to a value between 0 and 1 using LIDX = (Score-3) /
(60-3).13 Finally, we define lottery-like stocks as stocks with a top 30% LIDX value, non-
lottery stocks as those with a bottom 30% LIDX value, and remaining stocks as other
stocks. We update this list in January of each year.
Panel A of Table 2.2 presents the main characteristics of lottery-like stocks. For
comparison, we also report the characteristics of non-lottery stocks, other stocks, and all
stocks in the CRSP universe. The average price of lottery-like stocks is $5.67, which is
comparable in magnitude to the price of lottery tickets.14 Lottery-like stocks have a small
average market capitalization of $266 million. They have higher market-to-book ratio
12 The factors are obtained from
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
13 For example, if stock A is in group 1 for idiosyncratic skewness, group 20 for idiosyncratic volatility, and
group 20 for price. The score for stock A equals to 1 + 20 + 20 = 51. We standardize this score to a value
between 0 and 1: LIDX = (51 - 3)/60 – 3 = 0.84.
14 For instance, the ticket prices for the two largest lotto games in the U.S., Mega Millions and Powerball,
are $1 and $2, respectively. Source: Mega Millions (http://www.megamillions.com/), and Powerball
(http://www.powerball.com/pb_home.asp).
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than non-lottery stocks. As expected, they also have significantly higher volatility and
skewness.
2.3.4. Brokerage data and macroeconomic variables
To directly examine the potential spillover effects of jackpots on lottery-like stocks,
we obtain trading data from a major U.S. discount brokerage house. This data set contains
all trades of a set of individual investors during the 1991-1996 period. We examine trades
on common stocks.15 During this period, the only available multi-state lottery game is
Powerball, which started from April 22, 1992. We obtain draw date, winners, and jackpot
prize of each drawing from the Multi-State Lottery Association (i.e., the operator of
Powerball).16
Additionally, we use five commonly used macroeconomic variables to capture the
effects of business cycles: U.S. monthly unemployment rate (UNEMP), unexpected
inflation (UEI), monthly growth in industrial production (MP), monthly default risk
premium (RP), and the term spread (TS). We obtain UNEMP from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics web site. UEI is the difference between the current month inflation and the
average of the past 12 realizations. We obtain MP from the Federal Reserve web site. RP
is the difference between Moody’s Baa-rated and Aaa-rated corporate bond yields. TS is
the difference between the yields of a constant maturity 10-year Treasury bond and 3-
month Treasury bill. Summary statistics for these variables are reported in Panel B of
Table 2.2.
2.3.5. Institutional ownership data
Our second hypothesis posits that gambling sentiment would have greater impact on
stocks that are more likely to be held by retail investors, i.e., small stocks or stocks with
low institutional ownership. Small stocks are defined as stocks in the bottom 30th
percentile by market capitalization in the CRSP universe. Firm-level institutional
ownership data are collected from FactSet and based on Ferreira and Matos (2008). We
measure a firm’s institutional ownership in a year by its average quarterly total
institutional ownership. The mean of total institutional ownership is 55% for our sample
15 Details on the brokerage data are available in Barber and Odean (2000).
16 We thank Multi-State Lottery Association for providing the historical Powerball information.
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period (see Panel B of Table 2.2). Low institutional ownership stocks are stocks with less
than ten percent total institutional ownership.
2.3.6. Stock splits data
Our third economic setting focuses on the implication of time-varying gambling
attitudes on stock splits. We include all common stocks in the U.S. and identify splitters
as those with a CRSP distribution code of 5523. We study stock splits that reduce stock
prices, so reverse stock splits are not included in our sample. Following Lin, Singh, and
Yu (2009), we require splitters to have a CRSP Factor to Adjust Price (FACPR) greater
than or equal to one and equal to the CRSP Factor to Adjust Shares Outstanding
(FACSHR). After dropping stocks without COMPUSTAT data, our sample includes 490
stock splits from January 2005 to December 2013. The average monthly probability of
stock splits is 0.12% (see Panel B of Table 2.2).
2.3.7. IPO data
In our fourth economic setting, we analyze the effects of time-varying gambling
attitudes on first-day returns of IPOs. We obtain the monthly average first-day return on
the “net IPOs” from Jay Ritter’s website.17 Net IPOs are IPOs excluding closed-end funds,
REITs, acquisition companies, stocks with offer prices below $5, ADRs, limited
partnerships, units, banks and S&Ls, and those not listed on CRSP, as defined in Ibbotson,
Sindelar, and Ritter (1994). The first-day return is calculated as the percentage return from
the offering price to the first closing bid price. The monthly average first-day return is
calculated as the equal-weighted average of the first-day returns on all the offerings in a
particular calendar month. During our sample period, the average post-IPO first-day
return is 13.5% (see Panel B of Table 2.2).
2.4. Empirical results
2.4.1. Stock return predictability
Our first hypothesis focuses on the impact of time-varying gambling attitudes on stock
returns. If elevated gambling sentiment increases the demand for lottery-like stocks and
17 See http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm.
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generates price pressure on these stocks, ASVI should have a positive impact on the
abnormal return of lottery-like stocks in the short-run. Our tests examine whether this
short-term return predictability exists.
To measure the abnormal return performance of lottery-like stocks, we use the Carhart
(1997) four-factor model to account for size, market-to-book, and past performance. We
estimate 36-month rolling-window regressions and require all stocks to have at least 12
months of return data. After estimating the factor loadings using equation (2.3), we
calculate the abnormal return for each stock as:
ܣܴ௜,௧= ݎ௜− ݎ௙ − ߚ෨௠ ௞௧,௧ି ଵ൫ݎ௠ ௞௧− ݎ௙൯− ߚ෨௦௠ ௕,௧ି ଵݎ௦௠ ௕ − ߚ෨௛௠ ௟,௧ି ଵݎ௛௠ ௟− ߚ෨௨௠ ௗ,௧ି ଵݎ௨௠ ௗ,
(2.4)
where ARi,t is the abnormal return of stock i in month t. Factor loadings are estimated from
month t-36 to t-1. The abnormal returns are then value-weighted to obtain the portfolio
return.18
Following Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011), we estimate the following regression to
determine if stock returns are predictable in the short-run:
ܣܴ௣௢௥௧௙௢௟௜௢,௧ା௡ = ߙ+ ߚ௡ × ܣܸܵ ܫ௧+ ௧߳,݊ = 0, 1,2, 3, (2.5)
where ARportfolio,t+n is the average abnormal return in month t+n of a stock portfolio
weighted by market capitalization in month t+n-1. The coefficient βn measures the
predictive power of ASVI with n lags.
The coefficient estimates in Table 2.3 support our conjecture. The βn coefficients are
positive in months 0 and 1 for lottery-like stock portfolio. In economic terms, a one
standard deviation increase (i.e., 20%) in the ASVI for the topic “lottery” is associated
with a significantly positive price change of 47 basis points in month 1.19 The coefficient
estimates become negative from month two onward, indicating a subsequent price
reversal as the mispricing get corrected. In economic terms, a one standard deviation
increase in ASVI significantly reduces lottery-like stocks’ abnormal returns in month 3 by
33 basis points. In contrast to lottery-like stock portfolio, ASVI does not have any power
to predict the return of non-lottery stock and other stock portfolios. Further, the estimates
18 Our results are similar if we first form portfolios and then estimate abnormal returns at the portfolio-level.
19 The price impact of large jackpots on lottery-like stocks is likely to occur in month 1 as large jackpots
are claimed at the end of month 0.
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in Column 5 show that the return predictability is stronger when we Long lottery-like
stocks and Short non-lottery stocks simultaneously. The abnormal return of lottery-like
stocks disappears after three months.
Overall, the results in Table 2.3 support our first hypothesis. Lottery-like stocks earn
significantly positive abnormal returns when investors have stronger gambling sentiment.
This is consistent with our conjecture that retail investors’ gambling sentiment would
generate short-term overpricing among lottery-like stocks.
2.4.2. Attention-grabbing jackpots and predictability
One potential explanation for our evidence of short-term return predictability among
lottery-like stocks could be that those stocks experience positive abnormal returns when
investors pay more attention to lottery-related events. In this section, we use lottery
jackpots that grab investors’ attention to identify the sources of time-variation in
investors’ gambling attitudes. These are exogenous events and do not require the
gambling sentiment measure from Google.20
We define attention-grabbing jackpots in three different ways. First, the all-time
largest jackpot of $656 million was awarded on March 30, 2012, which is the largest
jackpot in the U.S. history. Second, record-breaking jackpots are those that break national
record at the time. This criterion gives us the all-time largest jackpot and two other
jackpots announced on February 18, 2006 and March 6, 2007. Third, we use a broader
definition of attention-grabbing jackpots. In addition to the three record-breaking
jackpots, we include near-record jackpots that are either the second largest jackpot at the
time or the largest jackpot over the past 24 months. If two jackpots selected are next to
each other such that event windows are contaminated, we drop both of them from our
sample. The above criterion leads to eight attention-grabbing jackpots in our sample
period. The sizes and dates of eight attention-grabbing jackpots are reported in the
Appendix (Table 2.1A). These jackpots take on average two months from the first to the
last drawing dates. Their values are between $336 million and $656 million.
20 The occurrences of large jackpots are random and are unlikely to be driven by factors that affect the stock
market. For example, the winning odds for Mega Millions and Powerball jackpots in 2015 are as low as 1
in 258,890,850 and 1 in 175,223,510, respectively. Source: Mega Millions and Powerball web sites.
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After identifying the lottery jackpots, we use a calendar-time portfolio approach to
measure the impact of attention-grabbing jackpots on stock returns:
ݎ௣௢௥௧௙௢௟௜௢,௧− ݎ௙,௧= ߙ+ ߚଵܦ[ିଵ,ାଵ]௃௔௖௞௣௢௧+ ߚଶܦ[ାଶ,ାଷ]௉௢௦௧ + ߚଷ൫ݎ௠ ௞௧− ݎ௙൯+ ߚସݎ௦௠ ௕ + ߚହݎ௛௠ ௟+
ߚ଺ݎ௨௠ ௗ + ௧߳, (2.6)
where the dependent variable is the average excess return of lottery-like or non-lottery
stocks in month t. The final drawing dates of attention-grabbing jackpots are in month 0.21
ܦ[ିଵ,ାଵ]௃௔௖௞௣௢௧ is a dummy variable that equals to one from month -1 to month +1 and zero
otherwise. β1 measures average abnormal return during the (-1, +1) period. ܦ[ାଶ,ାଷ]௉௢௦௧ is a
dummy variable that equals to one during the (+2, +3) period and zero otherwise. β2
measures average abnormal return during the (+2, +3) period. Standard errors are adjusted
for auto-correlation using the Newey and West (1987) method.
Table 2.4 reports the estimated coefficients of β1 (Panel A) and β2 (Panel B). We find
that lottery-like stocks earn significantly positive returns around attention-grabbing
jackpots. The average abnormal return during the (-1, +1) period is between 1.55% and
1.75% per month. This short-term mispricing is partially corrected during the (+2, +3)
period. The price reversal in months (+2, +3) is -1.23% for the all-time largest jackpot
and -1.10% for the record-breaking jackpots. These results are consistent with our return
predictability results in Table 2.3. Again, abnormal return of lottery-like stocks becomes
statistically insignificant beyond month +3.
Next, we examine the abnormal trading volumes around jackpots. Following Chae
(2005), the abnormal trading volume is calculated as:
ܣܾ݊ ݋݉ݎ ܽ ݈ܶ ܽݎ ݀݅݊ ݃ܸ ݋݈ ݑ݉ ௜݁,௧ = ௜߬,௧− ҧ߬௜, (2.7)
where ௜߬,௧ is the log-transformed turnover (i.e., trading volumes divided by outstanding
shares) for stock i in month t and ҧ߬௜ is the average log-transformed turnover during the
estimation period, which has a length of 36 months and ends three months before the
event. 22
21 We include month -1 as a run-up period because investors pay attention to lotteries when jackpot prizes
pass certain thresholds (see Williams and Siegel, 2014).
22 We also use an alternative approach to estimate abnormal trading volume. We adjust the log-transformed
turnover by the market model where the market volume is the value-weighted log turnover of stocks listed
on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, as in Campbell and Wasley (1996). The results are quantitatively similar.
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Table 2.5 presents the results. For attention-grabbing jackpots, lottery-like stocks
experience significantly positive abnormal trading volume of about 17% during the (-1,
+1) period and about 21% during the (+2, +3) period. This evidence suggests that changes
in gambling sentiment induce changes in trading activity among lottery-like stocks. We
find that the abnormal trading volume of lottery-like stocks is not significant around the
all-time largest jackpot. One possible explanation is that it may be difficult to make
conclusions about individual-level behavior using aggregate level data (e.g., trading
volume). Therefore, in the next section, we use the actual trades of retail investors to
directly examine their investment activities around large jackpots.
Overall, our results in this section suggest that lottery-like stocks experience short-term
overpricing and abnormal trading volume due to an increase in gambling sentiment among
retail investors. This spillover effect on lottery-like stocks is consistent with evidence
from the economics literature on betting markets.23
2.4.3. Lottery jackpots and investor trading: direct link
Our results so far suggest that lottery-type stocks are overpriced when the overall
gambling sentiment is high. However, we have not yet shown that shift in gambling
attitudes is positively correlated with investor trading. Without this direct link, our results
may have alternative explanations, especially because evidence in recent studies (i.e.,
Dorn, Dorn, Sengmueller, 2015; Gao and Lin, 2015) indicates that gambling and stock
market trading activities may be negatively correlated, i.e., lotteries and stocks serve as
substitutes rather than complements.24
23 A related literature in economics finds that state lotteries are complements to other forms of gambling.
For example, the introduction of state lotteries increases the participation in casino gaming and horse racing
(Scott and Garen, 1994; Calcagno, Walker, and Jackson, 2010). Increases in gambling expenditure by
households are associated with reductions in non-gambling expenditure, rather than reductions in other
types of gambling expenditure (Kearney, 2005). In addition, different types of U.S. lotteries complement
each other (Grote and Matheson, 2007).
24 Using data from Taiwan, Gao and Lin (2015) find a negative impact of lottery jackpots (i.e., large jackpot
drawings) on stock trading volume. Further, using the same brokerage data as ours in the U.S., Dorn, Dorn,
and Sengmueller (2015) report similar findings as Gao and Lin (2015). But their results are insignificant for
the 2004- 2008 period, which overlaps with our main sample period, using the TAQ trading data. Our paper
is different from the previous studies because we analyze (i) US multi-state jackpots rather than local
jackpots in California or Taiwan as in previous studies; (ii) the realization of large attention-grabbing
jackpots rather than daily balance of all jackpots; and (iii) the excess buy-sell imbalance of lottery-like
stocks rather than trading volume of all stocks. Our results are opposite, which suggests that results from
25
In this section, we test directly whether retail investors increase aggregate demand for
lottery-like stocks around large jackpots. We use the actual trades of retail investors from
a large discount brokerage house during the 1991-1996 period. We use two types of lottery
measures. First, we study the largest jackpot during the 1992-1996 period (i.e., the $111
million prize announced on July 7, 1993). Second, following Gao and Lin (2015), we
examine large drawings, which include either claimed jackpots or unclaimed balances.
To examine the impact of large jackpots on investor trading, we measure the aggregate
demand for lottery-like stocks as the excess buy-sell imbalance (EBSI) defined as the
difference in buy-sell imbalance between lottery-like and non-lottery stock portfolios
(Kumar, 2009).25 This measure captures the change in investors’ bullishness towards
lottery-like stocks relative to their change in bullishness towards non-lottery stocks.
Specifically, we estimate the following time-series regression:
ܧܤ ܵܫ௧ = ߙ+ ߚଵܦ[ିଵ,ାଵ]௃௔௖௞௣௢௧+ ߚଶܯܭܴܶܧ ௧ܶ+ ߚଷܯܭܴܶܧ ௧ܶି ଵ + ߚସܱܮ ܴܶܧ ௧ܶ+ ߚହܱܮ ܴܶܧ ௧ܶି ଵ + ߚ଺ܧܤ ܵܫ௧ି ଵ + ܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ௧ି ଵ + ௧߳.
(2.8)
The dependent variable is the monthly excess buy-sell imbalance for lottery-like
stocks. Lottery-like stocks are defined as in Section 2.3.3. The set of independent variables
includes contemporaneous and one month lagged market returns, contemporaneous and
one month lagged returns of the lottery-like stock portfolio. We also include lagged EBSI
to control for potential serial correlation in that measure. Additionally, we include
UNEMP, UEI, MP, RP and TS as control variables to account for potential business cycle
effects since investors are known to have stronger gambling sentiment during economic
recessions (Kumar, 2009). The sample period is from April 1992 to November 1996.
Standard errors are calculated using the method in Newey and West (1987).
Taiwan cannot be directly extrapolated to the U.S. setting. More importantly, our results suggest that it may
be difficult to make conclusions about individual-level behavior using aggregate market-level data.
25 The buy-sell imbalance (BSI) of portfolio p in month t is defined asܤ ܵܫ௣௧ = ଵ଴଴ே೛೟∑ ܤ ܵܫ௜௧ே೛೟௜ୀଵ , where the
BSI for stock i in month t is defined asܤ ܵܫ௜௧ = ∑ (௏஻೔ೕ೟ି ௏ௌ೔ೕ೟)ವ೟ೕసభ
∑ (௏஻೔ೕ೟ା௏ௌ೔ೕ೟)ವ೟ೕసభ . Here, Dt is the number of days in month t.
VBijt (VSijt) is the dollar buying (selling) volume of stock i on day j in month t, and Npt is the number of
traded stocks in portfolio p in month t. Kumar and Lee (2006) show that an equal-weighted BSI measure is
more appropriate for capturing shifts in investor sentiment than a value-weighted measure.
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The key variable of interest isܦ[ିଵ,ାଵ]௝௔௖௞௣௢௧, which equals to one from month -1 to month
+1 around the event jackpot, and zero otherwise. A positive and significant coefficient
onܦ[ିଵ,ାଵ]௝௔௖௞௣௢௧ would indicate that trading in lottery-like stocks increases around lottery
jackpot announcements.26 Table 2.6 presents the results. Consistent with our expectation,
we find a significantly positive coefficient of 7% onܦ[ିଵ,ାଵ]௝௔௖௞௣௢௧, which suggests that jackpot
announcement generates 7% higher net purchase of lottery-like stocks relative to non-
lottery stocks.
Next, we examine the effect of large drawings on daily EBSI. We have 228 large
drawings during our sample period. Since Powerball drawings were held on Wednesday
and Saturday evenings at 10:59 pm, we examine the spillover effect on the next trading
day (i.e., Thursdays and Mondays). Specifically, we estimate the following time-series
regression:
ܧܤ ܵܫ௧ = ߙ+ ߚଵܦ௧஽௥௔௪௜௡௚ + ߚଶܯܭܴܶܧ ௧ܶ+ ߚଷܱܮ ܴܶܧ ௧ܶ+ ߚସܧܤ ܵܫ௧ି ଵ + ߚହܸܺܫ ௧ି ଵ +
ߚ଺ܣܦ ௧ܵି ଵ + ܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ+ ௧߳. (2.9)
The dependent variable is daily excess buy-sell imbalance for lottery-like stocks. The
set of independent variables includes market return, return of the lottery-like stock
portfolio, and lagged EBSI. We also include the lagged Chicago Board Options Exchange
daily market volatility index (VIX) to account for investor fear and market sentiment, and
include lagged Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti business conditions index (ADS) to capture the
economic condition at the daily-level (Da Engelberg, and Gao, 2015). Control variables
include lagged market and lottery-like stock portfolio returns (up to five lags) and day-of-
the-week dummies. Standard errors are calculated using the method in Newey and West
(1987).
The key variable of interest isܦ௧
஽௥௔௪௜௡௚, which equals to one on the next trading day
following a large drawing, and zero on days with no drawings or small drawings. A large
(small) drawing has above (below) median drawing value during the April 22, 1992 to
26 Although the brokerage data cover trades of a set of retail investors from all U.S. states, only 14 states
participated in Powerball at its inception in 1992. Large states such as New York and California did not join
Powerball during the 1992-1996 period. Therefore, our estimate is conservative. We expect a smaller effect
using the brokerage data.
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November 30, 1996 period. Table 2.7 presents the results. We find a significantly positive
coefficient of 3% onܦ௧
஽௥௔௪௜௡௚, which suggests that large drawings generate 3% more net
purchase of lottery-like stocks on the following day relative to non-lottery stocks. The
magnitude of EBSI is smaller because large drawings attract less attention than lottery
jackpots.
Overall, the results in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show that attention-gabbing jackpots motivate
retail investors to increase their demand for lottery-like stocks. This evidence suggests
that shifts in gambling attitudes have a positive spillover effect on the stock market in the
U.S.
2.4.4. Cross-sectional variation in return predictability
Next, we study whether cross-sectional differences in gambling sentiment shifts affect
stock performance in the long-term. We test whether the negative lottery stock premium
is stronger among states with stronger gambling sentiment. Barberis and Huang (2008)
show that a security’s idiosyncratic risk could be priced. To get exposure to idiosyncratic
skewness, investors with strong gambling attitudes are willing to accept a lower risk
adjusted return for stocks with positive return skewness. We conjecture that this effect is
more likely to exist among investors in U.S. states with stronger gambling attitudes. Since
previous literature has documented that investors have local biases, we use the average
state-level SVI for the topic “lottery” to form portfolios based on gambling sentiment of
the state in which a firm is headquartered. Specifically, we first define value-weighted
portfolios for lottery-like, non-lottery, and other stocks. Then, we estimate the alphas of
these portfolios using monthly return regressions that include the four factors as the
benchmark.
Table 2.8 shows that lottery-like stocks significantly underperform non-lottery stocks.
A trading strategy that goes Long in lottery-like stocks and Short in non-lottery stocks
significantly underperforms the four-factor benchmark by 43 basis points per month.
Interestingly, this effect is driven by firms headquartered in states with strong gambling
sentiment. In contrast, lottery-like and non-lottery stocks do not have significantly
different performance when they are headquartered in U.S. states with moderate or weak
gambling sentiment.
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Next, we further investigate whether the lottery-like stock premium is stronger for
stocks that are more likely to be held by retail investors since these investors are more
likely to gamble in the stock market. We focus on stocks with low price and low
institutional ownership. We focus on the cross-sectional differences among firms that are
headquartered in states with strong gambling sentiment. Table 2.9 reports the long-term
performance of stocks sorted by institutional ownership or firm size. Panel A shows that
lottery-like stocks in high gambling sentiment states have larger underperformance when
the institutional ownership is lower. Specifically, lottery-like stocks underperform non-
lottery stocks by about 1.3% per month when institutional ownership is below ten percent.
The abnormal return difference decreases to 53 basis points for stocks with above ten
percent institutional ownership.
Panel B shows that among stocks ranked in the bottom 30% by size, lottery-like stocks
significantly underperform non-lottery stocks by 1.4% per month. In contrast, such
underperformance does not exist for large stocks. These findings suggest that gambling
sentiment has a larger impact on stocks returns for stocks that are more likely to be held
by retail investors.
Collectively, the results in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 support our second hypothesis.
Consistent with our conjecture, we find that in regions with strong gambling sentiment,
local investors are willing to accept more negative risk-adjusted return for lottery-like
stocks. This evidence is more pronounced among stocks with low institutional ownership
or low market capitalization. In contrast, in U.S. regions with weak gambling sentiment,
lottery-like stocks do not significantly underperform non-lottery stocks.
2.4.5. Gambling sentiment and stock splits
Previous finance literature has shown that firms are more likely to split their shares
when stock prices are high (e.g., Baker and Powell, 1992; Dyl and Elliott, 2006; Minnick
and Raman, 2014). Our third hypothesis posits that an increase in gambling sentiment
would lead to a higher probability of stock splits for stocks with high nominal prices.
In this section, we use logistic regression to estimate the influence of gambling
sentiment on stock splits. The dependent variable in this regression is equal to one if the
company splits its shares in a given month, and zero otherwise. We control for stock
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return, lagged firm size, and market-to-book ratio. We also control for split activities in
the previous year. Specifically, we run the following logistic regression:
ܮ݋݃ ݅ݐ( ݌݈ܵ݅ݐ௜,௧) = ߙ+ ߚଵܦ஺ௌ௏ூ௧ି ଵ + ߚଶܦ௣௜,௧ି ଵ + ߚଷܦ஺ௌ௏ூ௧ି ଵ × ܦ௣௜,௧ି ଵ + ߚସ݁ݎ ݐݑ݊ݎ ௜,௧+
ߚହ݅ݏ ݁ݖ ௜,௧ି ଵ + ߚ଺ܯܶܤ௜,௧ି ଵ + ߚ଻ݏ݌݈݅ݐ݁ݐ ݎ௜,௧ି ଵଶ + ௧߳, (2.10)
where DASVIt-1 is a dummy variable that equals one if investors have strong gambling
sentiment. We define strong gambling sentiment as ASVI values above the 75th percentile
value of the time-series. Dpi,t-1 is a dummy variable of price that equals to one if a given
stock is a high-priced stock. A high-priced stock has share prices above the 75th price
percentile of all common stocks in the CRSP universe in a given month.27 DASVIt-1× Dpi,t-
1 is the interaction between the price and the gambling sentiment dummy variables.
Among other variables, returni,t is the return excluding dividends of stock i over the
course of the month t, as in Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2009). Sizei,t-1 is the natural
logarithm of the market capitalization of stock i in month t-1 while MTBi,t-1 is the market-
to-book ratio defined as the market value of the firm over its book value. Market value
equals to market equity at calendar year-end plus book debt, while book value is
calculated as stockholders’ equity minus preferred stock plus deferred taxes and
investment tax credits and post retirement assets. Splitteri,t-12 is a dummy variable that
equals to one if a firm split its stocks in the previous year. Standard errors are clustered
by firm and by date.
The key variable of interest is the interaction between the price and gambling sentiment
dummy variables. We expect that the splitting propensity would be high when share price
is high and gambling sentiment is strong.
Table 2.10 reports the estimation results. We find that the interaction between price
and gambling sentiment dummy variables is positively significant in all specifications,
which supports our third hypothesis. The price dummy variable is significant at the 1%
27 During our sample period, the average value of the 75th price percentiles is $30 with a minimum value
of $15 and a maximum of $43. Our definition of high-priced stock is similar to the 70th price percentile
used in Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2009). Our definition of high-priced stocks is also motivated by
the minimum bid price requirements of major stock exchanges. Both NYSE and NASDAQ require listed
firms to have a share price of at least $1. Firms that fail to meet this requirement can be delisted. During the
2007 financial crisis, hundreds of firms traded below $2. In 2008 alone, 85 firms (10% of all listed firms in
NASDAQ) were delisted from NASDAQ, mostly for not meeting the $1 price requirement. In general,
firms trading in the sub-$5 range face substantial delisting risk.
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level, which suggest that high-priced firms are more likely to conduct stock splits
regardless of the level of gambling sentiment. In contrast, the gambling sentiment dummy
variable is insignificant, which suggests that not all firms are likely to have a high
propensity to split during high gambling sentiment periods. This is expected because low-
priced firms are not likely to split shares during high gambling sentiment periods for two
reasons: (i) these stocks already have the low price lottery-like characteristics, and (ii)
further split will incur substantial delisting risks. A positively significant interaction effect
suggests that gambling sentiment affects the split probability only when share price is
high.
We use the Marginal Effects at the Means for discrete variables to calculate the
marginal effect of high gambling sentiment on the probability of stock splits. We focus
on the marginal effect when the stock has a high price while holding other variables at
their means. We find that that, in economic terms, for a high-priced stock with average
values on size, book-to-market ratio, return, and splitting activities in the past 12 months,
a one-unit increase in the dummy variable for gambling sentiment raises the split
probability by 0.10% per month.28 This effect is economically significant since the
average monthly split probability is 0.12%. In addition, we find that small stocks and
stocks with higher returns are more likely to split, which is consistent with the existing
evidence in the literature.
Overall, the evidence in Table 2.10 provides support to our third hypothesis. We
demonstrate that retail investors’ gambling sentiment plays an important role in
explaining the time-varying demand for low-priced stocks. When investors’ gambling
sentiment is strong, high-priced firms are more likely to split stocks to cater to the excess
demand for low-priced stocks.
2.4.6. Underpricing of IPOs
In this section, we focus on our fourth hypothesis and examine whether gambling
sentiment helps to explain the time-variation in first-day IPO returns. We regress the
average monthly first-day return of the net IPOs against lagged ASVI. Following Baker,
28 In specification 5, when the price dummy variable equals to one and the ASVI dummy variable equals to
zero, the predicted split probability is 0.51% per month keeping control variables at their mean. In contrast,
the predicted split probability increases to 0.61% if the ASVI dummy variable increases to one.
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Greenwood, and Wurgler (2009), we control for the average log price at the beginning of
the month and the value-weighted market return excluding dividends over the course of
the month. We also include the hotness of IPO market and the monthly number of net
IPOs as additional controls. Our sample period for the test is from January 2005 to June
2014. This gives us a time-series of 107 monthly observations with IPO data.
We estimate the following regression:
ݎ௧
ூ௉ை = ߙ+ ߚଵܣܸܵ ܫ௧ି ଵ + ߚଶ݌௧ି ଵ + ߚଷܸܹ ܯܭ ௧ܶ+ ߚସℎ݋݊ݐ ݁ݏݏ௧+ ߚହܲܫ ܱ݊ݑ݉ ܾ݁ ݎ௧+ ௧߳,
(2.11)
where pt-1 is the equally-weighted average log price in the previous month by using all
common stocks in the CRSP universe, and VWMKTt is the value-weighted return of all
common stocks over the course of month t. Following Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter
(1994), Hotnesst is the percentage of deals that priced above the midpoint of the original
file price range in month t. IPO numbert is the natural logarithm of the monthly number
of net IPOs in month t. We do not examine the long-run performance of IPOs because our
sample period gets significantly shortened.
Table 2.11 reports the estimation results. After controlling for the market return,
average price level and the hotness of IPO market, the coefficient estimates of ASVI are
positive and significant at the 1% level. Economically, a one standard deviation increase
in ASVI (i.e., 20%) is associated with a 1.62% increase in the average first-day IPO return.
Relative to the mean first-day return of 13.44%, this reflects an economically meaningful
12.05% increase. Consistent with our fourth hypothesis, this evidence suggests that when
investors have stronger gambling sentiment, IPOs experience higher average first-day
returns.
2.4.7. Robustness checks and alternative explanations
In this section, we conduct a number of robustness checks for our baseline results.
First, we include five commonly used macroeconomic variables in our return
predictability regressions to account for business cycle effects since investors are more
likely to gamble during economic recessions (Kumar, 2009). The estimation results are
reported in Panel A of Table 2.12, which are similar to the baseline return predictability
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estimates in Table 2.3. This evidence suggests that business cycles in the U.S. cannot
explain the predictive power of our gambling sentiment measure.
Second, we test whether our findings can be explained by other investor sentiment
proxies. In particular, Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) construct an investor sentiment
index by using the first principal component of six sentiment proxies, where each of the
proxies has been orthogonalized with respect to a set of macroeconomic variables. These
data are available until 2010. In Panel B of Table 2.12, Column 1 (2) reports the return
predictability results without (with) the investor sentiment variable from Baker and
Wurgler (2007). Our results remain similar, which suggests that our results on gambling
sentiment cannot be explained by the other investor sentiment measures.
Third, search volume intensity from Google was publicly available only after June
2006. Column 3 shows that our return predictability results are similar for the sub-period
that starts in June 2006. In Column 4, we also control for the market-wide investor
sentiment for this sub-period and our results remain similar. Thus, the stock return
predictability patterns that we document exist even after Google’s search volume intensity
data are made public.
Fourth, we conduct several robustness checks for our stock split analysis. These results
are summarized in Panel C of Table 2.12. In Column 1, we include firm fixed effects to
control for unobservable firm characteristics. This allows us to focus on firms that have
time-series variations in stock splits. Our results remain similar. In addition, in Columns
2 to 7, we include macroeconomic controls and our results still hold. In untabulated tests,
we also include returns over the past three, six, or twelve months as additional control
variables, since past literature suggests that split decisions are a function of a long period
of lagged returns. Our results remain similar after including these lagged return variables.
In the last robustness check, we reconsider the first-day IPO returns analysis, where
we include five macroeconomic variables in the regression specification. Our results
remain robust (see Panel D of Table 2.12).
2.5. Summary and Conclusion
This study investigates how changes in overall attitudes toward gambling affect
financial market outcomes. Using a novel measure of gambling sentiment based on
lottery-related Internet search volume, we show that the time-variation in gambling
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attitudes predicts the returns of lottery-like stocks. Further, using attention-grabbing
lottery jackpots as exogenous shocks to gambling sentiment, we show that our results do
not reflect potential reverse causality. We find that large lottery jackpots not only increase
people’s participation in lotteries, but also enhance investors’ propensity to purchase
stocks with lottery-like characteristics. Analyzing trades of retail investors from a major
U.S. discount brokerage firm, we also show directly that investors increase aggregate
demand for lottery-like stocks around large jackpots and large drawings.
Examining geographical differences in the impact of gambling sentiment on market
outcomes, we find that in U.S. states where gambling attitudes are strong, lottery-like
stocks underperform stocks that are otherwise similar in the long-run. These effects are
stronger for smaller firms and firms with lower institutional ownership.
The time-variation in gambling attitudes also affects corporate financial decisions.
Specifically, firms with high nominal share prices are more likely to split their shares
when investors’ gambling sentiment becomes stronger. Stronger gambling sentiment is
also associated with higher first-day returns of initial public offerings. Collectively, these
results suggest that shifts in overall gambling attitudes have spillover effects on financial
markets.
These findings contribute to the growing finance literature that examines the role of
gambling in financial markets. Our paper adds a new dimension to this literature by
demonstrating that time-variation in gambling attitudes generates short-term mispricing
and also affects corporate decisions. In future work, it may be interesting to examine
whether time-varying gambling attitudes influence mutual fund flows. Mutual funds that
hold more lottery-like stocks could experience more cash inflows when gambling
sentiment is strong. It would also be interesting to examine the influence of time-varying
gambling sentiment on other lottery-like securities such as options.
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Table 2.1: Top and bottom gambling sentiment states
This table reports characteristics of the top and bottom five states in terms of the average search
volume intensity for the topic “lottery” from 2004 to 2013. Annual sales (reported in million $)
presents the total lottery sales value in fiscal year 2012. Population shows the state-level total
population according to the 2010 Census. Per capital sales is calculated as lottery sales divided
by population. Education reports the proportion of state population over the age of 25 that has
obtained a bachelor's degree or higher. Launch year reports the year when the first state lottery
ticket is on sale. Average SVI is the average annual search volume intensity, which is aggregated
from weekly SVIs.
Panel A: Top five states in gambling sentiment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
States Annualsales Population
Per
capital
sales
Education Launchyear
Average
SVI
Florida 4,449.90 18,801,310 236.68 26.52 1988 147.34
Georgia 3,834.70 9,687,653 395.83 29.52 1993 92.23
Massachusetts 4,741.40 6,547,629 724.14 39.05 1972 77.04
Michigan 2,413.46 9,883,640 244.19 26.31 1972 75.42
Tennessee 1,311.00 6,346,105 206.58 23.42 2004 73.14
Average 3,350.09 10,253,267 361.48 28.96 93.03
Median 3,834.70 9,687,653 244.19 26.52 77.04
Panel B: Bottom five states in gambling sentiment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
States Annualsales Population
Per
capital
sales
Education Launchyear
Average
SVI
Hawaii N/A 1,360,301 N/A 29.52 N/A 9.96
Utah N/A 2,763,885 N/A 30.29 N/A 10.15
Alaska N/A 710,231 N/A 26.67 N/A 11.37
Idaho 175.84 1,567,582 112.17 25.70 1989 12.04
Vermont 100.93 625,741 161.30 34.82 1978 13.69
Average 138.39 1,405,548 136.73 29.40 11.44
Median 138.39 1,360,301 136.73 29.52 11.37
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics
This panel reports the characteristics for lottery-like stocks, non-lottery stocks, and other stocks.
Variables are calculated as the monthly average from 2005 to 2013. Lottery-like stocks are defined
as stocks within the upper 30 percentiles of Lottery Index (LIDX) in each year. Similarly, Non-
lottery stocks are defined as stocks in the bottom 30 percentiles of LIDX in each year. Other stocks
are defines as the rest of stocks in CRSP. Number of stocks reports the average number of lottery-
like, non-lottery, other and all common stocks in the CRSP universe in each year. Stock price is
the average price. Stock return is the monthly realized return. Firm size in million U.S. dollar is
calculated as stock price multiplied by shares outstanding. MTB Ratio is defined as the market
value of the firm over its book value. Market value equals to market equity at calendar year-end
plus book debt while book value is calculated as stockholders’ equity minus preferred stock plus
deferred taxes and investment tax credits and post retirement assets. Trading volume is the log-
transformed turnover (i.e., total shares traded divided by outstanding shares). Idiosyncratic
volatility is the standard deviation of the residual from the four-factor model. Total skewness
(kurtosis) is the third (fourth) moment of monthly stock returns. Idiosyncratic skewness is the
scaled measure of the third moment of the residual from a two factor model (i.e., equation (2.2)).
Observations is the number of firm-month observations.
Panel A: Characteristics of lottery-like stocks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Lottery-like
stocks
Non-lottery
stocks
Other stocks CRSP all
stocks
Number of stocks 1,269 1,288 1,721 4,278
Stock price 5.67 135.03 19.42 51.10
Stock return 0.87% 0.80% 0.84% 0.84%
Firm size ($M) 266.54 8,995.79 1,694.37 3,534.46
Total volatility 19.63% 8.61% 12.40% 13.39%
Idiosyncratic volatility 18.80% 7.62% 11.40% 12.48%
Total skewness 0.52 0.08 0.23 0.27
Idiosyncratic skewness 0.54 0.15 0.28 0.32
Kurtosis 1.19 0.51 0.67 0.77
MTB ratio 2.22 1.68 1.73 1.85
Trading Volume -2.71 -2.14 -2.37 -2.40
Observations 127,858 137,200 180,136 445,194
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Table 2.2 (Cont’d)
This panel reports the summary statistics of other variables for our empirical analyses. IPO return
is the monthly average first-day return (in percentage) on the net IPOs. Hotness reports the
percentage of deals that priced above the midpoint of the original file price range. IPO number is
the natural logarithm of the monthly number of net IPOs. All the above three variables are
obtained from Jay Ritter’s website. Market return (i.e., VWMKTt in equation (2.11)) reports the
value-weighted monthly percentage return excluding dividends for all stocks in the CRSP
universe. UNEMP reports the U.S. monthly unemployment rate obtained from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. UEI is the unexpected inflation (i.e., current month inflation minus the average
of the past 12 realizations). MP is the monthly growth in industrial production obtained from the
Federal Reserve. RP is the monthly default premium (i.e., difference between Moody’s Baa-rated
and Aaa-rated corporate bond yields) obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. TS is
the term spread (i.e., difference between the yields of a constant maturity 10-year Treasury bond
and 3-month Treasury bill). Split is the monthly average splitting probability in percentage. IO is
the annual total institutional ownership. Stock return (i.e., returni, t in equation (2.10)) reports the
stock-level monthly percentage return excluding dividends. Ln (Size) is the natural logarithm of
market capitalization. Std dev reports the standard deviation. We also report the 25, 50, and 75
percentiles. N reports the number of observations. The sample period is from 2005 to 2013 for
most variables.
Panel B: Other variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Mean Std dev 25th Pctl 50th Pctl 75th Pctl N
IPO return 13.44 9.68 8.40 12.50 18.00 107
Hotness 37.79 23.31 22.00 40.00 50.00 107
IPO number 2.21 0.68 1.61 2.40 2.71 107
Market return 0.85 3.80 -1.47 1.15 3.40 107
UNEMP 7.04 1.98 5.00 7.40 9.00 108
UEI -0.01 0.47 -0.24 0.01 0.29 108
MP 0.07 0.81 -0.20 0.20 0.55 108
RP 1.19 0.55 0.90 0.98 1.29 108
TS 1.82 1.21 0.77 1.97 2.78 108
Split 0.12 0.14 0.03 0.07 0.19 108
IO 55.14 32.61 25.41 58.93 85.40 33,095
Stock return 0.54 16.40 -6.66 0.00 6.60 373,847
Ln (Size) 12.91 2.01 11.45 12.81 14.24 373,847
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Table 2.3: Stock return predictability regression estimates
This table reports the predictive power of our Google gambling sentiment measure. We regress
portfolio abnormal returns on the abnormal search volume intensity for the topic "lottery":
ARportfolio, t+n = α + βn×ASVIt + εt, (n=0, 1, 2, 3).
ASVI is the abnormal search volume intensity based on the time-series difference in log search
volume intensities (see equation (2.1)). We estimate the abnormal return of individual stocks by
36 months rolling window regressions. We use the Carhart (1997) four-factor model as
benchmark. We then form value-weighted portfolios of lottery-like, non-lottery, and other stocks.
Lottery-like stocks are defined as stocks within the upper 30 percentiles of Lottery Index (LIDX)
in each year. Non-lottery stocks are defined as stocks in the bottom 30 percentiles of LIDX in
each year. Other stocks are the rest of stocks in the CRSP universe. βn measure the predictive
power of ASVI with n lags. Column (1) indicates the month n (n=0, 1, 2, 3). Columns (2) to (4)
report the regression coefficients on ASVI (βn) for lottery-like, non-lottery, and other stock
portfolios, respectively. Firms in the three portfolios are rebalanced in every January while
portfolio weights are adjusted in every month according to market capitalization in the previous
month. Column 5 reports the coefficient estimates of a portfolio strategy that goes long in lottery-
like stocks and goes short in non-lottery stocks. The sample period is from January 2005 to
December 2013. N months reports the number of months. Standard errors (reported in parentheses)
are adjusted for auto-correlation using the Newey and West (1987) method. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Months Lottery-likestocks
Non-lottery
stocks Other stocks
Long-short
portfolio
0 0.847 -0.140 0.416 0.987
(0.925) (0.145) (0.453) (0.961)
1 2.339** -0.025 -0.586 2.365**
(0.947) (0.137) (0.509) (1.000)
2 -1.372 -0.003 0.308 -1.369
(0.976) (0.199) (0.360) (1.021)
3 -1.653** 0.199 -0.522* -1.852**
(0.787) (0.136) (0.307) (0.827)
N months 108 108 108 108
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Table 2.4: Stock performance around attention-grabbing jackpots
This table reports the average abnormal return for lottery-like and non-lottery stocks around
attention-grabbing jackpots. We define attention-grabbing jackpots in three different ways. First,
the all-time largest jackpot is the $656 million jackpot announced on March 30, 2012, which is
the largest jackpot in the U.S. history. Second, record-breaking jackpots are the jackpots that
break national record at the time. They include the all-time largest jackpot and two other jackpots
announced on February 18, 2006 and March 6, 2007. Third, we use a broader definition of
attention-grabbing jackpots. In addition to the above three record-breaking jackpots, we include
five near-record jackpots that are either the second largest jackpot at the time or the largest jackpot
over the past 24 months. We estimate the following regression:
ݎ௣௢௥௧௙௢௟௜௢,௧− ݎ௙,௧= ߙ+ ߚଵܦ[ିଵ,ାଵ]௃௔௖௞௣௢௧+ ߚଶܦ[ାଶ,ାଷ]௉௢௦௧ + ߚଷ൫ݎ௠ ௞௧− ݎ௙൯+ ߚସݎ௦௠ ௕ + ߚହݎ௛௠ ௟+ ߚ଺ݎ௨௠ ௗ+ ௧߳,.
Dependent variable is the average excess return of lottery-like or non-lottery stocks in month t.
The final drawing dates of attention-grabbing jackpots are in month 0. ܦ[ିଵ,ାଵ]௃௔௖௞௣௢௧ is a dummy
variable that equals to one from month -1 to month 1 and zero otherwise. β1 measures average
monthly abnormal return for the (-1, +1) period. ܦ[ାଶ,ାଷ]௉௢௦௧ is a dummy variable that equals to one
for the (+2, +3) period and zero otherwise. β2 measures average monthly abnormal return for the
(+2, +3) period. Panel A (B) reports the estimated coefficients of β1 (β2). Long-short portfolio is
a portfolio strategy that goes long in the lottery-like stock portfolio and goes short in the non-
lottery stock portfolio. The sample period is from January 2005 to December 2013. Standard errors
(reported in parentheses) are adjusted for auto-correlation using the Newey and West (1987)
method. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Average monthly abnormal return during months (-1, +1)
Jackpot type Lottery-like stocks Non-lottery stocks Long-short
portfolio
All-time largest 1.750*** 0.047 1.704***
(0.416) (0.189) (0.519)
Record-breaking 1.546** -0.137 1.683***
(0.597) (0.122) (0.605)
Attention-grabbing 1.694* -0.164 1.858*
(0.865) (0.139) (0.941)
Panel B: Average monthly abnormal return during months (+2, +3)
Jackpot type Lottery-like stocks Non-lottery stocks Long-short
portfolio
All-time largest -1.225* -0.090 -1.135*
(0.678) (0.106) (0.638)
Record-breaking -1.100* 0.114 -1.214**
(0.610) (0.199) (0.578)
Attention-grabbing -0.395 0.236 -0.630
(0.752) (0.147) (0.805)
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Table 2.5: Trading volume around attention-grabbing jackpots
This table reports the abnormal trading volume of lottery-like and non-lottery stocks around
attention-grabbing jackpots. We define attention-grabbing jackpots in three different ways. First,
the all-time largest jackpot is the $656 million jackpot announced on March 30, 2012, which is
the largest jackpot in the U.S. history. Second, record-breaking jackpots are the jackpots that
break national record at the time. They include the all-time largest jackpot and two other jackpots
announced on February 18, 2006 and March 6, 2007. Third, we use a broader definition of
attention-grabbing jackpots. In addition to the above three record-breaking jackpots, we include
five near-record jackpots that are either the second largest jackpot at the time or the largest jackpot
over the past 24 months. Abnormal trading volume is estimated as the difference between log-
transformed turnover (the total number of shares traded divided by shares outstanding) in month
t and the average log-transformed turnover in the estimation period. The estimation period has a
length of 36 months and ends three months before the event month. Panel A reports the average
abnormal trading volume in months (-1, +1) for the all-time largest, recording-breaking, and
attention-grabbing jackpots. Panel B reports the average abnormal trading volume in months (+2,
+3). The sample period is from January 2005 to December 2013. Standard errors (reported in
parentheses) are clustered by events and by firms. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Average abnormal trading volume during months (-1, +1)
Jackpot type Lottery-like stocks Non-lottery stocks Difference
All-time largest 1.556 -15.338*** 16.893***
(1.604) (0.668) (1.738)
Record-breaking 14.040** 7.046 6.994
(6.807) (10.039) (15.709)
Attention-grabbing 17.170*** -4.602 21.772**
(5.987) (6.079) (8.532)
Panel B: Average abnormal trading volume during months (+2, +3)
Jackpot type Lottery-like stocks Non-lottery stocks Difference
All-time largest 1.536 -1.765* 3.301
(2.166) (0.934) (2.359)
Record-breaking 18.086** 19.186* -1.100
(7.909) (10.694) (26.367)
Attention-grabbing 20.975*** -0.244 21.219**
(5.930) (7.927) (9.900)
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Table 2.6: Aggregate demand for lottery-like stocks around large jackpots
This table reports the excess buy-sell imbalance (EBSI) of lottery-like stocks around the largest
Powerball jackpot announced on July 7, 1993. We run the following time-series regression:
ܧܤ ܵܫ௧= ߙ+ ߚଵܦ[ିଵ,ାଵ]௃௔௖௞௣௢௧+ ߚଶܯܭܴܶܧ ௧ܶ+ ߚଷܯܭܴܶܧ ௧ܶି ଵ + ߚସܱܮ ܴܶܧ ௧ܶ+ ߚହܱܮ ܴܶܧ ௧ܶି ଵ+ ߚ଺ܧܤ ܵܫ௧ି ଵ + ܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ+ ௧߳.
EBSIt is the month t difference in buy-sell imbalance between lottery-like and non-lottery stocks.
ܦ[ିଵ,ାଵ]௃௔௖௞௣௢௧ is a dummy variable that equals one from month -1 to month 1 around the largest jackpot,
and zero otherwise. Other independent variables include contemporaneous and one month lagged
market returns (MKTRETt, MKTRETt-1), contemporaneous and one month lagged returns of the
lottery-like stock portfolio (LOTRETt, LOTRETt-1), and EBSI in the previous month. Control
variables include five macroeconomic variables: U.S. monthly unemployment rate (UNEMP),
unexpected inflation (UEI), monthly growth in industrial production (MP), monthly default risk
premium (RP), and the term spread (TS). The sample period is from April 1992 to November
1996. N months reports the number of months. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are
adjusted for auto-correlation using the Newey and West (1987) method. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DJackpot 9.476*** 9.253*** 10.473*** 9.343** 7.059*
(3.159) (3.183) (3.887) (4.135) (4.045)
MKTRETt 0.863** 0.845** -1.177 -0.922 -1.107
(0.410) (0.388) (1.264) (1.349) (1.234)
MKTRETt-1 0.144 -0.261 -1.182 -1.526
(0.430) (0.450) (1.215) (1.278)
LOTRETt 1.417 1.307 1.549*
(0.871) (0.911) (0.845)
LOTRETt-1 0.667 0.720
(0.716) (0.777)
EBSIt-1 0.257**
(0.115)
Constant 30.370** 31.153** 32.223** 33.576** 27.603*
(13.657) (14.122) (15.171) (16.221) (14.766)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N months 56 56 56 56 56
Adjusted R2 0.167 0.152 0.201 0.200 0.227
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Table 2.7: Aggregate demand for lottery-like stocks following large drawings
This table reports the daily buy-sell imbalance (EBSI) of lottery-like stocks following large
Powerball drawings. We run the following time-series regression:
ܧܤ ܵܫ௧= ߙ+ ߚଵܦ௧஽௥௔௪௜௡௚ + ߚଶܯܭܴܶܧ ௧ܶ+ ߚଷܱܮ ܴܶܧ ௧ܶ+ ߚସܧܤ ܵܫ௧ି ଵ + ߚହܸܺܫ ௧ି ଵ+ ߚ଺ܣܦ ௧ܵି ଵ + ܥ݋݊ ݐݎ݋݈ ݏ+ ௧߳.
EBSIt is the day t difference in buy-sell imbalance between lottery-like and non-lottery stocks.
ܦ௧
஽௥௔௪௜௡௚ is a dummy variable that equals to one on the next trading day following a large
drawing, and zero on days with no drawings or small drawings. A large (small) drawing has above
(below) median drawing value during the sample period. Other independent variables include
market return, return of the lottery-like stock portfolio, and lagged EBSI. VIXt-1 is the lagged
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) daily market volatility index. ADSt-1 is the lagged
Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti business conditions index. Control variables include lagged market and
lottery-like stock portfolio returns (up to five lags) and day-of-the-week dummies. The sample
period is from April 22, 1992 to November 30, 1996. N days reports the number of trading days.
Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are adjusted for auto-correlation using the Newey and
West (1987) method. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DDrawing 3.423* 3.293* 3.178* 3.170* 3.080*
(1.785) (1.783) (1.716) (1.721) (1.693)
MKTRETt 3.114*** 6.856** 6.047** 6.061** 5.673**
(1.189) (2.740) (2.800) (2.804) (2.769)
LOTRETt -3.273 -2.769 -2.780 -2.570
(2.064) (2.131) (2.140) (2.119)
EBSIt-1 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.157***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
VIXt-1 -0.054 0.287
(0.383) (0.410)
ADSt-1 -6.737***
(1.719)
Constant 2.260* 2.519* 1.963 2.744 -0.800
(1.316) (1.338) (1.287) (5.793) (5.976)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N days 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.022 0.053 0.052 0.068
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Table 2.8: Stock performance among U.S. states sorted by gambling sentiment
This table reports the performance of a value-weighted portfolio of lottery-like or non-lottery
stocks. Abnormal return is measured as the intercept of monthly return regressions by using the
Carhart (1997) four factor model as benchmark. Full sample reports the abnormal portfolio returns
for all stocks in our sample. Strong (moderate) (weak) sentiment reports the abnormal portfolio
returns of stocks headquartered in U.S. states with strong (moderate) (weak) gambling sentiment.
Strong-weak (strong-moderate) measures the abnormal return difference between stocks located
in states with strong and weak (moderate) gambling sentiment. Strong (moderate) (weak)
gambling sentiment state group includes 17 states with top (medium) (bottom) average search
volume intensity for the topic “lottery”. The three groups of states are updated in January of each
year. Long-short portfolio is a portfolio strategy that goes long in the lottery-like stock portfolio
and goes short in the non-lottery stock portfolio. The sample period is from January 2005 to
December 2013. N months reports the number of months. Standard errors (reported in parentheses)
are adjusted for auto-correlation using the Newey and West (1987) method. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Lottery-like
stocks
Non-lottery stocks Long-short
portfolio
Full sample -0.422* 0.010 -0.432*
(0.222) (0.033) (0.242)
Strong sentiment -0.542** 0.060 -0.602**
(0.225) (0.054) (0.253)
Moderate sentiment -0.143 -0.045 -0.098
(0.284) (0.080) (0.285)
Weak sentiment 0.146 -0.056 0.202
(0.447) (0.151) (0.477)
Strong – weak -0.687* 0.116 -0.803*
(0.394) (0.159) (0.427)
Strong – moderate -0.399 0.105 -0.504**
(0.251) (0.113) (0.240)
N months 108 108 108
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Table 2.9: Performance of stocks headquartered in U.S. states with strong
gambling sentiment
This table reports the performance of a value-weighted portfolio of stocks located in U.S. states
with strong gambling sentiment. Abnormal return is measured as the intercept of monthly return
regressions by using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model as benchmark. Panel A reports the
long-term performance of stocks with different levels of institutional ownership (IO). Low (high)
IO is the abnormal return of a value-weighted portfolio of lottery-like or non-lottery stocks with
less (more) than ten percent institutional ownership. Panel B reports the long-term performance
of stocks with different market capitalizations. Small (large) is the abnormal return of stocks in
the bottom (top) 30% by size. Low- high (Small- large) reports the abnormal return difference
between the same types of stocks with different levels of institutional ownership (market
capitalizations). Long-short portfolio reports the abnormal return earned by a portfolio strategy
that goes long in lottery-like stocks and goes short in non-lottery stocks. The sample period is
from January 2005 to December 2013. N months reports the number of months. Standard errors
(reported in parentheses) are adjusted for auto-correlation using the Newey and West (1987)
method. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Stocks sorted by institutional ownership
(1) (2) (3)
Lottery-like stocks Non-lottery stocks Long-short
portfolio
Low IO -1.237*** 0.112 -1.349***
(0.334) (0.405) (0.503)
High IO -0.465** 0.064 -0.529**
(0.223) (0.056) (0.250)
Low – high -0.772** 0.048 -0.821*
(0.331) (0.406) (0.455)
N months 108 108 108
Panel B: Stocks sorted by firm size
(1) (2) (3)
Lottery-like stocks Non-lottery stocks Long-short
portfolio
Small -3.427*** -1.989*** -1.438***
(0.384) (0.443) (0.390)
Large -0.050 0.062 -0.111
(0.248) (0.054) (0.272)
Small - large -3.377*** -2.050*** -1.327***
(0.451) (0.456) (0.422)
N months 108 108 108
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Table 2.10: Gambling sentiment and stock splits
This table reports the results of our logistic estimate. We run the following regressions:
Logit (Spliti,t )= α + β1DASVIt-1 + β2 Dpi,t-1 + β3DASVIt-1×Dpi,t-1 + β4Returni,t + β5Sizei,t-1 + β 6MTBi,t-1
                              + β7Spllitteri,t-12 + εt..
Dependent variable is equal to one if a company splits its shares in a given month. Independent
variables include a dummy variable of the abnormal search volume intensity for the topic”
Lottery” (DASVIt-1), a dummy variable of stock prices (Dpi,t-1), and their interaction term (DASVIt-1×
Dpi,t-1). We use 75th percentile as the break points for both dummies. DASVIt-1 is equal to one if it
has a value above the 75th percentile of the time-series. Similarly, Dpt-1 is equal to one if a firms'
price is above the 75th percentile of all stock in the CRSP universe in a given month. Control
variables include size (Sizei,t-1) and market-to-book ratio (MTBi,t-1) at the beginning of the month
and return (Returni,t) over the course of the month. Sizei,t-1 is the natural logarithm of the market
capitalization of stock i in month t-1 while MTBi,t-1 is defined as the market value of the firm over
its book value. Market value equals to market equity at calendar year-end plus book debt while
book value is calculated as stockholders’ equity minus preferred stock plus deferred taxes and
investment tax credits and post retirement assets. Splitteri,t-12 is equal to one if a firm splits its
share in the previous year. The sample period is from January 2005 to December 2013.
Observations is the number of firm-month observations. Standard errors (reported in parentheses)
are clustered by firm and by time. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DASVIt-1×Dpt-1 1.118** 1.116** 1.116** 1.119** 1.120**
(0.514) (0.517) (0.518) (0.520) (0.520)
DASVIt-1 -0.927 -0.930 -0.928 -0.932 -0.932
(0.595) (0.597) (0.597) (0.601) (0.601)
Dpt-1 3.713*** 3.730*** 3.905*** 3.926*** 3.928***
(0.224) (0.228) (0.239) (0.244) (0.244)
Returnt 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sizet-1 -0.066** -0.067** -0.063**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
MTBt-1 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.003)
Splittert-12 -0.494
(0.410)
Constant -9.109*** -9.129*** -8.334*** -8.375*** -8.415***
(0.258) (0.262) (0.480) (0.483) (0.484)
Observations 373,910 373,847 373,847 373,847 373,847
Pseudo R2 0.143 0.143 0.144 0.145 0.145
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Table 2.11: Gambling sentiment and first-day IPO returns
This table reports the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs). We run the following
regressions:
rtIPO = α + β1ASVIt-1 + β2pt-1 + β3VWMKTt + β3Hotnesst + β4IPOnumbert + εt..
The dependent variable is the monthly average first-day return on the net IPOs obtained from Jay
Ritter’s website. Net IPOs are IPOs excluding closed-end funds, REITs, acquisition companies,
stocks with offer prices below $5, ADRs, limited partnerships, units, banks and S&Ls, and those
not listed on CRSP. First-day return is calculated as the percentage return from the offering price
to the first closing bid price. The monthly average first-day return is calculated as the equal-
weighted average of the first-day returns on all the offerings in a particular calendar month.
Independent variables are the abnormal search volume intensity for the topic “lottery” in the
previous month (ASVIt-1). Following Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2009), we also include the
average log price in the previous month (pt-1) and the value-weighted return excluding dividends
of all common stocks in the CRSP universe (VWMKTt) as control variables. In addition, we control
for the hotness of IPO market (Hotnesst, i.e., the percentage of deals that priced above the midpoint
of the original file price range) and the natural logarithm of monthly number of net IPOs
(IPOnumbert). The sample period is from January 2005 to June 2014. N months reports the number
of months. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are adjusted for auto-correlation using the
Newey and West (1987) method. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ASVIt-1 6.445** 7.022** 7.233** 8.402** 8.093***
(3.163) (3.417) (3.406) (3.367) (3.090)
VWMKTt 0.516** 0.487** 0.405** 0.414**
(0.222) (0.221) (0.193) (0.190)
pt-1 13.167*** 14.310*** 14.978***
(4.335) (2.807) (2.781)
Hotnesst 0.166*** 0.168***
(0.041) (0.040)
IPOnumbert -0.726
(1.766)
Constant 13.432*** 12.993*** -38.949** -49.672*** -50.776***
(1.290) (1.307) (17.384) (11.448) (10.672)
N months 107 107 107 107 107
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.042 0.125 0.281 0.276
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Table 2.12: Robustness checks
This table reports results for various robustness tests. Panels A and B consider the robustness with
respect to the predictive power of our gambling sentiment measure. The dependent variables are
the contemporaneous and future abnormal returns of a long-short portfolio. In Panel A, Columns
1 to 5 include U.S. monthly unemployment rate (UNEMP), unexpected inflation (UEI, i.e., current
month inflation minus the average of the past 12 realizations), monthly growth in industrial
production (MP), monthly default risk premium (RP, i.e., difference between Moody’s Baa-rated
and Aaa-rated corporate bond yields), or term spread (TS, i.e., difference between the yields of a
constant maturity 10-year Treasury bond and 3-month Treasury bill) respectively as
macroeconomic control. ALL (Column 6) reports the estimates by including all the five
macroeconomic controls. Panel B considers subsets of data. Columns 1 and 2 consider a
subsample from 2005 to 2010 when data on monthly investor sentiment index are available (Baker
and Wurgler, 2007). Columns 3 and 4 consider the sample after June 2006, when Google’s search
volume intensity data become publicly available. We use Column 5 of Table 2.3 as the baseline
specification. Panel C considers the robustness of our results for stock splits. Dependent variable
is equal to one if the company splits its shares in a given month. Column 1 includes firm-level
fixed effects. Columns 2 to 7 include the five macroeconomic variables as control variables. We
use Column 5 of Table 2.8 as the baseline specification. Panel D considers the robustness of results
related to IPO first-day return. The dependent variable is the monthly average first-day return on
the net IPOs obtained from Jay Ritter’s website. Columns 1 to 6 include macroeconomic controls.
Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are adjusted for auto-correlation using the Newey and
West (1987) method (Panels A, B, and D) or clustered by firm and by time (Panel C). ***, **, and
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Return predictability with macroeconomic controls
Months (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UNEMP UEI MP RP TS ALL
0 0.985 1.008 1.035 1.070 0.991 1.084
(0.962) (0.996) (0.969) (0.974) (0.964) (1.026)
1 2.364** 2.368** 2.440** 2.493** 2.357** 2.506**
(1.005) (1.021) (0.965) (1.029) (1.006) (1.038)
2 -1.369 -1.369 -1.269 -1.264 -1.372 -1.223
(1.027) (1.022) (1.115) (1.017) (1.024) (1.110)
3 -1.851** -1.864** -1.800** -1.755** -1.852** -1.739*
(0.831) (0.847) (0.896) (0.829) (0.832) (0.878)
N months 108 108 108 108 108 108
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Table 2.12 (Cont’d)
Panel B: Return predictability with subsamples and investor sentiment control
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Months 2005-
2010
2005-2010 After June
06
After June 06
0 1.234 1.235 0.830 0.871
(1.830) (1.829) (1.060) (2.500)
1 3.437*** 3.433*** 2.413** 4.127***
(1.215) (1.246) (1.138) (1.521)
2 -1.836 -1.846 -1.013 -1.088
(1.522) (1.540) (1.104) (2.028)
3 -2.413 -2.420 -2.315** -3.876**
(1.484) (1.455) (0.933) (1.804)
Sentiment
Control NO YES NO YES
N months 72 72 91 55
Panel C: Stock split with firm-level fixed effects and macroeconomic controls
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Firm
FE
UMEM
P
UEI MP RP TS ALL
DASVIt-1×Dpt-
1
1.248*
* 1.115**
1.121*
*
1.121*
*
1.116*
*
1.117*
*
1.114*
*
(0.634) (0.519) (0.520) (0.520) (0.519) (0.519) (0.518)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observation
s 38,100 373,847
373,84
7
373,84
7
373,84
7
373,84
7
373,84
7
Pseudo R2 0.186 0.167 0.146 0.146 0.171 0.161 0.180
Panel D: IPO first-day return with macroeconomic controls
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UMEMP UEI MP RP TS ALL
ASVIt-1 7.982*** 8.066** 7.900** 8.000*** 7.765*** 7.561**
(3.000) (3.133) (3.113) (2.952) (2.903) (3.040)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
N months 107 107 107 107 107 107
Adjusted
R2 0.276 0.270 0.271 0.269 0.288 0.270
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Figure 2.1: Search volume intensity for “lottery”
This figure plots the time-series of the search volume intensity (SVI) for the topic “lottery” at the
national level from January 2005 to December 2013. Points A to H correspond to the eight
attention-grabbing jackpots. We define attention-grabbing jackpots in three different ways. First,
the all-time largest jackpot is the $656 million jackpot announced on March 30, 2012, which is
the largest jackpot in the U.S. history. Second, record-breaking jackpots are the jackpots that
break national record at the time. They include the all-time largest jackpot and two other jackpots
announced on February 18, 2006 and March 6, 2007. Third, we use a broader definition of
attention-grabbing jackpots. In addition to the above three record-breaking jackpots, we include
near-record jackpots that are either the second largest jackpot at the time or the largest jackpot
over the past 24 months. Prize and date of the eight jackpots are reported in Appendix Table 2.1A.
Source: Google Trends.
Panel A: National-level search volume intensity for “lottery”
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Figure 2.1 (Cont’d)
This panel plots the search volume intensity (SVI) for the topic “lottery” for three U.S. states:
Florida, Utah, and Texas. Points A and B correspond to jackpots of single state lotto games, while
points C and D correspond to jackpots of multi-state lotto games. Source: Google Trends.
Panel B: State-level search volume intensity for “lottery”
50
Figure 2.1 (Cont’d)
This panel shows the geographical distribution of the search volume intensity (SVI) for the topic
“lottery”. Darker color indicates stronger search volume intensity. The intensity is calculated
based on the average SVI during the 2004-2013 period. Source: Google Trends.
Panel C: Geographical distribution of search volume intensity for “lottery”
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Appendix
Table 2.1A: Attention-grabbing jackpots
This table provides details about the eight attention-grabbing jackpots in our sample. ID
corresponds to data points shown in Panel A of Figure 2.1. Jackpot date is the final drawing day
of the jackpot. First date is the first drawing day of the jackpot. Value is the prize of winning the
jackpot in million dollars. Game is the corresponding lotto game of a jackpot. Note indicates
whether the jackpot is the all-time largest, record-breaking, or attention-grabbing. We define the
attention-grabbing jackpots in three different ways. First, the all-time largest jackpot is the $656
million jackpot announced on March 30, 2012, which is the largest jackpot in the U.S. history.
Second, record-breaking jackpots are the jackpots that break national record at the time. They
include the all-time largest jackpot and two other jackpots announced on February 18, 2006 and
March 6, 2007. Third, we use a broader definition of attention-grabbing jackpots. In addition to
the above three record-breaking jackpots, we include five near-record jackpots that are either the
second largest jackpot at the time or the largest jackpot over the past 24 months. Source: Mega
Millions, Powerball.
ID Jackpot date First date Value ($ m) Game Note
A Feb 18, 2006 Dec 17, 2005 365 Powerball Record-breaking
B Mar 6, 2007 Jan 12, 2007 390 Mega Millions Record-breaking
C Aug 28, 2009 Jul 10, 2009 336 Mega Millions Near-record
D Jan 4, 2011 Nov 12, 2010 380 Mega Millions Near-record
E Mar 30, 2012 Jan 27, 2012 656 Mega Millions All-time largest
F Nov 28, 2012 Oct 6, 2012 588 Powerball Near-record
G May 18, 2013 Apr 3, 2013 591 Powerball Near-record
H Dec 17, 2013 Oct 4, 2013 648 Mega Millions Near-record
52
Chapter 3
Social Sensitivity and Stock Returns
3.1. Introduction
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has attracted increasing attention among
academics as well as practitioners. According to the U.S. Forum for Sustainable and
Responsible Investment (USSIF), the total U.S. domiciled assets under management using
socially responsible investing (SRI) strategies have reached $6.57 trillion in 2014.29 In
addition, survey evidence also suggests that investors care about social attributes.
According to Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012), 52% of respondents are actively seeking
firm-level CSR information. Consequently, investors are likely to update their beliefs
about firm-level social attributes regularly, which in turn could affect their investment
choices.
In this paper, we propose a novel method for identifying stocks that are likely to be
influenced by investors’ recent perception on stock-level social attributes. Specifically,
we estimate the return sensitivity of industries and firms with respect to Google search
volume of CSR-related keywords on an 18-month rolling basis. These social sensitivity
estimates capture the social attributes perceived by the market in recent periods. In
particular, according to our social sensitivity estimate, investors perceive a firm or an
industry as having good social attributes if it earns higher average returns during periods
with high CSR search volume in the recent past. We find that this identification strategy
is consistent with exiting low frequency CSR ratings and investors’ preconception on
industry-level CSR records, but provides a higher frequency (i.e., monthly) time-varying
measure for investors’ perception about social attributes.
When investors update their beliefs about social attributes, they are likely to rebalance
their portfolios and tilt investments toward firms with good perceived social attributes.
This trading behavior could generate predictable return patterns among firms with greater
29 Source: USSIF 2014 Trends Report available at:
http://www.ussif.org/Files/Publications/SIF_Trends_14.F.ES.pdf.
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social sensitivity. Specifically, we conjecture that there will be predictable return patterns
of socially sensitive firms and industries that can be identified ex-ante. Industries and
stocks with good perceived social attributes are likely to be underpriced so these stocks
are likely to have better future return.
With our social sensitivity estimates, we find that returns of stocks and industries with
greater return sensitivity to investors’ CSR-related searches are predictable. In particular,
a trading strategy that goes long in a value-weighted industry portfolio with the most
positive social sensitivity and goes short in a value-weighted industry portfolio with the
most negative social sensitivity generates a characteristic-adjusted return of 1.17% per
month from 2005 to 2013, or 14.02% per year. This return predictability covers 15-36%
of total market capitalization, which is economically meaningful.
In addition, our results remain robust at the stock level. Specifically, a value-weighted
portfolio of stocks with the most positive social sensitivity earns a seven-factor adjusted
alpha of 9.5% per year. Further, our results are robust to various unconditional and
conditional factor models as well as three alternative social sensitivity measures.
Beyond these return-based tests, we further investigate the potential economic channel
for our findings. In particular, we examine whether perceived social attributes affect the
investment choices of institutional investors using institutional trading data. This test is
motivated by the evidence in recent studies which shows that institutional investors are
more norm-constrained and care more about CSR (e.g., Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009;
Kumar, Page, and Spalt, 2011) and have better trading skills (Puckett and Yan, 2011). In
addition, our double sorted portfolio results also suggest that the predictability results are
stronger for firms that are more likely to be held by institutional investors (i.e., large firms
and firms with high institutional ownership). If institutional investors frequently update
their portfolio holdings to include stocks with good social attributes (i.e., which are
underpriced in the recent period), their trading activity could help to correct the
underpricing of stocks with good perceived social attributes. Consistent with our
hypothesis, we find that institutional investors have 1.3% higher net demand per month
on firms with good perceived social attributes in the recent period.
In the last set of tests, we examine the longevity of our return predictability results. We
find that the predictive power of our social sensitivity estimates declines as we increase
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the gap between social sensitivity estimation month and portfolio formation month. This
finding further supports our conjecture that investors update their perceptions about social
attributes and rebalance their investment frequently. Since institutional investors update
their portfolio holdings frequently and correct the underpricing of stocks with good
perceived social attributes, the alpha estimate of a long short strategy that based on stale
information becomes statistically insignificant after 3 months. This evidence suggests that
the underpricing of perceived social attributes is likely to be corrected in about 3 months.
Taken together, our findings contribute to several strands of literature. First, we
contribute to the emerging literature on corporate social responsibility. As suggested by
Liang and Renneboog (2016), the existing literature has typically focused on one
perspective on CSR such as Employee satisfaction and workplace safety (e.g., Edmans,
2011; Cohn and Wardlaw, 2016; Li, Edmans, and Zhang, 2016), environmental protection
(e.g., Dowell, Hart, and Yeung, 2000; Konar and Cohen, 2001; Chava, 2014), corporate
philanthropy (e.g., Masulis and Reza, 2015), customer satisfaction (e.g., Luo and
Bhattacharya, 2006; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013), or corporate governance (e.g., Dimson,
Karakas, and Li, 2015; Cheng, Hong, and Shue, 2016; Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog,
2016). We extend the previous literature by focusing on investors’ perception about firm-
level social attributes. Our key innovation is to identify firms and industries that are likely
to be perceived as having good social attributes by the market. In addition, we identify a
profitable SRI trading strategy based on social sensitivity.
Beyond the literature on CSR, our paper also contributes to the literature on return
predictability. For example, Cohen and Frazzini (2008) show that consumer-supplier links
can be used to identify predictable return patterns. In addition, Korniotis and Kumar
(2013) find that local economic conditions predict local stocks returns. Similarly,
Addoum and Kumar (2016) show that political sensitivity could also be used to identify
predictable patterns in stock returns. Our paper provides evidence of return predictability
along a new dimension, i.e., social responsibility dimension.
More broadly, we contribute to the literature on the value of intangible assets. The
previous literature suggests that firms with high research and development (Eberhart,
Maxwell, and Siddique, 2004), advertisement (Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis, 2001),
patent citations (Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li, 2013), and software development costs (Aboody
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and Lev, 1998) are likely to have better future returns. We show that good perceived social
attributes, which could be treated as a type of intangible assets, could also lead to better
stock returns.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the literature review and
hypothesis development. Section 3.3 discusses the data and methodology. Section 3.4
presents the empirical results. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2. Literature review and hypothesis development
3.2.1. Three views on the corporate social responsibility
The existing literature on corporate social responsibility mainly examines the relation
between corporate goodness and firm value. Theoretical work, as reviewed by Benabou
and Tirole (2010), has three different views for the impact of CSR on firm value. In
particular, the first view posits a win-win relation (i.e., “doing well by doing good”). This
view suggests that CSR is about taking a long-term perspective to maximize intertemporal
profits and correct short-termism of managers. Therefore, firms that are more socially
responsible should have better financial performance. Empirically, consistent with this
prediction, Edmans (2011) shows that employee satisfaction is positively associated with
firm value. A value-weighted portfolio of the ‘100 best companies to work for in America’
earned an annual four-factor adjusted alpha of 3.5% during the 1984 – 2009 period. In
addition, Deng, Kang, and Low (2013) find that acquirers with good social records realize
higher merger announcement returns. These mergers take less time and are less likely to
fail. Further, Dimson, Karakas, and Li (2015) find that successful shareholder
engagements for addressing environmental, social, and governance concerns are followed
by positive abnormal returns.
Similar to the first view, the second view conjectures that stakeholders delegate firms
to do good on their behalf. The costs of socially responsible behavior are then pass through
to stakeholders at their demand. Empirically, among others, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009)
find that although sin stocks (i.e., publicly traded firms involved in producing alcohol,
tobacco, and gambling) have higher expected returns than stocks that are otherwise
comparable, they are less held by norm-constrained investors, and receive less analysis
coverages. Further, the second view also suggest that CSR is consistent with profit
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maximization in the long-term. For example, El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra
(2011) find that firms with better CSR scores has cheaper equity financing while firms
involving in sin industries have substantially higher cost of equity.
In contrast to the first two views, the third view perceives CSR as an insider initiated
corporate philanthropy. In this scenario, CSR activities are value destroying. Among
others, Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman (2012) find that firms will only do good when they
have free cash flows. In addition, Cheng, Hong, and Shue (2016) and Masulis and Reza
(2015) show that increased insider ownership or corporate governance reduces corporate
goodness. Further, Krüger (2015) show that investors respond negatively to positive CSR
news, which suggests that investors perceive goodness spending as an agency problem.
Overall, the effect of CSR on firm value remains inconclusive. In a survey of all CSR
literature during the 1972 – 2007 period, Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh (2009) find that
most studies report a non-significant relation while the overall effect of CSR on firm value
is positive but small. In addition, a review by Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang (2008)
concludes that existing studies hint but do not clearly demonstrate that funds with CSR
screenings underperform conventional funds.
3.2.2. Main hypothesis
In this paper, we examine the relation between CSR and firm value from a new
perspective: perceived social attribute. The existing literature suggests that retail-based
industries are commonly perceived as socially responsible. These industry firms put a lot
of efforts in image building since a socially responsible corporate image could boost
consumer demand, generate customer loyalty, support premium pricing, and serve as an
alternative way to assure product quality (e.g., Besley and Ghatak, 2007; Castaldo,
Perrini, Misani, and Tencati, 2009; Elfenbein, Fisman, and Mcmanus, 2012; and
Albuquerque, Durnev, and Koskinen, 2016).
In contrast, some industries have controversial business and are commonly viewed as
socially irresponsible. For example, industries involving in fossil fuel (i.e., coal, oil, and
natural gas) and other natural resources (e.g., mining, precious metal) are commonly
screened by socially responsible funds. In addition, the Forum for Sustainable and
Responsible Investment (i.e., USSIF) also encourages all types of investors to divest from
these industries to address climate changes risks. Motivated by the above evidence, we
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conjecture that industry and stock level social attributes could influence the investment
preferences of investors.
Since investors frequently update their beliefs on firm level CSR reputation, they are
likely to alert their investments based on an industry’s perceived social attributes in the
recent past, which in turn could impact stock prices. To summarize, the key hypothesis of
this paper is that perceived social attributes affect stock returns. Firms with good
perceived social attributes in the recent past are likely to have better future returns.
3.3. Data and methodology
3.3.1. Main datasets
We collect data from various sources. We obtain market excess return (MKTRF), the
size factor (SMB), the value factor (HML), the momentum factor (UMD), the short term
reversal (STR) and long-term reversal (LTR) factors, and value-weighted returns of the 48
Fama and French (1997) industry portfolios at daily and monthly frequencies from
Kenneth French’s website.30 We obtain the liquidity factor (LIQ) from Lubos Pastor’s
website,31 the Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) cay measure from Sydney Ludvigson’s
website, U.S. business cycle data from National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER),
and Business Wire CSR newsletters from Factiva.
We obtain daily and monthly stock prices, stock returns, and shares outstanding from
Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP). We focus on all common stocks (i.e.,
share code equals to 10 or 11) in the CRSP universe and obtain relevant accounting
information from the CRSP-Compustat Merged dataset. We use the historical Standard
Industry Classification (SIC) codes from Compustat to assign all stocks into the 48 Fama
and French (1997) industries. If the historical SIC code is not available, we use the SIC
code from CRSP. We calculate book-to-market ratio for each firm using data from
Compustat. Specifically, book-to-market ratio is calculated as the ratio of year-end
stockholders’ equity plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit minus preferred stocks
to year-end market equity, as in Daniel and Titman (1997).
30 Available at: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
31 The liquidity factor is the main variable in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and is available at:
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor/research/.
58
We obtain the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (DGTW, 1997) characteristic-
adjustment stock assignments and benchmark portfolio returns from Russ Wermers’
website. Since the benchmark returns are available until 2011, we use the Daniel,
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermes (1997) method to generate DGTW returns for the 2012 to
2013 period.32 We estimate the DGTW return for each of the 48 Fama and French industry
portfolio by value weighting stock-level DGTW returns.33
To ensure our return-based social sensitivity measure captures industry- or firm-level
social attributes, we obtain stock-level ratings of corporate social responsibility from
KLD. This database covers the Russell 3000 stocks during the 2005 to 2013 period and is
widely used in the CSR literature. We focus on all the seven dimensions of corporate
goodness rated by KLD: Community, Diversity, Corporate Governance, Employee
Relations, Environment, Human Rights, and Product. KLD reports for each firm, its
number of strengths and concerns across all these seven dimensions. Since the number of
strength and concern indicators for most dimensions varies considerably each year, we
use the Deng, Kang, and Low (2013) method to calculate stock-level KLD score so that
it is comparable across years and dimensions. Specifically, we divide the aggregated
strength (concern) of each stock by the total number of strengths (concerns) in each year
to construct adjusted strength (concern). KLD score is the difference between adjusted
strength and adjusted concern. Further, as KLD ratings are updated annually, we use the
equal-weighted lagged KLD scores of industry firms in the Russell 3000 universe as
proxies for the scores of the corresponding 48 Fama and French industry portfolios.34
32 We verify the accuracy of our generated DGTW returns over the 2005 to 2011 period using the data from
Russ Wermers’ web site: http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm.
33 Following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) DGTW returns are calculated as follows: First,
we rank all stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq, at the end of June, by their market capitalization and
form quintile portfolios using NYSE quintile size breakpoints. We then further divide each quintile portfolio
into book-to-market quintiles based on their most recently available book-to-market ratio as of the end of
the December immediately prior to the ranking year. Finally, each of the resulting 25 portfolios are further
subdivided into quintiles based on the return in the past 12 months through the end of May of the ranking
year. This procedure forms 125 portfolios with each having a distinct combination of size, book-to-market,
and momentum characteristics. We reconstruct the 125 portfolios at the end of each June. We calculate
value-weighted returns for each of the 125 portfolios. DGTW adjusted return is defined as the return
difference between the stock and the corresponding portfolio of which that stock is a member.
34 We require all stocks to have valid adjusted strength and concern scores in all the seven dimensions to
ensure comparability. This filter does not affect the KLD coverage during the 2005 – 2012 period. However,
due to the significant criteria changes, only 300 firms have relevant data in 2013. Therefore, our sample for
KLD scores ends in 2012.
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To examine the institutional trading, we obtain transaction-level data of institutional
investors for the 2005 to 2010 period from ANcerno Ltd. This dataset reports execution
price, execution volume, side (i.e., buy or sell), and CUSIP for each transaction. As
suggested by Puckett and Yan (2011), ANcerno institutions are larger than the typical
institutions in the 13F universe and account for about 10% of all institutional trading
volume. In addition, characteristics of stocks held and traded by ANcerno institutions are
similar to those held by 13F institutions. We obtain institutional ownership data provided
by Ferreira and Matos (2008) from FactSet. We measure institutional ownership of a firm
using its average quarterly total institutional ownership in the previous year.
3.3.2. CSR attention measure
Following Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011, 2015), we use the search volume intensity
(SVI) reported by Google Trends to directly capture investors’ attention to CSR.
Specifically, we use the SVI for the topic “corporate social responsibility”. This time-
series measurement aggregates online search queries in different languages and different
keywords if they are related to CSR. The topic feature in Google Trends is able to identify
CSR-related searches even when a query does not explicitly contain the keyword
“CSR”.35 As Google accounts for approximately 67 percent of all search queries in the
U.S.,36 high CSR attention reflects a market-level increase in social awareness. We restrict
the search location to U.S. and measure the abnormal change in SVI (i.e., ASVI) as the log
difference in SVIs between month t and month t-1, as in Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011).37
The time-series of ASVI starts from 2004.
Figure 3.1 plots the time-series of SVI of the topic “corporate social responsibility”.
We find that the attention to CSR is time-varying. Before presenting our social sensitivity
estimation methods, we first validate our Google measure. In particular, we examine
whether CSR related news draws investors’ attention. This test is motivated by the “news
headlines” feature reported by Google Trends, which implies that the peaks of the SVI
35 For example, if you input “capital of Japan”, Google Trends will aggregate your search into the topic
“Tokyo”. Google Trends is available at: http://www.google.com/trends/.
36 The market share of Google is measured as of July, 2013. Source: comScore qSearch.
37 The time-series is in weekly frequency. Since CSR literature that focusing on the asset pricing
implications commonly examines monthly returns (e.g., Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Edmans, 2011), we
aggregate the time-series to monthly frequency by linear interpolation. In addition, to be consistent with the
literature using Google measure, we do not construct ASVI using error terms of time-series regressions.
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time-series coincide with CSR news headlines. In addition, Barber and Odean (2008)
show that news could generate attention-driven purchases.
To ensure the selection criteria of CSR news are objective and consistent over time,
we hand collect CSR newsletters reported by Business Wire. Since March 6, 2008,
Business Wire started to publish CSR newsletters called “corporate social responsibility
weekly recap” on a weekly basis. Each newsletter summaries CSR news around the world
during the previous week and covers various aspects of CSR: CSR awards, corporate
philanthropy, corporate policies, employee satisfaction, technological breakthrough, non-
profit organizations, and international environmental agreements. For each news headline,
Business Wire reports the location, summary, publishing date, and information source. A
sample newsletter is exhibited in Figure 3.2.38
Using these news headlines, we construct the monthly CSR news volume as follows.
We first obtain all newsletters (i.e., 292 newsletters) from Factiva for the March 2008 to
December 2013 period. We then assign each news headline into a corresponding calendar
month using its publishing date. Further, during the March 2008 to December 2013
period, there are five weeks without CSR newsletters. No evidence suggests that the
absence of CSR newsletters is caused by the lack of CSR news. Therefore, to ensure the
comparability of CSR news volume over time, we delete months with missing newsletters
because the total news volume of these months is lower than they should be and the CSR
news volume in these months are likely to be biased downward.39 Finally, we define log
CSR news volume as the natural log of the total number of news headlines in each month.
Figure 3.3 plots the standardized log SVI of CSR and standardized log CSR news
volume. We find that the two time-series share similar patterns. The pairwise correlation
test shows that the correlation between log SVI and CSR news volume is 0.56, significant
at the 1% level. Overall, we find that shifts in CSR attention could be associated with the
time-variation of CSR news volume.
38 The newsletter is available to the public from the Business Wire website:
https://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/home/distribution/csr/
39 These five weeks are: 30 April – 6 May 2009, 22 – 28 March 2012, 25 – 31 October 2012, 21 – 27
February 2013, and 22 – 28 August 2013. Our results are quantitatively similar if we include months with
missing CSR newsletters.
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3.3.3. Social sensitivity estimation and portfolio construction
Using Google search volume to capture investor attention, we estimate the return-based
social sensitivity for each of the 48 Fama and French industry portfolios. This industry-
level social sensitivity measure is motivated by the specifications used in Santa-Clara and
Valkanov (2003) and Addoum and Kumar (2016). For example, Kumar (2016) shows that
industry-level return sensitivity to the political party in power is able to capture the
market’s attitude toward an industry in the recent period, which in turn could identify
industries that are favored by investors in the current political climate. Similarly, we use
return sensitivity of industries to the attention to CSR to identify industries that are
favored by the socially responsible investors in the recent period ex-ante. Specifically, in
each month and for each industry portfolio, we regress the excess value-weighted industry
returns during the past 18 months on the excess market return and a social sentiment
indicator.40 In particular, we estimate the following time-series regression:
ݎ௜,௧− ݎ௙,௧= ߙ௜+ ߚ௜(ݎ௠ ௞௧− ݎ௙)௧+ ߠ௜ܦ௦௢௖௜௔௟,௧+ ௜߳,௧. (3.1)
In equation (3.1), the CSR attention indicator variable (Dsocial) equals to one when ASVI
of the topic “corporate social responsibility” in the previous month is above the time-
series median, or zero otherwise. This definition of Dsocial gives us a longer sample period
but raises the concern of potential look-ahead bias. In Section 3.7, we re-define Dsocial
using only past information, and our results remain unchanged.
Our focus is on the θi estimate, which captures the social sensitivity of an industry. A
positive θi estimate suggests that the industry earns higher average returns during high
CSR attention periods. In contrast, a negative θi suggest that the industry earns higher
average returns during low CSR attention periods. To allow for time-variation in both the
magnitude and direction of the social sensitivity estimates, we estimate θi with rolling
window regressions. The estimation period for θi is from April 2004 to November 2013
for our baseline specifications.
Using these social sensitivity estimates, we define five social sensitivity based industry
portfolios as follows: in each month, we sort the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries
by θi in descending order. We use the top five industries to form the Top portfolio and use
40 We use 18 months as the estimation window to ensure that we have a longer sample period. Our results
remain quantitatively similar if we use 24 or 36 months as the estimation window.
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the bottom five industries to form the Bottom portfolio. The Top portfolio includes
industries that are most favored by the market during high CSR attention periods, while
the Bottom portfolio includes industries that are least favored by the market during the
same periods. We assign the remaining 38 industries into portfolios 2, 3, and 4, with
approximately 13 industries in each portfolio.41 Portfolio returns are value-weighted by
industry-level market capitalization in the previous month. We update industry sorting
and portfolio construction on a monthly basis.
3.3.4. Characteristics of portfolios sorted by social sensitivity
Table 3.1 reports the characteristics of the five portfolios sorted by the social sensitivity
measure. Panel A reports the mean social sensitivity, size (log market capitalization),
book-to-market ratio, return over the past six months, and the average KLD score. We
calculate portfolio-level KLD score by value weighting industry-level scores using
industry market capitalizations in the previous month.
We find that social sensitivity and past returns increase monotonically from the Bottom
to the Top portfolio while the five portfolios have similar book-to-market ratios. Further,
as the Bottom and Top portfolios contain fewer industries, they are smaller than portfolios
2 to 4.
If our social sensitivity estimates are positively correlated with the level of corporate
goodness, then industries in the Top portfolio are expected to have better CSR rating than
the Bottom portfolio. The average KLD scores reported in Panel A support this conjecture.
We find that the Top portfolio has higher average KLD score than the Bottom portfolio,
which is significant at the 5% level.
Next, we examine the most prevalent industries in the Top and Bottom portfolios,
respectively. Prevalence is measured by the number or percentage of months an industry
is classified into the Top or Bottom portfolio. The existing literature on finance and
economics suggests that investors have preconceptions about industry-level social
attributes. For example, retail-based industries are commonly perceived as socially
responsible. Firms in these industries invest extensively in CSR since good CSR
41 During our sample period, we always have 48 industry portfolios in each month. Portfolio 2 contains 12
industries while portfolios 3 and 4 have 13 industries, respectively.
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reputation could boost consumer demand, generate customer loyalty, support premium
pricing, and assure product quality (e.g., Besley and Ghatak, 2007; Castaldo, Perrini,
Misani, and Tencati, 2009; Elfenbein, Fisman, and Mcmanus, 2012; and Albuquerque,
Durnev, and Koskinen, 2016).
In contrast, industries involving in fossil fuel (i.e., coal, oil, and natural gas) and other
natural resources (e.g., mining, precious metal) are commonly screened by SRI investors
(Geczy, Levin, and Stambaugh, 2005). Further, the USSIF also encourages all types of
investors to divest from these industries to address climate changes risks.42
Panel B of Table 3.1 reports the five most prevalent industries in the Top and Bottom
portfolios, respectively. We find that prevalent industries in the Top and Bottom portfolios
are consistent with investors’ preconception about social attributes. Specifically, retail-
based industries are more prevalent in the Top portfolio while industries with
controversial business operations are more prevalent in the Bottom portfolio. Further,
prevalent industries remain similar when we assign more industries to the Top and Bottom
portfolios, as reported in Panel C of Table 3.1. Overall, these findings suggest that our
return-based social sensitivity estimates are consistent with conventional CSR ratings.
3.4. Empirical results
3.4.1. Univariate sorting results
To investigate whether social attributes affect stock returns, we first examine the
performance of industry portfolios sorted by social sensitivity. Specifically, we examine
the performance of the following portfolios: (i) the Bottom portfolio, which is a value-
weighted portfolio of the five industries with the most negative social sensitivity during
the past 18 months, (ii) the Top portfolio, which is a value-weighted portfolio of the five
industries with the most positive social sensitivity in the past 18 months, (iii) the return
differences between the Top and Bottom portfolios, and (iv-vi) portfolios 2-4, which are
value-weighted portfolios of remaining Fama and French (1997) industries sorted into
terciles based on social sensitivity in the previous 18 months.
42 Source: http://www.ussif.org/climatereinvestment.
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Table 3.2 presents the portfolio performance estimates. In Panel A, we report the raw
and DGTW returns for the full sample period from October 2005 to December 2013. For
robustness, we also report the portfolio return estimates by varying the number of
industries in the Top and Bottom portfolios. Specifically, we use three alternative
specifications to form the Top and Bottom portfolios and the new extreme portfolios
contain three, seven, or ten industries, respectively. Standard errors reported in
parentheses are adjusted for autocorrelation using the method in Newey and West (1987).
We find that portfolio raw returns increase monotonically from the Bottom portfolio
to the Top portfolio. Industries in the Bottom portfolio earn an average raw monthly return
of 0.02%, while industries in the Top portfolio earn an average raw monthly return of
1.58%. The monthly raw return difference between the Top and Bottom portfolios is
1.56% and is significant at the 1% level. Further, the return pattern remains similar when
we use DGTW returns to measure performance. After adjusting for size, book-to-market,
and past performance, we find that industries in the Bottom portfolio earn a significantly
negative return of -0.56%. The DGTW return difference between the Top and Bottom
portfolios is 1.17%, which translates into an economically meaningful annualized return
of 14.01%.
Columns (3) to (8) reports the performance estimates when we vary the number of
industries in the Top and Bottom portfolios. We find that even when we have ten
industries in the two extreme portfolios, the return difference still translates into an
annualized return of 0.613%×12=7.36%, which is both statistically and economically
significant.
Next, we explicitly examine the riskiness of our social sensitivity based industry
portfolios. In Panel B of Table 3.2, we find that the Top and Bottom portfolios have higher
return standard deviations than the remaining portfolios. However, the Sharpe ratio
increases monotonically from the Bottom portfolio to the Top Portfolio. The pattern
remains similar when we vary the number of industries in the extreme portfolios.
In addition, we test whether our social sensitivity measure covers an economically
meaningful segment of the market by examining the market share of the Top and Bottom
portfolios in the CRSP universe. In Panel C of Table 3.2, we report the average monthly
market shares for social sensitivity sorted portfolios. Top-Bottom reports the combined
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market share of the Top and Bottom portfolios. We find that for both raw and DGTW
return measures, the Top-Bottom strategy covers about 15% of the market share in the
CRSP universe. When we use ten portfolios to form the extreme portfolios, the combined
market share of the Top and Bottom portfolios increases to 36%. Therefore, our social
sensitivity based trading strategy covers an economically meaningful segment of the
market.
To further ensure the robustness of our estimation results, Figure 3.4 plots the monthly
DGTW return difference between the Top and Bottom portfolios for the full sample
period. The bar chart shows that Top industries outperform Bottom industries in 60% of
the sample period. In addition, the average monthly outperformance magnitude (i.e.,
3.3%) is larger than the average underperformance magnitude (i.e., -1.9%). Further, we
find that the outperformance of industries in the Top portfolio becomes stronger during
the recent financial crisis. This is expected since firms with good social attributes are less
likely to experience negative outcomes in social and environmental areas such as lawsuits
and negative news related to environment and employee workplace safety. In addition,
investors pay greater attention to corporate behaviour during poor economic conditions
(e.g., Hirshleifer, 2008; Shefrin and Statman, 1993). Therefore, these firms may hold up
better during financial crisis. This pattern is also consistent with the findings in Nofsinger
and Varma (2014), who show that investors have higher demand for CSR during
economic downturns.43 Overall, these findings suggest that social sensitivity is positively
correlated with future stock returns.
3.4.2. Factor model estimates
Our results based on raw and DGTW returns suggest that social sensitivity is positively
correlated with future stock returns. In this section, we use various unconditional and
conditional factor models to control for additional factors and to allow for a time-varying
factor sensitivity. Specifically, our unconditional factor models include different
combinations of the following factors: the market excess return (MKTRF), the size factor
43 Due to the data limitation of Google Trends, this statement is based on a short sample period. However,
arguably speaking, our definition of economic recession is based on the NBER business cycle definition. In
addition, our sample covers months before 2006, a period that is commonly regarded as an economic
expansion. Further, our sample also includes the post 2007 financial crisis period. Therefore, even though
we only have one crisis during our sample periods, our sample also has two economic upturns.
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(SMB), the value factor (HML), the momentum factor (UMD), short-term reversal (STR)
and long-term reversal (LTR) factors, and the liquidity factor (LIQ). The estimation period
is from October 2005 to December 2013.
Table 3.3 reports the unconditional factor model estimation results. We find that our
results remain robust across all specifications. In particular, even after including seven
risk factors, the monthly alpha for the Top and Bottom portfolios are 79 and -91 basis
points, respectively, both significant at the 1% level. The performance difference between
the Top and the Bottom portfolios converts into an annualized risk-adjusted return of
1.704%×12=20.45%.
Next, to ensure our results are not driven by improper adjustment for time-varying
exposures to systematic risks, we use conditional factor models to address portfolio risks.
In particular, we interact factors in unconditional models with macroeconomic variables
to account for the U.S. business cycle.
Specifically, we include the interaction with the following macroeconomic variables:
(i) NBER recession indicator (REC), (ii) the Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) cay measure,
defined as the difference between current consumption and its long-run value based on
assets and income, (iii) the yield on the 90-day T-bill (YLD), (iv) the dividend yield of
the value-weighted CRSP index (DIV), (v) the term spread (TERM), defined as the
difference between the yields of a constant maturity 10-year Treasury bond and a 90-day
T-bill, and (vi) the default spread (DEF), defined as the difference between Moody’s Baa-
rated and Aaa-rated corporate bond yields.
Table 3.4 reports the conditional factor model estimation results. Our focus is the alpha
estimate of a trading strategy that goes long in the Top portfolio and goes short in the
Bottom portfolio. The interaction variable for each conditional factor model is indicated
at the top of each column. We find that the alpha estimates remain economically
significant (1.19% - 1.53%) when we use conditional factor model. These findings show
that our results are robust to accounting for changes in business cycle over time.
3.4.3. Fama-MacBeth regression estimates
In the last sets of our baseline tests, we estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions.
The dependent variable is the monthly value-weighted returns of the 48 Fama and French
(1997) industry portfolios. The main explanatory variable is the lagged social sensitivity
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estimate θi. We also include the following explanatory variables that are commonly used
to predict cross-sectional returns: the factor loadings of the Fama and French (1992) three-
factor model estimated by daily industry returns in the previous month (Beta MKTRF,
Beta SMB, Beta HML), return over the past six months (Lag 6m Return), value weighted
log market capitalization of industry firms in the previous month (Size), and value-
weighted book-to-market ratio of industry firms by using book-to-market-ratio available
in the previous year (book-to-market). The sample period is from October 2005 to
December 2013. We report the time-series averages of monthly cross-sectional regression
coefficients, Standard errors are adjusted using the Newey and West (1987) method.
Table 3.5 reports the results. We find that industries with higher social sensitivity earn
higher returns even after controlling for all commonly used factors in the literature. In
economic terms, a one standard deviation increase in social sensitivity is associated with
an additional return of 0.118×0.446=5% in the following month. Our results show that
social sensitivity of industries is an important factor in explaining the cross-sectional
variation in returns and this effect is different from firm characteristics that are known to
predict cross-sectional returns. This evidence further supports our main hypothesis.
3.4.4. Factor model estimates: stock level
Our results so far are based on industry-level analyses. In this section, we examine
whether the positive relation between social sensitivity and stock returns remains robust
at the stock level. In particular, we focus on all common stocks in the CRSP universe (i.e.,
share code = 10 or 11). In each month, we estimate social sensitivity for each stock and
use these estimates to sort all stocks in descending order. We form the Top (Bottom)
portfolio by value weighting stocks located in the top (bottom) quintile.
Table 3.6 reports the stock-level unconditional factor model estimation results. Since
the social sensitivity estimates at stock level are more volatile than the industry level
estimates, component stocks in stock quintile portfolios are likely to vary a lot. Therefore,
we expect a smaller alpha estimates for stock-level analysis. Consistent with our
expectation, we find that the magnitude for alpha estimates reduced by more than 50%.
Nevertheless, the performance difference between the Top and Bottom portfolios still
translates into an annualized seven-factor adjusted alpha of 0.655×12=7.9%, which is
economically meaningful.
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3.4.5. Institutional trading
Our baseline results demonstrate that perceived social attributes, as measured by social
sensitivity, predict stock returns. In this section, we investigate a potential economic
channel for this return predictability.
Recent literature suggests that with norm constraints, institutional investors are less
likely to hold sin stocks (i.e., publicly traded firms involved in producing alcohol, tobacco,
and gaming, Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009) and stocks with lottery-like characteristics
(Kumar, Page, and Spalt, 2011). In addition, institutional investors are sophisticated and
have better investment skills (e.g., Puckett and Yan, 2011). Therefore, they are likely to
alter their portfolio holdings to include stocks with good perceived social attributes in the
recent period.
We start by examining the return performance of double-sorted portfolios. In
particular, if social attributes generate institutional trading, then the return predictability
patterns are likely to be stronger among firms with high institutional ownership. In
addition, the existing literature also demonstrates that institutions prefer large stocks (e.g.,
Lakonishock, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992; Gompers and Metrick, 2001). Therefore, we
construct portfolios sorted by firm size and social sensitivity, or by institutional ownership
and social sensitivity. We focus on all common stocks in the CRSP universe. In each
month, we classify stocks into large or small size group (high or low institutional
ownership group) if its market capitalization (institutional ownership) is above or below
the median value across all firms in that month. Within each size (institutional ownership)
category, we further partition stocks in to high (low) social sensitivity group if the firm’s
social sensitivity is above (below) the top (bottom) tercile across firms.
Table 3.7 presents the value weighted seven-factor adjusted alpha for the double-sorted
portfolios. Standard errors reported in the parentheses are adjusted for autocorrelation
using the method in Newey and West (1987). Consistent with the view that social
attributes trigger institutional trading, we find that the alpha estimates are stronger among
large firms (Panel A) and firms with high institutional ownership (Panel B).
Next, we directly test whether perceived social attributes generate institutional trading.
In particular, we use the actual transactions of institutional investors during the 2005 to
2010 period. Following Kumar and Lee (2006), we measure the aggregate demand for top
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social sensitivity stocks as the excess buy-sell imbalance (EBSI) defined as the difference
in buy-sell imbalance between top and bottom social sensitivity stocks.44 This measure
captures the changes in net demand for top social sensitivity stocks relative to bottom
social sensitivity stocks. For robustness, we also examine the EBSI between top social
sensitivity stocks and remaining stocks.
Table 3.8 presents the results. Consistent with our expectation, we find that the average
EBSI between top and bottom social sensitivity stocks is 1.3% per month, significant at
the 5% level. This evidence suggests that institutions have 1.3% more net purchases of
top social sensitivity stocks relative to bottom social sensitivity stocks during our sample
period. In addition, we find that the net purchase of top social sensitivity stocks is higher
than that of bottom social sensitivity stocks in 60% of the sample. Similarly, institutions
also have 1.8% net purchase of top social sensitivity stocks relative to all the remaining
stocks, and the net purchase is positive in two-thirds of our sample. Overall, these findings
suggest that institutional investors regularly rebalance their portfolios to include stocks
with good perceived social attributes in the recent period.
3.4.6. Longevity of return predictability
In this section, we study the longevity of the predictive power of our social sensitivity
estimates. In particular, if it is driven by mispricing, then one might expect the perdition
power of our social sensitivity estimates to decline if the gap between social sensitivity
estimation month and portfolio formation month is widened. Since perceived social
attribute is not a permanent characteristic, investors are likely to update their perception
on social attributes when new information draws their attention. For example, investors
immediately adjust their perception about Volkswagen (which was widely regarded as a
pioneer in clean technology) when the diesel emission scandal occurs. In addition, our
institutional trading results also suggest that institutional investors are likely to identify
44 The buy-sell imbalance (BSI) of portfolio p in month t is defined asܤ ܵܫ௣௧ = ଵ଴଴ே೛೟∑ ܤ ܵܫ௜௧ே೛೟௜ୀଵ , where the
BSI for stock i in month t is defined asܤ ܵܫ௜௧ = ∑ (௏஻೔ೕ೟ି ௏ௌ೔ೕ೟)ವ೟ೕసభ
∑ (௏஻೔ೕ೟ା௏ௌ೔ೕ೟)ವ೟ೕసభ . Here, Dt is the number of days in month t.
VBijt (VSijt) is the dollar buying (selling) volume of stock i on day j in month t, and Npt is the number of
traded stocks in portfolio p in month t.
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stocks with good perceived social attributes in the recent past and help to correct the
underpricing of these stocks.
Table 3.9 reports the unconditional seven-factor adjusted alpha of a trading strategy
that goes long in the Top portfolio and goes short in the Bottom portfolio when we vary
the portfolio formation periods. Consistent with the mispricing hypothesis, we find that
the magnitude of seven-factor alpha gradually declines as we increase the formation
period. It is not significantly different from zero beyond three months. This evidence
suggests that institutional investors are likely to correct the underpricing of perceived
social attributes in about 3 months.45
3.4.7. Robustness checks
In this section, we conduct several robustness checks for our baseline results. First,
Table 3.1 shows that past returns increase monotonically with social sensitivity, which
raises the concern that our CSR sensitivity measure merely captures momentum return.
However, results in Table 3.3 suggest that momentum factor does not explain our results.
For further robustness, we use the Carhart (1997) four-factor model to re-estimate
industry-level social sensitivity as follows:
ݎ௜,௧− ݎ௙,௧= ߙ௜+ ߚ௜൫ݎ௠ ௞௧− ݎ௙൯௧+ ܵܯ ܤ௧+ ܪܯܮ௧+ ܷܯܦ௧+ ߠ௜ܦ௦௢௖௜௔௟,௧+ ௜߳,௧.
(3.2)
This alternative social sensitivity measure explicitly accounts for the momentum
return. The long-run abnormal return test results using social sensitivity estimated by
equation (3.2) are reported in Columns 1 to 3 of Table 3.10. We find that the seven-factor
alphas for the Top, Bottom, and the Top-Bottom portfolios are quantitatively similar after
adding the momentum factor. Therefore, this evidence suggests that our return
predictability results are not explained by the momentum factor.
Second, we address the potential look-ahead bias in our social sensitivity estimates. In
our baseline specification, to ensure a longer sample, we use the median of the time-series
as the cutoff point to define Dsocial. For robustness, we use expanding window medians as
an alternative method to define Dsocial. In particular, Dsocial, t equals to 1 if ASVIt-1 is larger
45 This finding also suggests that our return predictability results are not likely to be explained by an
overpricing story since we do not observe price reversal after three months.
71
than the median of all previous observations, or zero otherwise. We use the median of
ASVIs in 2004 to define the first Dsocial in January 2005.
Columns 4 to 6 of Table 3.10 reports the seven-factor alpha results using expanding-
window social sensitivity. We find that our results remain quantitatively similar. Further,
we also define social sensitivity using equation (3.2) and expanding window median
values to account for momentum return and potential look-ahead bias at the same time.
Columns 7 to 9 of Table 3.10 reports the results. We find that the seven-factor alphas
remain unchanged. Overall, evidence in Table 3.10 suggests that the outperformance of
the Top portfolio is not explained by the momentum factor or look-ahead bias.
Third, we also re-estimate conditional factor model and Fama-MacBeth type
regressions using the three alternative social sensitivity definitions. The estimation results
for conditional factor models and Fama-MacBeth type regressions are reported in Table
3.11 and Table 3.12, respectively. Again, the estimation results remain quantitatively
similar.
3.5. Summary and conclusion
Survey evidence suggests that investors are actively updating their beliefs about firm-
level CSR records. Therefore, their recent perception on firm-level social attributes could
affect their investment decisions. In particular, investors are likely to invest more in firms
with good perceived social attributes. In this paper, we propose a novel measure to
identify firms that are likely to be perceived as having good social attributes by the market.
Specifically, we use social sensitivity, defined as the return sensitivity to the aggregate
attention to CSR, to capture perceived social attributes.
We show that social sensitivity is positively correlated with industry- or stock-level
CSR records. Using social sensitivity estimates, we find that returns of market segments
with high social sensitivity are predictable. A trading strategy that goes long in stocks
with good perceived social attributes and goes short in stocks with bad perceived social
attributes generates a monthly DGTW return of 1.17%. Our return predictability evidence
remains robust after controlling for a broad set of factors or observable characteristics.
Further, by investigating institutional trading, we demonstrate that social attributes
trigger institutional demand. Overall, our results suggest that perceived social attributes
affect stock returns. In future work, it would be interesting to examine whether perceived
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social attributes affect mutual fund flows since institutional investors have exhibited a
clear preference for firms with good social attributes.
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of social sensitivity based industry portfolios
This table reports characteristics of portfolios defined by social sensitivity. We focus on 48 Fama
and French (1997) industries. The Top (Bottom) portfolio is a value-weighted portfolio of the five
industries with the most positive (negative) social sensitivity in the past 18 months. Portfolios 2-
4 are value-weighted portfolios of the remaining industries sorted into terciles based on social
sensitivity during the same estimation window. Panel A reports the mean social sensitivity, size
(log market capitalization), book-to-market ratio, six months’ cumulated return with a one-month
lag, and KLD score. KLD score is estimated at stock-level by using the Deng, Kang, and Low
(2013) method and then valued weighted to portfolio-level by using stock-level market
capitalization in the previous month. Panel B (C) reports the five (ten) most prevalent industries
in the Top and Bottom portfolios when five (ten) industries are used to defined the Top and Bottom
portfolios. Prevalence is measured by the number (i.e., N) or percentage (i.e., % months) of months
an industry is included into a given portfolio during the estimation period. The estimation period
is from April 2004 to November 2013. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are adjusted for
auto-correlation using the Newey and West (1987) method. ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Portfolio characteristics
Portfolio Socialsensitivity Size BM
Lag 6m
Return KLD score
1 (Bottom) -3.262 13.885 0.600 2.647 -0.375***
2 -1.088 15.113 0.531 4.101 -0.320***
3 0.342 15.219 0.471 5.917 -0.258***
4 1.548 15.026 0.491 7.400 -0.250***
5 (Top) 3.246 13.182 0.483 7.557 -0.253***
Top - Bottom 0.121**
Panel B: Five prevalent industries in the Top and Bottom portfolios
Industry (Top) N % months Industry (Bottom) N % months
Fabricated Products 61 61.616 Agriculture 56 56.566
Textiles 37 37.374 Precious Metals 38 38.384
Recreation 30 30.303 Mining 33 33.333
Apparel 29 29.293 Coal 33 33.333
Automobiles 26 26.263 Banking 29 29.293
Panel C: Ten prevalent industries in the Top and Bottom portfolios
Industry (Top) N % months Industry (Bottom) N % months
Fabricated Products 80 80.808 Agriculture 74 74.747
Apparel 53 53.535 Construction 48 48.485
Textiles 46 46.465 Precious Metals 48 48.485
Recreation 45 45.455 Defense 45 45.455
Transportation 40 40.404 Medical Equipment 45 45.455
Rubber and Plastic Products 36 36.364 Pharmaceutical Products 44 44.444
Healthcare 35 35.354 Mining 44 44.444
Computers 34 34.343 Banking 42 42.424
Construction Materials 32 32.323 Petroleum and Natural Gas 41 41.414
Personal Services 30 30.303 Other 38 38.384
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Table 3.2: Performance of social sensitivity based industry portfolios
This table reports the performance of the five portfolios sorted by social sensitivity. We focus on 48 Fama and French (1997) industries. The Top
(Bottom) portfolio is a value-weighted portfolio of the five industries with the most positive (negative) social sensitivity in the past 18 months.
Portfolios 2-4 are value-weighted portfolios of the remaining industries sorted into terciles based on social sensitivity during the same estimation
window. Top-Bottom reports the performance difference between the Top and Bottom portfolios. Panel A reports the raw and DGTW returns during
our sample period from October 2005 to December 2013. DGTW returns are calculated using the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997)
method. Columns (1) and (2) reports the raw and DGTW returns when we use five industries to construct the Top and Bottom portfolios. For robustness,
we also vary the number of industries in the Top and Bottom portfolios. In Columns (3) to (8), we report the raw and DGTW returns when we use
three, seven, and ten industries to form the Top and Bottom portfolios. Panel B reports the standard deviation of portfolio excess returns and the Sharpe
ratio. Panel C reports the average monthly market share for the raw and DGTW return portfolios. We also report the total market share covered by the
Top-Bottom trading strategy. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are adjusted for auto-correlation using the Newey and West (1987) method.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Portfolio performance estimates
Baseline 3 industries 7 industries 10 industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Portfolio Raw return DGTW return Raw return DGTW return Raw return DGTW return Raw return DGTW return
1 (Bottom) 0.016 -0.564** 0.294 -0.587 0.268 -0.297* 0.482 -0.203
(0.816) (0.272) (0.856) (0.411) (0.674) (0.169) (0.596) (0.168)
2 0.557 -0.141 0.415 -0.220** 0.496 -0.172 0.452 -0.163
(0.585) (0.094) (0.600) (0.095) (0.586) (0.107) (0.600) (0.106)
3 0.743 -0.076 0.744 -0.073 0.774 -0.079 0.824 -0.059
(0.594) (0.117) (0.583) (0.112) (0.599) (0.122) (0.604) (0.123)
4 1.254** 0.241** 1.306** 0.272** 1.264** 0.267** 1.114** 0.146
(0.540) (0.100) (0.533) (0.110) (0.530) (0.111) (0.553) (0.119)
5 (Top) 1.575*** 0.604** 2.131*** 1.007*** 1.499*** 0.516*** 1.474*** 0.410***
(0.544) (0.238) (0.568) (0.330) (0.562) (0.183) (0.516) (0.135)
Top - Bottom 1.559*** 1.168*** 1.838*** 1.595*** 1.230*** 0.813*** 0.992*** 0.613**
(0.509) (0.443) (0.592) (0.550) (0.350) (0.271) (0.338) (0.252)
N months 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
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Table 3.2 (Cont’d)
Panel B: Portfolio performance characteristics
Baseline 3 industries 7 industries 10 industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Portfolio Std Dev Sharpe ratio Std Dev Sharpe ratio Std Dev Sharpe ratio Std Dev Sharpe ratio
1 (Bottom) 6.270 -0.017 6.618 0.026 5.649 0.026 5.399 0.067
2 5.011 0.087 5.068 0.058 4.975 0.075 4.927 0.067
3 4.793 0.130 4.771 0.130 4.805 0.136 4.842 0.145
4 4.923 0.230 4.908 0.241 4.948 0.231 4.982 0.199
5 (Top) 5.504 0.264 6.008 0.334 5.320 0.259 4.901 0.276
Top - Bottom 4.773 0.327 5.549 0.331 3.760 0.327 3.392 0.292
Panel C: Average monthly portfolio market share
Baseline 3 industries 7 industries 10 industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Portfolio Raw return DGTW return Raw return DGTW return Raw return DGTW return Raw return DGTW return
1 (Bottom) 10.098 9.894 5.669 5.453 14.594 14.470 21.397 21.357
2 28.158 28.415 32.587 32.856 25.996 26.266 21.569 21.887
3 30.520 30.405 32.614 32.376 28.186 27.979 23.649 23.379
4 25.802 25.982 26.272 26.494 22.600 22.797 19.078 19.021
5 (Top) 5.423 5.304 2.858 2.820 8.624 8.488 14.307 14.356
Top - Bottom 15.521 15.198 8.527 8.273 23.218 22.959 35.704 35.713
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Table 3.3: Factor model estimation
This table reports factor model performance estimation of portfolios sorted by social sensitivity. We focus on the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries.
The Top (Bottom) portfolio is a value-weighted portfolio of the five industries with the most positive (negative) social sensitivity in the past 18 months.
Top-Bottom reports the performance difference between the Top and Bottom portfolios. The factor models include the following factors: the market
excess return (MKTRF), the size factor (SMB), the value factor (HML), the momentum factor (UMD), short-term reversal (STR) and long-term
reversal (LTR) factors, and the liquidity factor (LIQ). The sample period is from October 2005 to December 2013. Standard errors (reported in
parentheses) are adjusted for auto-correlation using the Newey and West (1987) method. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Factor Top Bottom Top - Bottom Top Bottom Top - Bottom Top Bottom Top - Bottom
Alpha 0.815*** -0.822** 1.637*** 0.808*** -0.869*** 1.677*** 0.793*** -0.911*** 1.704***
(0.273) (0.329) (0.519) (0.254) (0.323) (0.481) (0.252) (0.311) (0.474)
MKTRF 0.985*** 1.205*** -0.220 0.995*** 1.256*** -0.261 0.989*** 1.241*** -0.252
(0.121) (0.112) (0.220) (0.111) (0.103) (0.190) (0.112) (0.100) (0.191)
SMB 0.101 -0.190 0.291 0.072 -0.064 0.136 0.031 -0.179 0.210
(0.117) (0.214) (0.294) (0.121) (0.222) (0.316) (0.122) (0.197) (0.301)
HML 0.182 -0.089 0.271 0.109 0.128 -0.019 0.152 0.248 -0.097
(0.196) (0.184) (0.317) (0.166) (0.207) (0.283) (0.142) (0.218) (0.315)
UMD -0.002 -0.014 0.013 -0.006 0.004 -0.010 -0.016 -0.025 0.009
(0.077) (0.069) (0.105) (0.078) (0.069) (0.122) (0.076) (0.065) (0.124)
STR -0.047 -0.125 0.078 -0.072 -0.195* 0.123
(0.084) (0.106) (0.138) (0.083) (0.106) (0.146)
LTR 0.122 -0.356* 0.478 0.177 -0.202 0.378
(0.180) (0.200) (0.343) (0.198) (0.180) (0.347)
LIQ 0.084 0.238** -0.154
(0.070) (0.093) (0.127)
Adj R2 0.782 0.732 0.003 0.780 0.747 0.033 0.781 0.764 0.037
N months 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
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Table 3.4: Conditional factor model: Top-Bottom
This table reports conditional factor model performance estimation of portfolios sorted by social sensitivity.
We focus on the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries. The factor models include the following factors:
the market excess return (MKTRF), the size factor (SMB), the value factor (HML), the momentum factor
(UMD), short-term reversal (STR) factor, and long-term reversal (LTR) factor. We interact each factor with
one of the following interaction variables (INT): the recession indicator from the National Bureau of
Economic Research (REC), the Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) cay measure, the dividend yield of the value-
weighted CRSP index (DIV), the yield on the 90-day T-bill (YLD), the term spread (TERM), and the default
spread (DEF). Columns (1) to (6) report the performance difference between the Top and Bottom portfolios.
The interaction variable used in each regression is indicated at the top of each column. The Top (Bottom)
portfolio is a value-weighted portfolio of the five industries with the most positive (negative) social
sensitivity in the past 18 months. The sample period is from October 2005 to December 2013. Standard
errors (reported in parentheses) are adjusted for auto-correlation using the Newey and West (1987) method.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Interaction variable (INT) REC cay DIV YLD TERM DEF
Factor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Alpha 1.366*** 1.190*** 1.483*** 1.528*** 1.480*** 1.381***
(0.488) (0.403) (0.470) (0.527) (0.482) (0.493)
MKTRF -0.125 -0.313** -0.186 -0.245 -0.389 0.273
(0.194) (0.134) (0.429) (0.268) (0.236) (0.337)
SMB -0.118 0.771 -1.251 0.579* -0.438 0.310
(0.401) (0.496) (1.265) (0.307) (0.542) (0.819)
HML -0.188 0.273 -1.880** 0.161 -1.179** -0.409
(0.446) (0.273) (0.816) (0.293) (0.570) (0.765)
UMD 0.190 -0.065 0.632 -0.002 0.341 0.747*
(0.208) (0.275) (0.435) (0.105) (0.450) (0.382)
STR 0.192 0.010 0.955 -0.223 1.615*** 0.181
(0.274) (0.172) (0.659) (0.169) (0.422) (0.481)
LTR 0.519 0.163 1.604* 0.450 -0.252 0.456
(0.408) (0.260) (0.861) (0.323) (0.722) (0.791)
MKTRF×INT -0.507 -0.260** -0.650 -0.048 0.058 -0.472**
(0.395) (0.124) (2.576) (0.080) (0.111) (0.218)
SMB×INT 0.614 0.479 8.351 -0.273** 0.273 -0.334
(0.584) (0.410) (6.229) (0.131) (0.223) (0.527)
HML×INT 0.718 0.278 9.918*** -0.304** 0.463* 0.364
(0.667) (0.243) (3.583) (0.152) (0.238) (0.373)
UMD×INT -0.288 -0.034 -3.232 0.134 -0.112 -0.424**
(0.246) (0.192) (2.019) (0.105) (0.153) (0.197)
STR×INT -0.130 -0.339* -5.359 0.465*** -0.636*** 0.128
(0.347) (0.193) (3.585) (0.133) (0.166) (0.298)
LTR×INT -0.403 0.161 -5.547 -0.108 0.249 0.031
(0.614) (0.257) (3.823) (0.187) (0.255) (0.398)
Adj R2 0.031 0.136 0.059 0.157 0.168 0.038
N months 99 99 99 99 99 99
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Table 3.5: Social sensitivity and expected returns
This table reports estimates from Fama Macbeth (1973) regressions. We focus on returns of value-weighted
Fama and French (1997) 48 industry portfolios. The dependent variable is monthly industry portfolio return.
Regressors include lagged social sensitivity loading, industry-level Fama and French (1992) three-factor
loadings estimated by daily returns over the previous month, cumulated industry return over the past six
months (Lag 6m Return), lagged value-weighted log market capitalization of industry-firms (Size), value-
weighted book-to-market ratio of industry-firms using book-to-market ratio in the previous year (Book-to-
market). We report the time-series averages of monthly cross-sectional regression coefficients. The sample
period is from October 2005 to December 2013. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are adjusted for
auto-correlation using the Newey and West (1987) method. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Factor (1) (2) (3) (4)
Social sensitivity 0.133** 0.126** 0.121*** 0.118**
(0.057) (0.048) (0.044) (0.045)
Beta MKTRF 0.104 -0.463 -0.588 -0.522
(0.533) (0.502) (0.463) (0.477)
Beta SMB -0.266 -0.309 -0.392 -0.373
(0.242) (0.251) (0.267) (0.268)
Beta HML 0.047 -0.017 -0.025 0.028
(0.148) (0.142) (0.146) (0.152)
Lag 6m Return 0.010 0.009 0.009
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Size -0.027 -0.048
(0.086) (0.084)
Book-to-market -0.424
(0.360)
Constant 0.750* 0.875** 1.254 1.580
(0.389) (0.433) (1.038) (0.958)
Average R2 0.294 0.345 0.378 0.395
Observations 4,752 4,752 4,752 4,752
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Table 3.6: Factor model estimation: stock level
This table reports factor model performance estimation of portfolios sorted by social sensitivity. We focus on stock-level social sensitivity by using
all common stocks (share code equals 10 or 11) in the CRSP universe. Stocks are sorted into quintiles based on social sensitivity. The Top (Bottom)
portfolio is a value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the top (bottom) social sensitivity quintile. Top -Bottom reports the performance difference between
the Top and Bottom portfolios. The factor models include the following factors: the market excess return (MKTRF), the size factor (SMB), the value
factor (HML), the momentum factor (UMD), short-term reversal (STR) and long-term reversal (LTR) factors, and the liquidity factor (LIQ). The
sample period is from October 2005 to December 2013. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are adjusted for auto-correlation using the Newey
and West (1987) method. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Factor Top Bottom Top - Bottom Top Bottom Top - Bottom Top Bottom Top - Bottom
Alpha 0.262* -0.328 0.590* 0.273** -0.371 0.644** 0.267** -0.388 0.655**
(0.150) (0.244) (0.326) (0.134) (0.245) (0.303) (0.134) (0.240) (0.297)
MKTRF 1.074*** 1.226*** -0.152 1.062*** 1.272*** -0.210** 1.060*** 1.266*** -0.206**
(0.048) (0.090) (0.130) (0.035) (0.080) (0.102) (0.036) (0.079) (0.103)
SMB 0.285*** 0.110 0.175 0.233** 0.192 0.041 0.216** 0.144 0.072
(0.085) (0.148) (0.202) (0.091) (0.149) (0.209) (0.098) (0.133) (0.196)
HML 0.044 0.036 0.008 -0.055 0.164 -0.219 -0.037 0.215 -0.252
(0.121) (0.127) (0.213) (0.107) (0.129) (0.183) (0.107) (0.134) (0.211)
UMD 0.059* -0.227*** 0.287*** 0.052 -0.216*** 0.268*** 0.047 -0.228*** 0.275***
(0.036) (0.056) (0.075) (0.037) (0.039) (0.057) (0.038) (0.036) (0.056)
STR 0.016 -0.128* 0.145 0.006 -0.158** 0.163
(0.050) (0.069) (0.090) (0.053) (0.071) (0.099)
LTR 0.165* -0.208 0.373** 0.188* -0.143 0.331*
(0.097) (0.131) (0.174) (0.105) (0.120) (0.179)
LIQ 0.036 0.100* -0.064
(0.044) (0.060) (0.087)
Adj R2 0.920 0.895 0.234 0.922 0.902 0.298 0.922 0.903 0.295
N months 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
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Table 3.7: Performance of double-sorted portfolios
This table reports performance estimates of double sorted portfolios defined using social sensitivity and an
additional firm characteristic. We use market capitalization or institutional ownership (IO) as an additional
firm characteristic. Component returns are those of all common stocks (share code=10 or 11) in the CRSP
universe. In each month, stocks are classified into large or small size groups (high or low institutional
ownership group) if its market capitalization (institutional ownership) is above or below the sample median.
In addition, within a given size (institutional ownership) group, a stock is further classified as being in the
high (low) return-based social sensitivity (RBSS) category if its RBSS above (below) the top (bottom)
tercile. We report the alpha estimates using the seven-factor unconditional model. Panel A reports the alpha
estimates of size and social sensitivity sorted portfolios while Panel B reports the alpha estimates of
institutional ownership and social sensitivity sorted portfolios. The sample period is from October 2005 to
December 2013. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are adjusted for auto-correlation using the Newey
and West (1987) method. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Portfolios sorted by size and social sensitivity
Portfolio 1 (Small size) 2 (Large size) Large - Small
1 (Low RBSS) -0.309 -0.286** 0.023
(0.210) (0.127) (0.205)
2 -0.062 0.018 0.080
(0.126) (0.055) (0.137)
3 (High RBSS) -0.084 0.286** 0.370**
(0.136) (0.120) (0.167)
High - Low RBSS 0.225 0.572**
(0.216) (0.230)
Panel B: Portfolios sorted by IO and social sensitivity
Portfolio 1 (Low IO) 2 (High IO) High - Low IO
1 (Low RBSS) -0.462* -0.366** 0.097
(0.249) (0.162) (0.195)
2 0.094 0.026 -0.068
(0.117) (0.047) (0.125)
3 (High RBSS) 0.185 0.238* 0.053
(0.198) (0.131) (0.226)
High - Low RBSS 0.647* 0.604**
(0.356) (0.274)
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Table 3.8: Institutional trading of top social sensitivity stocks
This table reports the excess buy-sell imbalance (EBSI) of top social sensitivity stocks. EBSI is the monthly
difference in buy-sell imbalance between top and bottom social sensitivity stocks (Top-Bottom), or between
top social sensitivity stocks and all the remaining common stocks (share code=10 or 11) in the CRSP
universe (Top-Remaining). Stocks are sorted into quintiles based on social sensitivity. We define top
(bottom) social sensitivity stocks as stocks in the top (bottom) social sensitivity quintile. Remaining stocks
are stocks that are not classified into the top social sensitivity quintile. We also report the percentage of
months when EBSI is positive. The sample period is from October 2005 to December 2013. Standard errors
(reported in parentheses) are adjusted for auto-correlation using the Newey and West (1987) method. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Top-Bottom Top-Remaining
EBSI 1.327** 1.796***
(0.565) (0.497)
% of positive EBSI 60.32% 66.67%
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Table 3.9: Longevity of return predictability
This table reports the effect of varying portfolio formation periods on average monthly seven-factor
adjusted abnormal return to of portfolios sorted by social sensitivity. We focus on the performance
difference between the Top and Bottom portfolios. The Top (Bottom) portfolio is a value-weighted portfolio
of the five industries with the most positive (negative) social sensitivity in the past 18 months. We report
the monthly seven-factor alpha when we positively shift the portfolio formation period by 1-6 months. A
positive shift in portfolio formation period corresponds to delayed formation of the Top and Bottom
portfolios. A shift of zero is equivalent to the baseline portfolio formation procedure and the coefficients
are the same as those reported in Column (9) of Table 3.3. The sample period is from October 2005 to
December 2013. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are adjusted for auto-correlation using the Newey
and West (1987) method. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Baseline Shift 1
month
Shift 2
month
Shift 3
month
Shift 4
month
Shift 5
month
Shift 6
month
Alpha 1.704*** 1.131*** 0.849*** 0.610* 0.093 0.185 0.184
(0.474) (0.404) (0.303) (0.346) (0.384) (0.502) (0.461)
N months 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
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Table 3.10: Factor model estimation: robustness
This table reports factor model performance estimation of industry portfolios sorted by social sensitivity. We estimate social sensitivity in three
alternative ways: (i) in Columns 1 to 3, we estimate social sensitivity by equation (3.2) to account for the Carhart (1997) four factors, (ii) in Columns
4 to 6, we define Dsocial using expanding window medians to address look-ahead bias, and (iii) in Columns 7 to 9, we combine methods use in (i) and
(ii) to account for more factors and look-ahead bias at the same time. We focus on the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries. The Top (Bottom)
portfolio is a value-weighted portfolio of the five industries with the most positive (negative) social sensitivity in the past 18 months. Top-Bottom
reports the performance difference between the Top and Bottom portfolios. The factor models include the following factors: the market excess return
(MKTRF), the size factor (SMB), the value factor (HML), the momentum factor (UMD), short-term reversal (STR) and long-term reversal (LTR)
factors, and the liquidity factor (LIQ). The sample period is from October 2005 to December 2013. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are
adjusted for auto-correlation using the Newey and West (1987) method. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Multi-factor sensitivity Expanding window sensitivity Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Factor Top Bottom Top - Bottom Top Bottom Top - Bottom Top Bottom Top - Bottom
Alpha 0.790*** -0.355 1.145*** 0.683*** -0.979*** 1.662*** 0.994*** -0.399 1.393***
(0.211) (0.254) (0.325) (0.250) (0.344) (0.448) (0.235) (0.317) (0.434)
MKTRF 0.948*** 1.091*** -0.142 1.029*** 1.227*** -0.198 0.903*** 1.118*** -0.215
(0.066) (0.084) (0.115) (0.082) (0.119) (0.157) (0.074) (0.106) (0.161)
SMB 0.175 -0.073 0.248 0.199* -0.411*** 0.610** 0.263** -0.207 0.469**
(0.120) (0.187) (0.257) (0.117) (0.142) (0.235) (0.129) (0.179) (0.229)
HML 0.399*** -0.284 0.683** 0.202 0.131 0.071 0.472*** -0.289 0.760**
(0.133) (0.226) (0.317) (0.154) (0.198) (0.292) (0.142) (0.259) (0.357)
UMD 0.080* 0.020 0.059 -0.036 -0.087 0.051 0.083* -0.007 0.090
(0.045) (0.067) (0.090) (0.062) (0.061) (0.098) (0.046) (0.081) (0.104)
STR -0.203** 0.090 -0.294 0.044 -0.072 0.115 -0.151** 0.253 -0.404**
(0.082) (0.178) (0.202) (0.093) (0.100) (0.143) (0.064) (0.163) (0.185)
LTR -0.128 0.013 -0.140 -0.025 -0.169 0.143 -0.123 -0.221 0.097
(0.101) (0.178) (0.208) (0.128) (0.202) (0.271) (0.112) (0.212) (0.288)
LIQ -0.195*** 0.168* -0.363*** 0.085 0.197** -0.112 -0.203*** 0.140 -0.343**
(0.070) (0.095) (0.123) (0.076) (0.087) (0.119) (0.072) (0.098) (0.132)
Adj R2 0.795 0.732 0.262 0.838 0.808 0.071 0.806 0.749 0.344
N months 99 99 99 90 90 90 90 90 90
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Table 3.11: Conditional factor model estimation: robustness
This table reports conditional factor model performance estimation of portfolios sorted by social
sensitivity. We estimate social sensitivity in three alternative ways: (i) in Columns 1 to 3, we
estimate social sensitivity by equation (3.2) to account for the Carhart (1997) four factors, (ii) in
Columns 4 to 6, we define Dsocial using expanding window medians to address look-ahead bias,
and (iii) in Columns 7 to 9, we combine methods use in (i) and (ii) to account for more factors and
look-ahead bias at the same time. We focus on the 48 Fama and French (1997) industries. The
factor models include the following factors: the market excess return (MKTRF), the size factor
(SMB), the value factor (HML), the momentum factor (UMD), short-term reversal (STR) factor,
and long-term reversal (LTR) factor. We interact each factor with one of the following interaction
variables (INT): the recession indicator from the National Bureau of Economic Research (REC),
the Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) cay measure, the dividend yield of the value-weighted CRSP
index (DIV), the yield on the 90-day T-bill (YLD), the term spread (TERM), and the default
spread (DEF). Columns (1) to (6) report the performance difference between the Top and Bottom
portfolios. The interaction variable used in each regression is indicated at the top of each column.
The Top (Bottom) portfolio is a value-weighted portfolio of the five industries with the most
positive (negative) social sensitivity in the past 18 months. The sample period is from October
2005 to December 2013. Standard errors (reported in parentheses) are adjusted for auto-
correlation using the Newey and West (1987) method. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Multi-factor sensitivity
Interaction variable (INT) REC cay DIV YLD TERM DEF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Alpha 1.041*** 1.097*** 0.988** 1.040*** 1.029*** 1.185***
(0.372) (0.350) (0.430) (0.357) (0.344) (0.380)
Adj R2 0.254 0.349 0.304 0.265 0.253 0.301
N months 99 99 99 99 99 99
Panel B: Expanding window sensitivity
Interaction variable (INT) REC cay DIV YLD TERM DEF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Alpha 1.125** 1.008** 1.504*** 1.609*** 1.602*** 1.165**
(0.462) (0.408) (0.426) (0.434) (0.391) (0.452)
Adj R2 0.111 0.139 0.090 0.148 0.130 0.129
N months 90 90 90 90 90 90
Panel C: Combined
Interaction variable (INT) REC cay DIV YLD TERM DEF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Alpha 0.982*** 0.786** 1.422** 1.346*** 1.255** 1.078**
(0.370) (0.387) (0.543) (0.478) (0.497) (0.482)
Adj R2 0.447 0.471 0.367 0.253 0.291 0.409
N months 90 90 90 90 90 90
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Table 3.12: Social sensitivity and expected returns: robustness
This table reports estimates from Fama Macbeth (1973) regressions. We focus on returns of value-
weighted Fama and French (1997) 48 industry portfolios. The dependent variable is monthly
industry portfolio return. Regressors include lagged social sensitivity loading, industry-level Fama
and French (1992) three-factor loadings estimated by daily returns over the previous month,
cumulated industry return over the past six months (Lag 6m Return), lagged value-weighted log
market capitalization of industry-firms (Size), value-weighted book-to-market ratio of industry-
firms using book-to-market ratio in the previous year (Book-to-market). We estimate social
sensitivity in three alternative ways: (i) in Columns 1 to 3, we estimate social sensitivity by
equation (3.2) to account for the Carhart (1997) four factors, (ii) in Columns 4 to 6, we define
Dsocial using expanding window medians to address look-ahead bias, and (iii) in Columns 7 to 9,
we combine methods use in (i) and (ii) to account for more factors and look-ahead bias at the same
time. We report the time-series averages of monthly cross-sectional regression coefficients. The
sample period is from October 2005 to December 2013. Standard errors (reported in parentheses)
are adjusted for auto-correlation using the Newey and West (1987) method. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Multi-factor
sensitivity
Expanding window
sensitivity
Combined
(1) (2) (3)
Social sensitivity 0.086** 0.131*** 0.072*
(0.040) (0.047) (0.043)
Beta MKTRF -0.539 -0.549 -0.567
(0.480) (0.528) (0.534)
Beta SMB -0.307 -0.459 -0.391
(0.265) (0.289) (0.282)
Beta HML 0.001 0.018 -0.033
(0.152) (0.165) (0.164)
Lag 6m Return 0.009 0.007 0.006
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Size -0.066 -0.068 -0.099
(0.086) (0.088) (0.089)
Book-to-market -0.477 -0.622 -0.643*
(0.355) (0.380) (0.360)
Constant 1.847* 1.893* 2.271**
(0.998) (1.008) (1.030)
Average R2 0.396 0.391 0.393
Observations 4,752 4,320 4,320
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Figure 3.1: Search volume intensity for CSR
This figure plots the time-series search volume intensity (SVI) for the topic “corporate social
responsibility” in the U.S. region from January 2004 to December 2013. Source: Google Trends.
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Figure 3.2: Sample CSR newsletter
This figure reports a sample “corporate social responsibility weekly recap” newsletter from Business Wire. Source: Factiva.
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Figure 3.3: Relation between CSR search volume and CSR news volume
This figure plots the standardized log volume for CSR related news (blue line) and standardized
logsvi for the topic “corporate social responsibility” (red line) during the March 2008 to December
2013 period.
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Figure 3.4: Social sensitivity based industry portfolios: DGTW returns
This figure plots the DGTW returns of the social sensitivity based Top-Bottom portfolio formed
using value-weighted Fama and French (1997) 48 industry portfolios. The sample period is from
October 2005 to December 2013.
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Chapter 4
Socially Sensitive Fund Flows
4.1. Introduction
Early studies on mutual funds suggest that investors chase performance. Cash flows
into and out of mutual funds are strongly correlated with past returns (e.g., Chevalier and
Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998). In addition, Berk and Green (2004) predict that
rational investors are likely to use past fund performance to update their beliefs about fund
managers’ ability to generate excess returns, which also implies a positive relation
between fund flows and past performance.
However, recent studies show that investors also care about mutual fund attributes.
Among others, Kumar, Niessen-Ruenzi, and Spalt (2015) document that investors are
likely to avoid funds managed by individuals with foreign-sounding names even if these
funds do not have inferior return performance. In addition, to pursue social objectives,
mutual fund investors are willing to accept lower risk-adjusted returns (e.g., Renneboog,
Ter Horst, and Zhang, 2008). Further, fund attributes could also influence the flow-return
sensitivity of mutual funds (e.g., Bollen, 2007; Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang, 2011).
Motivated by these studies, in this paper, we investigate whether potential stereotypes
associated with a fund’s social attributes affect the investment decision of mutual fund
investors. Since socially responsible investing (SRI) has become an important criterion to
mutual fund investors, we ask whether investors are more likely to invest in funds that are
perceived to have good social attributes. In addition, we also examine whether perceived
social attributes influence flow-return sensitivity. Our key conjecture is that funds
perceived to have good social attributes attract higher flows even if these funds do not
have superior return performance. In addition, we posit that these funds are likely to be
rewarded more following good performance and punished less following the bad
performance.
We test our conjectures using a novel method to identify the social attributes of each
fund. We are not interested in name-based or social screen-based SRI funds since these
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funds only account for a very small market segment of the U.S. equity fund universe.46
Instead, we want to capture the social attributes perceived by the market. As investors
care about social attributes (e.g., Bollen, 2007; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Benabou and
Tirole, 2010), their perception of fund-level social attributes might affect their investment
choices.
Specifically, we estimate the social sensitivity of each fund with respect to the shifts
in social sentiment on a 24 months rolling basis. We measure the market-level social
sentiment using Google’s search volume intensity (SVI) for the topic corporate social
responsibility (CSR). These social sensitivity estimates capture the perceived social
attributes of each fund. Funds with positive social sensitivity estimates are likely to be
perceived to have good social attributes. This identification strategy is motivated by recent
studies which show that Google search could reveal market-level sentiment (Da,
Engelberg, and Gao, 2015), and return sensitivity could help to identify stocks and
industries that are in line with the market sentiment (Addoum and Kumar, 2016).
The main finding of this paper is that monthly flows are around 0.1 percent higher for
funds in the top (i.e., most positive) social sensitivity quintile. In addition, compared to
equity funds with comparable characteristics, top socially sensitive funds experience 0.19
percentage lower outflows when their recent performance is in the bottom decile of all
mutual funds and 0.46 percentage higher inflows per month when their recent
performance is in the top decile. We observe these flow differences even if top socially
sensitive funds and other funds have similar performance.
In additional, the test results of fund flows during the recent financial crisis also support
the conjecture that perceived social attributes affect fund flows. As investors have stronger
social sentiment during economic downturns, the financial crisis could negatively impact
the cash flows of mutual funds with poor perceived social attributes. We find that funds
in the bottom social sensitivity quintile experience a 0.17% to 0.25% drop in flows relative
to funds with moderate social sensitivity during the recent financial crisis.
Overall, these finding suggest that investors prefer funds with good perceived social
attributes. They invest more money when these funds have good performance and
46 For example, the widely used SRI fund list published by the U.S. Forum for Sustainable and Responsible
Investment (USSIF) only includes about 40 U.S. equity funds.
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withdraw less money when these funds have poor performance. Our evidence is consistent
with the conjecture that the perceived social attributes of mutual funds could be an
important driver of differences in flow patterns.
Taken together, our findings contribute the growing finance literature that examines
investor behavior and financial performance related to socially responsible investing. In
the spirit of Markowitz (1952), early literature on SRI has typically focus on comparing
return performance of SRI and conventional portfolios (e.g., Hamilton, Jo, Statman, 1993;
Statman, 2000; 2005; Bauer, Koedijk, and Otten, 2005; Dwewall, Guenster, Bauer, and
Koedijk, 2005; 2011; and Geczy, Stambaugh, and Levin, 2005). We extend the evidence
from the previous literature by mainly focusing on whether social attributes influence the
investment choices of mutual fund investors. We show that investors are more likely to
invest in funds with good perceived social attributes in the U.S. market.
More recently, Bollen (2007) and Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang (2011) show that
flows of SRI funds are less sensitive to poor past performance. Rather than focusing on
SRI funds, we extend their findings by examining the impact of perceived social attributes
on all U.S. equity funds. We show that funds with good social attributes are not only
punished less following the bad performance but also on average attract more flows even
if these funds do not have superior return performance.
Beyond the literature on SRI, our results also contribute to a broader literature on
mutual funds. Previous studies have shown that fund attributes such as fund names and
manager names could influence the investment decisions of mutual fund investors. For
example, investors are more likely to invest in mutual funds with hot investment style
names (Cooper, Gulen, and Rau, 2006) but less likely to invest in mutual funds that are
managed by individuals with foreign sounding names (Kumar, Niessen-Ruenzi, and Spalt,
2015). We contribute to this literature by relating the investment decision of mutual fund
investors to social attributes.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews related literature and develops
our key hypotheses. Section 4.3 discusses our datasets and methodology. Section 4.4
presents the empirical results, and Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2. Hypothesis development
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Mutual fund literature suggests that investors chase past performance. Cash flows into
and out of mutual funds are strongly correlated with past returns. Among others, Chevalier
and Ellison (1997) find that investors react strongly to risk adjusted returns and fund
managers frequently adjust the risk exposure to ensure the attractiveness of their funds.
In addition, Sirri and Tufano (1998) show that consumers base their investment decisions
on past performance information but do so asymmetrically. They tend to invest
disproportionally more in funds with good performance and are less sensitive to poor past
performance. Further, Lynch and Musto (2003) predict that investors are less sensitive to
poor past performance because funds with poor past performance are likely to discard
strategies that underperform. They show that strategy changes only occur after bad
performance. Collectively, early studies on mutual funds show little evidence that
investors are likely to pay attention to fund attributes that are unrelated to performance.
In contrast, recent studies show that investors’ social objectives could override their
financial objectives (e.g., Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). Specifically, socially responsible
investing (SRI) has become an important attribute for mutual fund investors when
considering new investment opportunities. According to the U.S. Forum for Sustainable
and Responsible Investment (USSIF), mutual funds are one of the fastest growing SRI
segments in the U.S. For example, the total net asset of SRI funds in the U.S. has increased
from $641 billion to $1.93 trillion from 2012 to 2014. SRI is an investment discipline that
focuses on environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) criteria to generate
positive social impact. Therefore, financial performance could be less important for SRI
investors because they derive nonfinancial attributes from their investment.
Consistent with this view, Bollen (2007) shows that the behavior of SRI fund investors
is different from that of conventional funds. As SRI investors derive utility from investing
in stocks that are consistent with their personal values or address social concerns, they are
likely to care less about the financial performance. He shows that SRI investors are more
sensitive to past positive returns. In addition, Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang (2011)
also find similar results using international data.
Despite the fact that SRI funds has accounted for more than 12% of the total net assets
of all mutual funds in the U.S., the existing literature has typically focused on a small
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segment of the mutual fund universe.47 For example, the widely used USSIF list of SRI
funds only contains about 40 equity funds, which accounts for less than 2% of the U.S.
equity fund universe.
To generalize the flow-return sensitivity results documented in the relatively small SRI
fund universe, in this paper, we propose a novel measure to identify fund-level social
attributes for all U.S. equity funds. This identification strategy would allow us to examine
the behavior of SRI investors in a much broader setting. In particular, we assign all U.S.
equity funds to a corresponding quintile based on their return sensitivity to the attention
of corporate social responsibility.
If investors value social attributes, they are likely to find mutual funds that are
perceived to have good social attributes in the recent past attractive. Therefore, these funds
are likely to attract more flows after controlling for other fund characteristics that are
known to explain fund flows. In addition, since these investors care less about financial
performance, funds with good perceived social attributes are likely to be punished less
following poor performance. Meanwhile, compared to funds that are otherwise similar,
funds with good perceived social attributes are likely to be rewarded more following good
performance since investors derive both financial and social utilities from investing in
these funds.
Further, the recent literature suggests that mutual fund investors value social attributes
more during financial crisis. Among others, Nofsinger and Varma (2014) find that SRI
funds outperform conventional funds during financial crisis since SRI funds are less likely
to suffer from litigation costs related to environmental pollution, product quality, and
employee safety. Such litigation costs are more likely to occur among conventional funds
and are more costly during financial crisis. Therefore, we conjecture that mutual fund
investors are likely to avoid funds with poor social attributes during crisis periods.
To summarize, this paper has the follow three testable hypotheses:
H1: Mutual funds in the top perceived social attributes quintile have higher flows
than funds that are otherwise similar.
47 According to the 2015 investment company fact book, the total net asset of all mutual funds in the U.S.
is $15.9 trillion at the end of 2014. Source: https://www.ici.org/pdf/2015_factbook.pdf.
95
H2: Investors are likely to reward mutual funds with good perceived social
attributes more following good performance, but punish these funds less following
poor performance.
H3: Mutual funds with poor perceived social attributes are likely to experience
lower flows during financial crisis.
4.3. Data and method
To test our hypotheses, we collect data from various sources. In this section, we
describe our main data sets and also describe our measure of the social sensitivity of
mutual funds.
4.3.1. Mutual fund data
Our main data source for mutual fund is the CRSP Survivor Bias-Free Mutual Fund
Database. We obtain fund returns, expenses, loads, total net asset (TNA), investment
objectives, and other fund characteristics from this dataset. We combine funds with
different share classes into a single fund using the MFLINKS files from the Wharton
Research Data Services. The main unit of fund analysis is the “wficn” identifier from
MFLINKS. Since CRSP reports each share class as a separate series (i.e., “fundno”), we
aggregate funds with multiple fundnos into a single wficn. Specifically, we calculate fund-
level TNA as the sum of TNAs of its individual share classes and calculate fund age and
objective using the characteristics of the oldest share class. For all other characteristics,
we take the weighted average using the one-month lagged TNAs of individual fundnos as
the weights.
We restrict our sample to U.S. domestic equity mutual funds. We use the investment
objective code provided by CRSP (i.e., crsp_obj_cd) to define our sample and fund
segments, as in Doshi, Elkamhi, and Simutin (2015). In particular, we screen investment
objective codes and fund names to exclude international, balanced, sector, bond, money
market, hedge, and index funds. Following Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001), we exclude
funds with less than $15 million TNA because returns on small funds tend to be biased
upward in the CRSP database. We also remove the first eighteen months of returns on
each fund to mitigate the effect of incubator bias documented by Evans (2010). Finally,
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we exclude funds with missing names in CRSP, as in Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and
Amihud and Goyenko (2013). Our final sample contains 1,858 distinct funds during the
2004 to 2015 period, and our sample also includes all U.S. SRI equity funds.
Following Sirri and Tufano (1998), we define fund flow, the main variable of interest
in our paper, as follows:
ܨ ݋݈ݓ௜,௧ = (ܶܰܣ௜,௧− ܶܰܣ௜,௧ି ଵ) ܶܰܣ௜,௧ି ଵ− ݎ௜,௧⁄ . (4.1)
In particular, Flowi,t denotes money flow of fund i at the end of month t. TNAi,t denotes
fund i’s total net asset at the end of month t and ri,t denotes fund i’s return (net of fees)
in month t, as reported in CRSP. To eliminate the effect of outliers, we winsorize flow
observations by 0.5% at each tail. Our results remain similar if we winsorize fund flows
by 1% at each tail.
4.3.2. Estimating social sensitivity of mutual funds
We estimate the social sensitivity of each mutual fund. The estimation of fund-level
social sensitivity is motivated by the specifications used in Santa-Clara and Valkanov
(2003) and Addoum and Kumar (2016). Specifically, in each month, for each mutual fund,
we regress the excess fund return during the past two years on the market risk premium
and a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) attention indicator. Specifically, we estimate
the following time-series regression:
ݎ௜,௧− ݎ௙,௧ = ߙ௜+ ߚ௜(ݎ௠ ௞௧− ݎ௙)௧+ ߠ௜ܦ௦௢௖௜௔௟,௧+ ௜߳,௧. (4.2)
In this equation, we define the CSR attention indicator variable (Dsocial) using the
search volume intensity (SVI) reported by Google Trends. Specifically, we use the SVI in
the U.S. region for the topic “Corporate Social Responsibility” to measure the overall
CSR attention in the country. We use the log difference between SVIs in the
contemporaneous and previous months to capture shifts in overall CSR attention, as in
Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011, 2015). The CSR attention indicator variable (Dsocial) is
equal to one if the log difference of SVIs in the previous month is above the 75th percentile
of the time-series during the 2004 to 2015 period, or zero otherwise.48
48 We choose this particular model to ensure the consistency with the return sensitivity model used in
Chapter 3 since Chapters 3 and 4 are related research.
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The θi estimate captures the fund-level sensitivity to CSR attention. In particular, a
positive θi suggests that the fund earns higher average returns in months with high CSR
attention relative to its return in months with low CSR attention. In contrast, a negative
θi estimate indicates that the fund has better return performance during months with low
CSR attention. Since investors tend to be net buyers of attention grabbing stocks and such
net purchase could drive up stock prices (Barber and Odean, 2008; Da, Engelberg, and
Gao, 2011), mutual funds with better returns during high attention periods are likely to
hold stocks that are perceived to be socially responsible by investors.
We estimate θi by rolling window regressions to allow the magnitude and direction of
θi to vary over time. Using θi estimates, in each month, we sort mutual funds in descending
order and create funds quintiles. The top social sensitivity quintile includes funds that are
most favored by the market in months with high CSR attention, while bottom social
sensitivity quintile includes funds that are least favored by the market during the same
periods. We re-estimate θi and re-construct mutual fund quintiles on a monthly basis.49
4.3.3. Attributes of social sensitivity sorted mutual funds
Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics of mutual fund quintiles defined by our social
sensitivity estimates. The most striking feature of this table is that flows are 0.2% higher
for funds with top social sensitivity when compared to those of funds with bottom social
sensitivity. However, the higher flows into the top socially sensitive funds cannot be
explained by higher flows into the same segment as the average segment flow is actually
lower for top socially sensitive funds compared to that of funds in the bottom social
sensitivity quintile. While flows are higher for funds with top social sensitivity, there is
no economically or statistically significant difference among other fund characteristics
that are known to explain fund flows, including fund risk, expense ratio, management fee,
fund age, or the load versus no load feature. Overall, results in Table 4.1 show that
investors have a preference for mutual funds with good perceived social attributes in the
recent past.
Figure 4.1 plots the monthly flow difference between funds in the top and bottom
quintiles. Panel A plots the equal-weighted flow difference. We find that funds in the top
49 Our results remain similar if we form social sensitivity based terciles rather than quintiles.
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social sensitivity quintile have higher flows in 65% of the sample period. In addition, the
flow difference is widened in the recent financial crisis period from December 2007 to
June 2009, as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). This
evidence is consistent with the conjecture that investors have higher CSR demand during
the financial crisis which in turn could enlarge the flow difference between funds with
good and bad perceived social attributes. Our results are not sensitive to different
weighting methods as the value-weighted flow difference in Panel B are similar to that in
Panel A. Further, our findings also remain similar when we examine the flow difference
between funds in the top social sensitivity quintile and all the remaining funds in the CRSP
universe. For brevity, we do not report those results.
Table 4.1 also reports the name attributes of the social sensitivity sorted funds. We
examine the proportion of social-style names in the five quintiles relative to the total
number social style names in the CRSP universe. In particular, we screen the following
keywords in mutual fund names: “Calvert”, “Sentinel”, “Pax”, “Sustainable”,
Responsible, “Social”, “Socially responsive”, “Ethical”, “ESG”, “Women”,
“Environmental”, “Water”, “Energy solution”, or “Tobacco free”). In particular, Calvert,
Sentinel, and Pax are mutual fund companies that only have socially responsible funds.
Other keywords are selected by screening through all equity fund names in the CRSP
mutual fund database as well as the names of SRI funds listed by USSIF. We find that the
proportion of social-style names increases monotonically from the bottom (14.45%) to
the top (29.32%) quintiles. This evidence suggests that the perceived social attributes of
mutual funds captured by our social sensitivity measure are consistent with the
conventional measure of SRI funds.
4.4. Empirical results
4.4.1. Fund flow
In this section, we present the first set of our main results. Our main objective is to
examine whether investors’ social sentiment affect flows of mutual funds with different
social sensitivity. Our key conjecture is that fund characteristics, such as social attributes,
are likely to affect investment decisions of mutual fund investors. If investors value CSR
and derive utility from social attributes, then they are likely to skew their investments
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more toward funds in the top social sensitivity quintile, which are perceived as being
socially responsible during the recent period. To test this conjecture, we start by
examining the relation between social sensitivity and mutual fund flows.
Specifically, we estimate flow regressions using the monthly fund flows as the
dependent variable. The main independent variable is the Dtop dummy variable, which
equals to one when a fund is located in the top social sensitivity quintile, or zero otherwise.
Likewise, we also include the Dbottom dummy variable, which indicates whether a fund is
located in the bottom social sensitivity quintile.
Our primary set of control variables includes (i) fund size (the natural logarithm of the
fund’s TNA in million USD in the previous month), (ii) fund risk (the standard deviation
of monthly returns in the past twelve months), (iii) fund age (the natural logarithm of fund
age in years), (iv) segment flow, defined as the growth rate of fund i’s market segment
(i.e., funds with the same CRSP investment objective code) due to flows in month t,
excluding flows in fund i, (v) family flow, defined as the growth rate of fund i’s fund
family due to flows in month t, excluding flows in fund i, and (vi) a loaded fund dummy
variable, which indicates whether a fund has front or rear load. In addition, we also
account for expense ratio, management fee and turnover in previous month and control
for fund returns using performance rank and squared performance rank measures.
Performance rank is defined as the rank of the fund in the previous twelve months relative
to all other funds in the same market segment.50 We estimate the flow regressions as a
panel and include combinations of year, segment, segment × year, and fund family fixed
effects. For robustness, we also estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions. We
cluster standard errors by fund and by date. The specification used is indicated at the top
of each column. FMB refers to Fama MacBeth regression.
Table 4.2 presents the flow regression estimates. Consistent with our conjecture, we
find that the DTop variable is significantly positively correlated with fund flows for all
panel regression specifications. All else equal, fund flows are around 0.095% to 0.131%
higher for funds in the top social sensitivity quintile. In addition, the Fama and MacBeth
regression yields similar results. Compared to the monthly average flow of -0.473%
during our sample period, the magnitude of these estimates are economically meaningful.
50 Our results remain quantitatively similar if we use raw return to account for past performance.
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In contrast, flows of funds in the bottom social sensitivity quintile do not have
significantly lower flows when compared to the middle three quintiles. This finding
suggests that investors do not perceived funds in the bottom quintile and those in the three
middle quintiles to have significantly different social attributes.
In particular, specifications (1) and (3) include year and segment fixed effects. In
addition, after accounting for segment × year fixed effects in specification (5), we find
that even within the same segment and year, funds with top social sensitivity receive more
money flows. This evidence suggests that the higher flows into top social sensitivity funds
are not driven by unobservable differences at the segment level. Further, we also control
for fund family fixed effects in specification (6). We find that the results remain similar,
which suggest that our findings are not explained by the time-invariant unknown
heterogeneity at the fund family level. Collectively, results in Table 4.2 show that
investors have a preference for funds with good social reputation and these funds attract
more flows than funds that are otherwise comparable.
4.4.2. Performance of funds sorted by social sensitivity
Results in Table 4.2 suggest that funds with better social reputation attract more flows.
One potential explanation for the higher flow among top social sensitivity funds could be
that these funds have better performance during our sample period. To rule out this
alternative explanation, we investigate the return performance of our social sensitivity
sorted quintile portfolios. In particular, we examine both value-weighted and equal-
weighted returns of mutual fund portfolios.
Panel A of Table 4.3 reports the raw portfolio return, return standard deviation, and the
Sharpe ratio for the five quintile portfolios sorted by social sensitivity. Columns (1) to (3)
report the equal-weighted results. We find that raw returns are similar among the five
quintile portfolios. The return difference between the top and bottom quintiles is
statistically insignificantly. In addition, the Sharpe ratios are also similar across the five
portfolios. Further, Columns (4) to (6) show that the results remain quantitatively similar
using value-weighted returns. Figure 4.2 plots the monthly raw return difference between
the top and bottom social sensitivity quintiles. Consistent with results in Panel A of Table
4.3, we find that the return difference is evenly distributed around zero.
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Our results so far are based on raw returns. In the next set of tests, we use factor models
to account for risks. In particular, we include the following factors: the market (MKTRF),
size (SMB), and value (HML) factors in Fama and French (1992), the momentum factor
(MOM) in Carhart (1997), the short-term and long-term reversal factors (STR, LTR), and
the liquidity factor (LIQ). We obtain the liquidity factor from Lubos Pastor’s website 51
and obtain other factors from Kenneth French’s website.52 Standard errors are calculated
using the Newey and West (1987) method.
Panel B of Table 4.3 reports the alpha estimates of factor model regressions. We focus
on the difference between the top and bottom quintile portfolios. Consistent with Panel
A, we find that there is no significant performance difference in any of the specifications
considered in Panel B. Further, in unreported tests, we also examine the alpha estimate of
a strategy that goes long in the top quintile and goes short in the remaining four quintiles.
The results remain quantitatively similar.
Collectively, results in Table 4.3 suggest that a more positive fund-level social
sensitivity is not associated with better risk-adjusted return. Therefore, if investors prefer
funds with top social sensitivity, such preference is unlikely to be driven by the difference
in fund performance.
4.4.3. Flow-return sensitivity
In the next set of tests, we examine the flow-return relation among top social sensitivity
funds. In particular, we test a more specific conjecture, which posits that funds with top
social sensitivity are likely to be “rewarded” more after a good performance and
“punished” less after a bad performance. This conjecture is motivated by the existing
literature which suggests that investors with fund attribute preferences react more strongly
to extreme past returns (both positive and negative) than to average past returns (e.g.,
Kumar, Niessen-Ruenzi, and Spalt, 2015) while SRI investors care less about past
performance (e.g., Bollen, 2007; Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang, 2011).
To test this conjecture, we include several interactions in our baseline flow regressions.
Specifically, we interact Dtop and Dbottom with performance rank variables (i.e., PRank and
51 The liquidity factor is the main variable in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and is available at:
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor/research/.
52 Available at: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
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Prank2), respectively. In addition, we also interact performance rank variables with fund
size to account for the differences in the flow-return relation driven by fund size.
The flow-return regression results are reported in Table 4.4. In specifications (1) and
(2), we interact Dtop and Dbottom with PRank to examine the linear flow-return relation. We
find that the interaction term between Dtop and PRank is significantly positive, regardless
of the inclusion of lagged fund flow as an additional control. These results suggest that
compared to other domestic equity funds, funds in the top social sensitivity quintile attract
more cash inflows following the good performance.
In addition, the mutual fund literature suggests that the flow-return relation is likely to
be nonlinear (e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Therefore, we include squared performance
measure PRank2 to capture the nonlinear effect. The results are presented in Column (3)
of Table 4.4. Consistent with our conjecture, we find that the flow-return relation is more
salient for funds with extreme return ranks.
To better illustrate the nonlinearity, Figure 4.3 plots the difference in fund flows
between funds in the top quintile and those in the three middle quintiles, conditional on
performance ranks implied by the estimates in specification (3) of Table 4.4. The figure
displays a U shape. This evidence is consistent with our conjecture that, following the
good performance, investors reward top social sensitivity funds more by investing more
capital, but punish these funds less following bad performance through withdrawing less
capital. In economic terms, the monthly flow difference due to fund-level social
sensitivity is 0.19% for the worst performing funds and 0.46% for the best performing
funds.
Columns (4) to (6) of Table 4.4 present the results for three additional robustness
checks. First, we examine the flow-return relation using Fama and MacBeth (1973)
regression. As implied by the estimates in specification (4), the monthly flow difference
is 0.16% for funds with the worst performance and 0.50% for funds with the best
performance. In specification (5), to ensure that our results are not driven by segment-
level flow dynamics, we replace the segment and year fixed effects with segment × year
fixed effects. Further, in specification (6), we account for fund family fixed effects. Our
results remain quantitatively similar across all the three alternative specifications. Overall,
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evidence in Table 4.4 suggests that investors have a more tolerant attitude toward funds
with top social sensitivity.
4.4.4. Fund flow during financial crisis
Next, we investigate whether business cycles affect the money flows of mutual funds
with different social sensitivity.53 The recent literature suggests that investors have higher
CSR demand during the financial crisis (e.g., Nofsinger and Varma, 2014)). In addition,
negative corporate events attract more attention during the financial crisis (Hirshleifer,
2008). Motivated by the fact that investors are likely to divest from funds with poor social
attributes during economic downturns, we examine whether funds with bottom social
sensitivity are likely to have lower flows during the financial crisis.
Table 4.5 reports the results. The main variables of interest are the interaction term
between Dtop and a financial crisis indicator Dcrisis, as well as the interaction term between
Dbottom and Dcrisis. According to the definition of NBER, Dcrisis is equal to one during the
December 2007 to June 2009 period, or zero otherwise. We use the same set of control
variables as in Table 4.2. Consistent with our conjecture, we find that funds in the bottom
social sensitivity quintile experience significant reductions in flows during the recent
financial crisis. The monthly average flows of these funds reduce by 0.165% to 0.252%,
depending on the specification. As investors pay more attention to negative corporate
events during financial crisis (e.g., Hirshleifer, 2008; Shefrin and Statman, 1993) and the
occurrence of negative corporate events are costlier for these investors during crisis
periods, they are likely to avoid funds in the bottom social sensitivity quintile during
economic downturns to achieve better risk-adjusted returns.
In contrast, Dtop is significantly positive in all specifications while the interaction
variable between Dtop and Dcrisis is statistically insignificant. This is expected since
investors with social norms derive social utility from investing in funds with good social
attributes. Therefore, their investment decisions are less affected by economic conditions.
53 One potential limitation of this empirical analysis is that we have a short sample period. However, our
definition of economic recession is based on the NBER business cycle definition. In addition, our sample
covers months before 2006, a period that is commonly regarded as an economic expansion. Further, our
sample also includes the post 2007 financial crisis period. Therefore, even though we only have one crisis
during our sample periods, our sample also has two economic upturns.
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Overall, our evidence in Table 4.5 is consistent with the view that investors with increased
CSR demand are more likely to avoid funds with poor social attributes.
4.4.5. Robustness checks
In this section, we address the potential look-ahead bias in our baseline specification.
In particular, to ensure a longer sample, we use the 75th percentile of ASVI of the full
sample period to define Dsocial in our baseline regressions, which raises the concern of
potential look-ahead bias in our social sensitivity measure. We address the potential look-
ahead bias using an alternative definition of Dsocial. In particular, we re-define Dsocial using
expanding-window method and re-estimate equation 4.2. Under this alternative measure,
Dsocial equals to one if ASVI in the previous month is above the 75th percentile of all
previous observations, or zero otherwise. For example, we use the 75th percentile of all
ASVI observations in 2004 to define our first Dsocial in January 2005 so that Dsocial only
relies on past information. We re-estimate our flow regressions (i.e., Table 4.2) and flow
return sensitivity regressions (i.e., Table 4.4) using this alternative social sensitivity
estimate.
Table 4.6 reports the flow regression results. We find that even with a shorter sample,
the regression estimates of Dsocial remain quantitatively similar for both panel and Fama
and MacBeth (1973) regressions. Therefore, results in Table 4.6 suggest that the higher
flows into top social sensitivity funds are not explained by look-ahead bias. Mutual funds
attract more flows if they are perceived to have good social attributes in the recent past.
Table 4.7 presents the flow-return sensitivity results using the alternative social
sensitivity estimates. Again, we find that our results are quantitatively similar. As implied
by the estimates using Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression, the monthly flow difference
is 0.19% for the worst performers and 0.46% for the best performers. In addition, panel
regressions also yield similar results. Therefore, results in Table 4.6 also suggest that
investors tend to reward funds with good perceived social attributes more following good
return performance but punish these funds less following poor return performance.
4.5. Summary and Conclusion
This study investigates how perceived social attributes affect mutual fund flows. Using
social sensitivity as a novel measure to proxy for social attributes of all U.S. equity funds,
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we show that investors are more likely to invest in funds with top social sensitivity even
though these funds do not have better return performance. This evidence suggests that
social attributes provide additional utility to mutual fund investors.
In addition, consistent with the flow-return relation documented among SRI funds, we
demonstrate that investors reward top social sensitivity funds more following good
performance and punish these funds less following the bad performance, compared to
funds that are otherwise similar. These results remain robust after accounting for fund-
level characteristics, segment-level flow dynamics, and fund family fixed effects. Taken
together, our findings show that besides financial performance, mutual fund investors also
care about social attributes of mutual funds. In addition, their preference for funds with
good perceived social attributes becomes stronger during periods with the high social
sentiment.
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Table 4.1: Social sensitivity and fund characteristics
This table reports the monthly mean fund characteristics sorted by our social sensitivity estimates
θi, with Column (1) (Column (5)) reports the characteristics of funds in the bottom (top) social
sensitivity quintile. The θi estimate captures the return sensitivity of each fund to overall CSR
attention in the U.S. Social sensitivity reports the mean of θi estimates. Fund flow is the net change
in fund asset beyond asset appreciation in the current month defined as (TNAi,t –TNAi,t-1)/TNAi,t-1
– ri,t, where TNAi,t denotes fund i’s total net asset in month t, and ri,t denotes fund i’s return in
month t as reported in CRSP. PRank is the performance rank of the fund in the previous twelve
months relative to all other funds with the same CRSP investment objective code, scaled to lie
between zero (worst performance) and one (best performance). Fund size is the natural logarithm
of the fund’s size in million USD in the previous month. Fund risk is the standard deviation of
monthly returns in the previous twelve months. Expense ratio, management fee, and turnover are
fund i’s expense ratio, management fee, and turnover rate in the previous month. Fund age is the
natural logarithm of fund age in years in month t. Segment flow is the growth rate of fund i’s
market segment (i.e., funds with the same CRSP investment objective code) due to flows in month
t, excluding flows in fund i. Family flow is the growth rate of fund i’s fund family due to flows in
month t, excluding flows in fund i. Loaded fund is a dummy variable that equals to one when the
fund has front load or rear load, or zero otherwise. No. of funds reports the monthly average
number of funds in each quintile. We also report the name attributes of quintile funds. Social
indicates the percentage of social-style names in a quintile relative to all social-style names in the
sample while social-style names contain at least one of the following keywords: “Calvert”,
“Sentinel”, “Pax”, “Sustainable”, “Responsible”, “Social”, “Socially responsive”, “Ethical”,
“ESG”, “Women”, “Environment”, “Water”, “Energy solution”, or “Tobacco free”. The sample
period is from April 2006 to December 2015.
Variable Bottom 2 3 4 Top
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fund attributes
Social sensitivity -1.055 -0.450 -0.085 0.287 0.855
Fund flow -0.580 -0.465 -0.481 -0.462 -0.375
PRank 0.469 0.495 0.501 0.513 0.522
PRank2 0.314 0.324 0.330 0.344 0.360
Fund size 6.057 6.087 6.095 6.025 5.928
Fund risk 4.697 4.439 4.377 4.436 4.602
Expense ratio 0.096 0.092 0.092 0.094 0.098
Management fee 0.060 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.058
Turnover 6.035 6.153 6.172 6.636 6.853
Fund age 2.548 2.550 2.577 2.600 2.597
Segment flow -0.188 -0.185 -0.232 -0.272 -0.339
Family flow -0.389 -0.350 -0.295 -0.307 -0.316
Loaded fund 0.709 0.702 0.705 0.701 0.713
No. of funds 251 252 252 252 251
Fund name
Social 14.452 15.851 16.534 23.839 29.324
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Table 4.2: Flow regression estimates
This table shows the estimates of percentage fund flows regressed on the top and bottom social
sensitivity dummy variables Dtop and Dbottom and various control variables. Fund flow is the net
change in fund asset beyond asset appreciation in the current month defined as (TNAi,t –TNAi,t-
1)/TNAi,t-1 – ri,t, where TNAi,t denotes fund i’s total net asset in month t, and ri,t denotes fund i’s
return in month t as reported in CRSP. Dtop (Dbottom) is equal to one if a fund has the most positive
(negative) return sensitivity to CSR attention during the past two years, or zero otherwise. All
control variables, except for segment and family flows are lagged by one month and have been
defined in Table 4.1. Specification (4) applies Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimation method with
Newey and West (1987) standard errors. All other specifications use pooled OLS regressions with
standard error clustered by fund and by date. Specifications (1) to (3) include segment and year
fixed effects while specification (6) also includes fund family fixed effects. In specification (5),
we include segment × year fixed effects to account for segment-level flow dynamics. The sample
period is from April 2006 to December 2015. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS FMB OLS OLS
Dtop 0.131*** 0.103*** 0.095** 0.117*** 0.110*** 0.106***
(0.050) (0.037) (0.037) (0.028) (0.039) (0.038)
Dbottom -0.007 0.004 -0.013 0.018 -0.023 -0.015
(0.050) (0.036) (0.037) (0.032) (0.038) (0.037)
PRank 2.913*** 2.109*** 1.003*** 0.923*** 0.998*** 0.950***
(0.110) (0.078) (0.217) (0.176) (0.218) (0.213)
PRank2 1.107*** 1.012*** 1.114*** 1.193***
(0.217) (0.169) (0.218) (0.214)
Fund size 0.096*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.053*** 0.041*** 0.009
(0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015)
Fund risk -0.097*** -0.071*** -0.076*** -0.158*** -0.079*** -0.060***
(0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.024) (0.019) (0.020)
Expense ratio -1.887* -1.675** -1.897*** -0.168 -1.902*** -4.444***
(0.969) (0.741) (0.734) (0.626) (0.737) (0.889)
Management fee -0.359*** -0.248*** -0.253*** -2.790*** -0.252*** -0.250***
(0.127) (0.090) (0.090) (0.609) (0.094) (0.085)
Turnover -0.003 -0.003 -0.003* -0.005* -0.003* -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Fund age -0.563*** -0.364*** -0.365*** -0.312*** -0.370*** -0.393***
(0.054) (0.038) (0.038) (0.023) (0.038) (0.044)
Segment flow 0.418*** 0.355*** 0.356*** -31.269*** 0.308*** 0.376***
(0.047) (0.042) (0.042) (1.195) (0.044) (0.043)
Family flow 0.239*** 0.212*** 0.212*** 0.176*** 0.213*** 0.181***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
Load 0.074 0.065 0.067 0.025 0.066 0.205***
(0.061) (0.044) (0.044) (0.024) (0.044) (0.067)
Lagged fund flow 0.291*** 0.291*** 0.266*** 0.289*** 0.278***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Segment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Segment × year
FE No No No No Yes No
Fund family FE No No No No No Yes
Adj/ave. R2 0.080 0.159 0.159 0.240 0.160 0.166
Observations 145,762 145,762 145,762 145,762 145,762 145,762
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Table 4.3: Performance of funds sorted by social sensitivity estimates
This table presents the fund performance estimates. In Panel A, we report equal-weighted and value-weighted raw return (in percentage) of mutual
fund quintiles sorted by social sensitivity, the standard deviation of raw return (Std. Dev), and the Sharpe ratio. In Panel B, we regress the monthly
difference in the returns between top and bottom social sensitivity quintile portfolios on the market, SMB, HML, UMD, STR, LTR and LIQ factors.
Standard error (reported in parentheses) are adjusted for auto-correlation using the Newey and West (1987) method. ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Raw returns of mutual funds sorted by social sensitivity
Equal-weighted (Columns 1-3) Value-weighted (Columns 4-6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quintile Return Std. Dev Sharpe ratio Return Std. Dev Sharpe ratio
Bottom 0.536 5.072 0.089 0.568 5.019 0.096
(0.536) (0.536)
2 0.596 4.823 0.106 0.653 4.785 0.118
(0.506) (0.506)
3 0.595 4.697 0.108 0.623 4.570 0.117
(0.492) (0.484)
4 0.610 4.673 0.112 0.648 4.603 0.122
(0.484) (0.483)
Top 0.588 4.689 0.107 0.596 4.642 0.110
(0.489) (0.492)
5 - 1 0.052 1.286 -0.027 0.028 1.349 -0.043
(0.123) (0.126)
N months 107
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Table 4.3 (Cont’d)
Panel B: Factor model estimates: Top – bottom
Equal-weighted (Columns 1 – 4) Value-weighted (Columns 5 – 8)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CAPM 3-Factor 4-Factor 7-Factor CAPM 3-Factor 4-Factor 7-Factor
Alpha 0.099 0.050 0.046 0.029 0.078 0.017 0.011 0.000
(0.115) (0.120) (0.119) (0.121) (0.116) (0.117) (0.113) (0.113)
MKTRF -0.080*** -0.021 -0.014 -0.009 -0.085*** -0.014 -0.002 -0.003
(0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.034) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.033)
SMB -0.171** -0.172** -0.187** -0.192*** -0.193*** -0.198***
(0.082) (0.082) (0.087) (0.070) (0.070) (0.074)
HML -0.159*** -0.140** -0.102 -0.205*** -0.175*** -0.121
(0.048) (0.054) (0.070) (0.048) (0.053) (0.075)
MOM 0.026 0.022 0.042 0.040
(0.027) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030)
STR -0.022 0.006
(0.039) (0.039)
LTR 0.001 -0.045
(0.057) (0.059)
LIQ 0.050** 0.038
(0.024) (0.023)
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117
Adj.R2 0.071 0.231 0.232 0.233 0.072 0.289 0.302 0.303
110
Table 4.4: Flow-return relation of top and bottom socially sensitive funds
This table reports the estimates of percentage fund flows regressed on the top and bottom social
sensitivity dummy variables Dtop and Dbottom interacted with lagged performance measures. We
use the same specifications as in Table 4.2 and add interactions terms of Dtop and Dbottom with
performance variables. Fund flow is the net change in fund asset beyond asset appreciation in the
current month defined as (TNAi,t –TNAi,t-1)/TNAi,t-1 – ri,t, where TNAi,t denotes fund i’s total net
asset in month t, and ri,t denotes fund i’s return in month t as reported in CRSP. Dtop (Dbottom) is
equal to one if a fund has the most positive (negative) return sensitivity to CSR attention during
the past two years, or zero otherwise. All control variables, except for segment and family flows
are lagged by one month and have been defined in Table 4.1. Specification (4) applies Fama and
MacBeth (1973) estimation method with Newey and West (1987) standard errors. All other
specifications use pooled OLS regressions with standard error clustered by fund and by date.
Specifications (1) to (3) include segment and year fixed effects while specification (6) also
includes fund family fixed effects. In specification (5), we include segment × year fixed effects to
account for segment-level flow dynamics. The sample period is from April 2006 to December
2015. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS FMB OLS OLS
Dtop -0.098 -0.057 0.185* 0.163* 0.195** 0.163*
(0.092) (0.069) (0.095) (0.084) (0.097) (0.097)
Dbottom -0.119 -0.075 -0.077 -0.034 -0.080 -0.072
(0.078) (0.058) (0.082) (0.079) (0.082) (0.080)
Dtop × PRank 0.444** 0.311** -1.148*** -1.028*** -1.105** -0.987**
(0.174) (0.130) (0.443) (0.388) (0.442) (0.443)
Dbottom × PRank 0.231 0.162 0.039 0.110 0.033 0.025
(0.159) (0.122) (0.404) (0.376) (0.409) (0.405)
Dtop × PRank2 1.422*** 1.360*** 1.371*** 1.284***
(0.450) (0.387) (0.449) (0.447)
Dbottom × PRank2 0.155 0.002 0.144 0.149
(0.432) (0.375) (0.436) (0.437)
PRank2 2.504*** 2.655*** 2.536*** 2.452***
(0.771) (0.607) (0.778) (0.762)
PRank 3.380*** 2.508*** 0.104 1.094* 0.072 0.234
(0.303) (0.222) (0.773) (0.628) (0.778) (0.765)
Fund size 0.146*** 0.080*** 0.042* 0.165*** 0.043* 0.020
(0.026) (0.019) (0.025) (0.021) (0.025) (0.027)
PRank × fund
size -0.102** -0.083** 0.181 -0.029 0.185* 0.146
(0.044) (0.032) (0.111) (0.087) (0.112) (0.112)
PRank2 × fund
size -0.280** -0.293*** -0.283** -0.252**
(0.111) (0.084) (0.112) (0.112)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Segment FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Segment × year
FE No No No No Yes No
Fund family FE No No No No No Yes
Adj/ave. R2 0.080 0.159 0.159 0.248 0.160 0.166
Observations 145,762 145,762 145,762 145,762 145,762 145,762
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Table 4.5: Flow regression estimates: financial crisis
This table shows the estimates of fund flow regressions around the 2007 financial crisis. The
financial crisis dummy variable Dcrisis is equal to one during the December 2007 to June 2009
period. The dependent variable and other independent variables are the same as in Table 4.2. All
specifications use pooled OLS regressions with standard error (reported in parentheses) clustered
by fund and by date. Specifications (1) to (3) include segment and year fixed effects while
specification (5) also includes fund family fixed effects. In specification (4), we include segment
× year fixed effects to account for segment-level flow dynamics. The sample period is from April
2006 to December 2015. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dtop 0.112** 0.095** 0.088** 0.098** 0.103**
(0.055) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.042)
Dbottom 0.036 0.032 0.018 0.011 0.015
(0.054) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040)
Dtop × Dcrisis 0.107 0.051 0.039 0.067 0.020
(0.103) (0.080) (0.080) (0.086) (0.081)
Dbottom × Dcrisis -0.252** -0.165** -0.180** -0.189** -0.171**
(0.108) (0.084) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085)
Dcrisis -0.018 0.033 0.038 0.021 0.028
(0.125) (0.122) (0.123) (0.131) (0.122)
PRank 2.902*** 2.102*** 0.989*** 0.984*** 0.937***
(0.109) (0.078) (0.217) (0.217) (0.213)
PRank2 1.113*** 1.120*** 1.200***
(0.217) (0.218) (0.213)
Fund size 0.095*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.009
(0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
Fund risk -0.096*** -0.070*** -0.075*** -0.079*** -0.060***
(0.024) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Expense ratio -1.884* -1.670** -1.892*** -1.896** -4.425***
(0.970) (0.741) (0.734) (0.737) (0.889)
Management fee -0.360*** -0.248*** -0.252*** -0.252*** -0.250***
(0.128) (0.091) (0.091) (0.095) (0.085)
Turnover -0.003 -0.003 -0.003* -0.003* -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Fund age -0.563*** -0.365*** -0.365*** -0.370*** -0.394***
(0.054) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.044)
Segment flow 0.417*** 0.355*** 0.356*** 0.308*** 0.375***
(0.047) (0.041) (0.042) (0.044) (0.043)
Family flow 0.238*** 0.212*** 0.212*** 0.213*** 0.181***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Load 0.074 0.065 0.068 0.067 0.206***
(0.060) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.067)
Lagged fund flow 0.291*** 0.291*** 0.289*** 0.278***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Segment FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Segment × year
FE No No No Yes No
Fund family FE No No No No Yes
Adj. R2 0.080 0.159 0.159 0.160 0.166
Observations 145,762 145,762 145,762 145,762 145,762
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Table 4.6: Flow regression estimates: alternative specification
This table reports the estimates of percentage fund flows regressed on the top and bottom social
sensitivity dummy variables Dtop and Dbottom and various control variables. We focus on the last
four specifications in Table 4.2 and use an alternative definition for social sensitivity to address
look ahead bias. Specifically, we use the expanding-window median to re-define Dsocial and re-
estimate social sensitivity for each fund. Fund flow is the net change in fund asset beyond asset
appreciation in the current month defined as (TNAi,t –TNAi,t-1)/TNAi,t-1 – ri,t, where TNAi,t denotes
fund i’s total net asset in month t, and ri,t denotes fund i’s return in month t as reported in CRSP.
Dtop (Dbottom) is equal to one if a fund has the most positive (negative) return sensitivity to CSR
attention during the past two years, or zero otherwise. All control variables, except for segment
and family flows are lagged by one month and have been defined in Table 4.1. Specification (2)
applies Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimation method with Newey and West (1987) standard
errors. All other specifications use pooled OLS regressions with standard error clustered by fund
and by date. Specification (1) includes segment and year fixed effects while specification (4) also
includes fund family fixed effects. In specification (3), we include segment × year fixed effects to
account for segment-level flow dynamics. The sample period is from January 2007 to December
2015. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FMB OLS OLS
Dtop 0.075* 0.113*** 0.100** 0.087**
(0.039) (0.030) (0.041) (0.040)
Dbottom -0.045 -0.008 -0.065 -0.033
(0.038) (0.031) (0.040) (0.039)
PRank 1.040*** 0.927*** 1.032*** 1.007***
(0.227) (0.184) (0.228) (0.224)
PRank2 1.052*** 1.007*** 1.060*** 1.122***
(0.224) (0.177) (0.225) (0.221)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes No No Yes
Segment FE Yes Yes No Yes
Segment × year
FE No No Yes No
Fund family FE No No No Yes
Adj/ave. R2 0.157 0.240 0.158 0.165
Observations 133,928 133,928 133,928 133,928
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Table 4.7: Flow-return relation: alternative specification
This table reports the estimates of percentage fund flows regressed on the top and bottom social
sensitivity dummy variables Dtop and Dbottom interacted with lagged performance measures. We
focus on the last four specifications in Table 4.5 and use an alternative definition for social
sensitivity to address look ahead bias. Specifically, we use the expanding-window median to re-
define Dsocial and re-estimate social sensitivity for each fund. Fund flow is the net change in fund
asset beyond asset appreciation in the current month defined as (TNAi,t –TNAi,t-1)/TNAi,t-1 – ri,t,
where TNAi,t denotes fund i’s total net asset in month t, and ri,t denotes fund i’s return in month t
as reported in CRSP. Dtop (Dbottom) is equal to one if a fund has the most positive (negative) return
sensitivity to CSR attention during the past two years, or zero otherwise. All control variables,
except for segment and family flows are lagged by one month and have been defined in Table 4.1.
Specification (2) applies Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimation method with Newey and West
(1987) standard errors. All other specifications use pooled OLS regressions with standard error
clustered by fund and by date. Specification (1) includes segment and year fixed effects while
specification (4) also includes fund family fixed effects. In specification (3), we include segment
× year fixed effects to account for segment-level flow dynamics. The sample period is from
January 2007 to December 2015. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FMB OLS OLS
Dtop 0.243** 0.185** 0.264*** 0.235**
(0.097) (0.086) (0.099) (0.100)
Dbottom -0.038 0.001 -0.044 -0.017
(0.090) (0.086) (0.090) (0.090)
Dtop × PRank -1.364*** -1.117*** -1.321*** -1.267***
(0.440) (0.372) (0.437) (0.439)
Dbottom × PRank -0.234 -0.055 -0.265 -0.262
(0.440) (0.414) (0.443) (0.446)
Dtop × PRank2 1.516*** 1.395*** 1.463*** 1.434***
(0.439) (0.359) (0.436) (0.434)
Dbottom × PRank2 0.340 0.006 0.344 0.354
(0.477) (0.415) (0.479) (0.486)
PRank2 2.358*** 2.499*** 2.386*** 2.265***
(0.801) (0.622) (0.808) (0.794)
PRank 0.295 1.276* 0.269 0.469
(0.800) (0.655) (0.804) (0.792)
Fund size 0.043 0.165*** 0.045* 0.017
(0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.029)
PRank × fund size 0.174 -0.042 0.177 0.137
(0.116) (0.091) (0.116) (0.117)
PRank2 × fund size -0.276** -0.278*** -0.278** -0.246**
(0.116) (0.087) (0.117) (0.118)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes No No Yes
Segment FE Yes Yes No Yes
Segment × year
FE No No Yes No
Fund family FE No No No Yes
Adj/ave. R2 0.157 0.247 0.158 0.165
Observations 133928 133928 133928 133928
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Figure 4.1: Monthly flow difference between top and bottom socially sensitive
funds
This figure shows the monthly average flow difference between the top and bottom socially
sensitive funds. Fund flow is calculated as: Fund flowt = (TNAt – TNAt-1)/TNAt-1 – rt. Top (bottom)
socially sensitive funds are funds in the top (bottom) social sensitivity quintile. Panel A plots the
equal-weighted flow difference and Panel B plots the value-weighted flow difference,
respectively.
Panel A: Equal-weighted monthly flow difference
Panel B: Value weighted monthly flow difference
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Figure 4.2: Monthly return difference between top and bottom socially sensitive
funds
This figure shows the monthly average raw return difference between the top and bottom socially
sensitive funds. Top (bottom) socially sensitive funds are funds in the top (bottom) social
sensitivity quintile. Panel A plots the equal-weighted return difference and Panel B plots the value-
weighted return difference, respectively.
Panel A: Equal-weighted monthly return difference
Panel B: Value-weighted monthly return difference
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Figure 4.3: Differences in fund flow conditional on performance: Top funds
This figure shows the predicted difference (in percentage points) in fund flow conditional on fund
performance in the past twelve months between funds with top social sensitivity and those in the
three middle social sensitivity quintiles. The graph is based on specification (3) in Table 4.4. The
positive values indicate higher flows into top socially sensitive funds.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis comprises three essays that investigate the impact of investor attention on
financial market outcomes. Chapter 2 investigates how changes in overall attitudes toward
gambling affect financial market outcomes. Using a novel measure of gambling sentiment
based on lottery-related Internet search volume, we show that the time-variation in
gambling attitudes predicts the returns of lottery-like stocks. Further, using attention-
grabbing lottery jackpots as exogenous shocks to gambling sentiment, we show that our
results do not reflect potential reverse causality. We find that large lottery jackpots not
only increase people’s participation in lotteries, but also enhance investors’ propensity to
purchase stocks with lottery-like characteristics. Analyzing trades of retail investors from
a major U.S. discount brokerage firm, we also show directly that investors increase
aggregate demand for lottery-like stocks around large jackpots and large drawings.
The time-variation in gambling attitudes also affects corporate financial decisions.
Specifically, firms with high nominal share prices are more likely to split their shares
when investors’ gambling sentiment becomes stronger. Stronger gambling sentiment is
also associated with higher first-day returns of initial public offerings. Collectively, these
results suggest that shifts in overall gambling attitudes have spillover effects on financial
markets.
These findings contribute to the growing finance literature that examines the role of
gambling in financial markets. Our paper adds a new dimension to this literature by
demonstrating that time-variation in gambling attitudes generates short-term mispricing
and also affect corporate decisions. Our results also relate to the public economics. Since
state lottery is an important source for public funding, practitioners could study the
behavior of lottery players using our Google measure and develop their games
accordingly to increase lottery sales.
In Chapter 3, we propose a novel measure to identify firms that are likely to be
perceived as having good social attributes by the market. Specifically, we use social
sensitivity, defined as the return sensitivity to the aggregate attention to CSR, to capture
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perceived social attributes. We show that social sensitivity is positively correlated with
industry- or stock-level CSR records. Using social sensitivity estimates, we find that
returns of market segments with high social sensitivity are predictable. A trading strategy
that goes long in stocks with good perceived social attributes and goes short in stocks with
bad perceived social attributes generates a monthly DGTW return of 1.17%. Our results
have great implication for practitioners since we identify a profitable socially responsible
investing strategy that could be easily implemented.
Relatedly, using social sensitivity as a novel measure to proxy for social attributes of
all U.S. equity funds, in Chapter 4, we show that investors are more likely to invest in
funds with top social sensitivity even though these funds do not have better return
performance. This evidence suggests that social attributes provide additional utility to
mutual fund investors.
In addition, consistent with the flow-return relation documented among SRI funds, we
demonstrate that investors reward top social sensitivity funds more following good
performance and punish these funds less following the bad performance, compared to
funds that are otherwise similar. These results remain robust after accounting for fund-
level characteristics, segment-level flow dynamics, and fund family fixed effects. Our
social sensitivity identification strategy could also be implemented by practitioners to
identify non-SRI funds that are likely to be favored by SRI investors.
Taken together, this thesis shows that investor attention reveals market level sentiment
and affects investment choices of both retail and institutional investors. Their trading
activity could in turn impact stock prices and corporate decisions.
In future work, it could be interesting to investigate whether investors react differently
to firms with different perceived social attributes when the earnings of these firms miss
the analyst forecasts. In particular, I conjecture that firms with poor perceived social
attributes would have more negative price reaction when their earnings miss analyst
forecasts. In addition, another potential project is to examine whether corporate social
responsibility engagements are more likely to happen following major CSR related
disasters (e.g., BP oil spill) and how do these events affect the success rate of engagements
and the return performance around announcement dates.
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